Ownership, control and firm performance in Europe by Tong, Guanqun
Loughborough University
Institutional Repository
Ownership, control and ﬁrm
performance in Europe
This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository
by the/an author.
Additional Information:
• A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.
Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7003
Publisher: c© Guanqun Tong
Please cite the published version.
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
 Ownership, CotladFmPfc iEu
 
By 
Guanqun Tong 
 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
of  
Loughborough University 
 
November 2010 
© by Guanqun Tong 2010  
 2
Abstract 
This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern corporations: 
separation of ownership and control.  Ownership concentration has been one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management.  
Existing literature is mainly concerned with the impact of managerial ownership on firm 
performance.  Little evidence is provided on the impact of general ownership concentration, 
including multiple large shareholders, on firm performance.  This study aims to examine the 
efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, and to explore 
relevant policy implications to improve firm performance. 
Based on the company ownership data across a sample of 1291 European companies in the 
year of 2004, this study shows that European companies’ ownership are highly concentrated 
with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company.  Industrial 
companies hold direct controls of European non-subsidiary companies, while private 
shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners.  On average, there is more than one large 
shareholder who owns more than 10% of the shares in a European company. 
A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship between 
ownership, control and firm performance.  A significant non-linear impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance with multiple turning points is confirmed.  Specifically, 
Tobin’s Q is highest when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion 
of shareholdings other than the largest one, reaches a value of 0.08.  The largest 
shareholding of 10% might also be able to deliver relatively strong performance.  
Restructuring owner identities could be another efficient governance approach.  Direct 
control from founder owners, ultimate control from insurance companies, and management 
ownership are beneficial for firm performance, while government, financial institutions 
except insurance companies and ultimate control of non-financial corporate owners are found 
to be detrimental for firm performance.  Firm performance can also be improved by 
strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition’s power.  The impacts of 
ownership and control on firm performance are found conditioned by country and industry.  
Therefore policies should be adjusted according to the companies’ institutional environments.   
Although the endogeneity of ownership concentration and current firm performance is 
rejected in this study, past firm performance seems to affect current ownership concentration 
level.  Higher accounting rates of return four years ago could result in lower current 
ownership concentration, while higher last year’s Tobin’s Q could result in higher current 
ownership concentration.  Capital structure is found to be a significant substitute mechanism 
for ownership.  These elements should be taken into account when the ownership 
governance mechanism is implemented. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, G34 
Keywords: Corporate ownership; Corporate control; Ownership structure; Firm performance; 
Corporate governance; Multiple large shareholders 
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Introduction 
As early as 1776, in his famous The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith anticipated that 
managers in joint-stock companies could not necessarily be expected to operate the 
companies in the same interests as the owners.  This anticipation was developed and 
confirmed over one century later by many economists.  Among them, Berle and 
Means (1932) provided perhaps the seminal account of the issues involved in the 
management of joint stock companies.  
The Berle and Means (1932) paradigm of the “separation of ownership and control” 
challenged the neo-classical economic theory of the firm in a fundamental way.  The 
basic axiom of the neoclassical economic theory of the firm is that firms maximize 
present value.  One of the most important assumptions under this theory is the 
identity of the utility functions of the owner and manager.  In other words, it deals 
with only one type of firm: the owner-managed firm.  Evidently, several other types 
of firms exist, and these differ from the traditional type in their owner-management 
relationships.  Moreover, these other types of firms are now economically far more 
significant than the traditional owner-managed type in terms of the magnitude of the 
resources which they control.  They provide a potentially serious impairment to the 
neoclassical economic theory of the firm and thus inspire the early literature on the 
theories of ownership structure. 
Originating from Marshall (1932) and Berle and Means (1932), managerial theories of 
the firm have been extensively developed as alternatives to the traditional 
neo-classical theory of the firm.  Managerial theories of the firm suggest models 
based on managerial utility maximization constrained by a minimum profit reflecting 
the interests of shareholders, such as the sales maximization model proposed by 
Baumol (1959) and the expense preference model proposed by Williamson (1964).  
They give some predictions about equilibrium choices and comparative static 
responses which are different from those of the neoclassical model of the firm.   
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The separation of ownership and control is also a typical case of a principal-agent 
problem.  A principal-agent relationship can be defined as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In this relationship, managers 
act as agents for the shareholder-owner of the firm.  When managers do not own 
shares (or own just a few), any effort they make to improve the firm’s performance 
will benefit the shareholders, but not the managers themselves.  So the utility 
function of the managers will deviate from that of the owners.  In addition to their 
probably different interests, managers do have both the ability and opportunity to 
make some inefficient decisions in the operations of the firm.  The ability lies 
particularly in the information asymmetries between managers and shareholders, 
which means that managers in charge have more information about the real value and 
potential of the firm than do outside shareholders.  The opportunity lies in the 
deficiency of any contract in practice.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce agency costs as the sum of three kinds of costs 
incurred as a result of the agency relationship between managers and shareholders.  
One type of cost is the “monitoring costs”, which is the cost of establishing some 
appropriate incentives for the agent, and to carry out oversight of the agent’s activities.  
Another type of cost is the “bonding cost”, caused by paying out expenditures to the 
agent to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal 
or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions.  The 
third type of cost is the “residual loss” as the reduction in welfare experienced by the 
principal due to the conflict of interests between the agent and the principal. 
The early literature focused on the inefficiency or costs associated with non-owner 
managements.  Therefore managerial ownership has become the central issue in the 
more recent literature exploring the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance.  However, these studies are mainly on American or British companies 
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whose ownership structure is famously more widely dispersed.  Very little evidence 
has been provided from continental European companies, where a much higher degree 
of ownership concentration is identified1. 
European companies have the history of having influential multiple large shareholders 
for long periods of time who actively monitor a firm’s performance (Krivogorsky, 
2006).  Recent evidence shows that the presence of multiple large shareholders is 
still prevalent in Europe, although the threshold for defining bloc holders varies 
among countries2.  Thus a study on the control power of multiple large shareholders 
is especially important when investigating the effect of ownership and control 
structure on firm performance in Europe. 
The absence of one share-one vote is a further form of separation of ownership and 
control in European companies.  Maher and Andersson (2000) state that in the 
absence of one share-one vote, data on direct ownership concentration can either 
under or overestimate actual control that shareholders exercise over the corporation.  
Dispersed ownership can lead to dispersed voting power under one share-one vote, 
which implies “strong managers, weak owners”, or concentrated voting power if the 
voting power is concentrated in the hands of bloc holders via dual class shares, golden 
shares, proxy votes, voting trusts, etc, implying “strong voting bloc holders, weak 
minority owners”.  Concentrated ownership can lead to concentrated voting power 
when voting rights are aligned with ownership rights via one share-one vote, or 
concentrated via separation devices.  The implications are “weak managers, weak 
minority owners, and strong majority owners”.   
Moreover, many firms today are effectively controlled via a “pyramid structure”.  
                                                        
1 La Porta et al. (1999) find that, in their sample, all 20 firms in the U. K., 18 out of 20 in Japan, and 16 out of 20 
in the U. S. fit the widely held description.  In Argentina, Greece, Austria, Hong Kong, Portugal, Israel, or 
Belgium, there are hardly any widely held firms.  Maher and Andersson (2000) give some international 
comparisons of ownership concentrations across OECD countries and find the average equity holding of the 
largest shareholder and the bloc holdings in the U. K., the U. S., Japan and Netherlands are substantially lower 
than in the Continental European countries. 
2 Facci and Lang (2002) collect data on 5232 European companies and show that 39% of firms have at least two 
blockholders that hold at least 10% of the voting rights, and 16% of firms have at least three blockholders. 
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Control is gained through direct as well as indirect voting rights and cash flow 
ownership3.  This makes the explanation of control more complicated. 
Using a sample of British and Continental European companies, this study aims to 
provide more evidence on the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate 
governance mechanism to ease the agency problem raised from separation of 
ownership and control.  Voting shares instead of cash flow shares are used as 
ownership data.  Ownership is recorded even when the percentage is very small (less 
than 1%).  In additional to direct ownership data, ultimate owners are identified to 
capture the ultimate control of the firm.   
Chapter One of this study reviews existing theoretical literature and introduces 
hypotheses.  The empirical literature is reviewed in Chapter Two.  Several 
methodology issues involved in modelling and testing the ownership-performance 
relationship are also discussed in Chapter Two.  Based on the ownership data of 
1291 European companies, Chapter Three provides descriptive statistics of current 
ownership and control pattern in Europe.   
The rest chapters of this study carry out empirical tests on the ownership-performance 
relationship based on a cross-sectional sample of 655 European companies.  Chapter 
Four investigates various measurements of firm performance and ownership 
concentration, describes the data and discusses the other determinants of firm 
performance.  In Chapter Five, ownership concentration is tested as a linear 
determinant of firm performance.  Various regression methods are carried out to 
control the restrictions of OLS assumptions.  Country and industry effects are also 
tested in this chapter.  Chapter Six moves on to investigate the potential non-linear 
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance.  The quadratic and 
piecewise regressions are carried out.  As another important element of ownership 
and control, the impact of owner identity on performance is examined in Chapter 
                                                        
3 La Porta et al. (2002) is among a few who use direct and indirect voting rights and cash-flow ownership owned 
by the controlling shareholder of the firm to identify the ultimate owner along the control chain. 
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Seven.  Chapter Eight investigates the potential impact of past firm performance on 
ownership concentration, and tests the endogeneity of ownership concentration and 
firm performance. 
 16
Chapter One  Theoretical Literature Review 
The separation of ownership and control in modern firms challenges the neo-classical 
theory of the firm which deals with only the owner-managed firm.  Managerial 
theories and agency theories of the firm explore the inefficiency associated with 
non-owner managers.  Ownership and control structure of the firm is one of the 
corporate governance mechanisms that are used to reduce these costs and improve 
firm performance.  However, the theoretical literature on the effectiveness of 
ownership and control structure for solving the agency problem reaches ambiguous 
conclusions.  The identities as well as percentage shareholdings of controlling 
owners may affect the relationship between ownership and control structure and firm 
performance.  Moreover ownership and control structure could affect firm 
performance as well as being affected by firm performance.  
In this chapter, the theoretical literature on the relationship between ownership and 
control structure and firm performance is investigated.  I start from introducing a 
benchmark model of ownership concentration by La Porta et al. (2002) and Maury 
and Pajuste (2004).  The relationship between general ownership concentration and 
firm performance is developed and analyzed.  The model also provides hypotheses 
on the impact of multiple large shareholders on firm performance.  Then the impact 
of identities of controlling owners on firm performance is discussed.  Managerial 
ownership, or internal control, has been the central issue of the literature due to the 
famously “widely dispersed” ownership structure of American and British companies.  
The impact of institutional ownership, one type of large investors, is especially 
appealing during the current financial crisis.  The impacts of government ownership, 
founding family ownership and non-financial corporate ownership are also discussed.   
1  Degree of control and performance 
1.1  Alignment effect and private cost extraction 
The separation of ownership and control in modern firms, as discussed in the 
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Introduction, provides incentives and opportunities for managers to extract private 
benefit from the firm, but concentrated ownership can help owners regain control, and 
put pressure on managers to reduce private benefit extraction and improve firm 
performance.  However, the unbalanced power between large shareholders and other 
small investors also provides large shareholders the incentives and opportunities to 
extract private benefit.  This conflict of interests imposes agency (monitoring) costs 
on the outsiders who seek to limit pre-emption of corporate earnings by the 
controlling group.  Similarly, the absence of any interaction between ownership and 
investment decisions can be questioned.  Cost of capital theory suggests that the 
more concentrated the ownership, the less is the firm’s market liquidity, and the 
higher is the return the firm has to pay to shareholders.  This implies that increased 
ownership concentration will raise the cost of capital and hence reduce firm 
performance.   
La Porta et al. (2002) and Maury and Pajuste (2004) set out a benchmark model of 
ownership concentration.  Consider a single firm with one controlling 
shareholder/coalition 4 , whose share (αn) of the firm’s cash flow or equity is 
exogenously determined by the history of the firm.  Control is contestable with the 
degree of contestability depending on the respective voting powers of the controlling 
group (u) and outside holders of large share blocs (v).  The firm has investment 
resources of I, which can be invested in projects which pay a gross rate of return of R.  
The controlling group pre-empts a share (s) of total profits IR×  before distributing 
the rest as dividends to all shareholders (including the controlling group).  This 
pre-empted share of profits s is assumed to be more than zero due to the existence of 
agency problem.  Diversion of profits is assumed to involve two costs or risks.  
First, there is a deadweight loss (or “cost-of-theft”) given by c(s,u,v), with cs > 0, 
css > 0, csu < 0 and csv > 0.  Second, there is a non-zero probability (p) that outsiders 
will be able to recover these funds; this depends on the contestability of the coalition 
                                                        
4 For present purposes this can be thought of either as the management or as a non-managing group of 
shareholders. 
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(u, v). 
The total value of the firm (Q) is: IRsQ ××−= )1( .  The value of the controlling 
group’s share is: 
RIuvscsRIpRIspV n
C ),,()1())1(1( −−+−−= α        (1) 
This is maximised by choice of s; hence the optimal value of s (=s*) is found by 
solving: 
)1)(1(),,( * puvsc ns −−= α              (2) 
In this model, the optimal pre-empted share of profits and therefore the value of the 
firm depends on the power relationships between the controlling shareholder/coalition 
and others (αn, u, v, p).  The costs of pre-emption are borne initially by the 
controlling group; there are no agency (monitoring) costs borne by outside 
shareholders, nor are there any potential gains from better investment decisions by the 
insider group because, for example, they are better informed about the firm’s business 
than outsiders. 
Equation (2) leads directly to the interest alignment hypothesis.  Differentiating (2) 
with respect to αn gives5: 
0
),,(
1*
* <−−= vusc
p
d
ds
ssnα               (3) 
The negative result shows that the optimal pre-empted profits s* is inversely related to 
the cash flow possessed by the controlling shareholder/coalition αn .  The greater the 
cash flow αn possessed by the controlling shareholder/coalition, the more this group 
internalizes the costs of its actions and the less the costly private benefits it extracts 
                                                        
5 This calculation assumes no interdependence between pre-empted profit and the structure of the coalitions in the 
firm. 
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(s*).  The value of the firm is inversely related to s*.  This implies a positive 
relationship between the stake of the controlling group (αn) and total firm value. 
We turn next to consider the voting powers of the controlling shareholder/coalition.  
Allowing for the dependence of p on u with ∂p/∂u < 0, we can differentiate (2) with 
respect to u to get: 
0
)1(* >
−−−
=
ss
sun
c
c
du
dp
du
ds α              (4) 
The positive result shows that an increase in the voting power of the controlling 
shareholder/coalition u increases the amount of private benefit extraction s*.  This 
can be caused due to a decrease in the risk of clawback (p), for example through an 
adverse vote at a shareholders’ meeting.  Thus the value of the firm is inversely 
related to the voting power of the controlling shareholder/coalition u.   
Therefore the positive impact of ownership concentration could combine with the 
negative impact, and result in a non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance.  The argument is that the positive impact of less 
private benefit extraction dominates at low ownership concentration level of the 
controlling shareholders.  Over a certain level of ownership concentration, the 
controlling shareholders have greater power and therefore are more motivated to 
entrench themselves from outsider investors. This results in increased agency costs 
which eventually dominate the overall impact of controlling shareholders. 
Based on these hypotheses, the empirical studies of this thesis try to find which force 
dominates the impact of large shareholding on firm performance – the alignment 
effect or increased private benefit extraction.  Taking consideration of the potential 
non-linear hypothesis, further empirical studies are carried out to specify the dominant 
impact during different ranges of ownership concentration. 
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1.2  Power of multiple large shareholders 
Evidence shows that the presence of multiple large shareholders is prevalent in 
modern economics, although the threshold of defining bloc holders varies among 
countries.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) use ownership structure 
data of companies from 27 wealthy countries and show that often the voting stake of 
the second bloc holder is above 10%.  European companies have the history of 
having influential multiple large shareholders for long periods of time who actively 
monitor a firm’s performance (Krivogorsky, 2006).  Facci and Lang (2002) show 
that 39% of 5232 European companies have at least two block holders that hold at 
least 10% of the voting rights, and 16% of firms have at least three block holders.  
Even in the U.S., Gomes and Novaes (1999) find that 57.2% of the closely held 
corporations listed in the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) with 
annual sales above 10 million dollars have more than one large shareholder.   
From the viewpoint of the initial owner of the firm, or the controlling shareholder, to 
achieve an optimal ownership structure and avoid the cost of going public, he has the 
choice to sell shares privately, that is, sell shares to a limited number of shareholders.  
The controlling shareholder may form a controlling coalition with other bloc holders 
to share control when he can not make unilateral decisions in the firm.  In the 
coalition multiple controlling shareholders can take part in major corporate decisions 
(Gomes and Novaes, 2005). 
The simple presence of multiple large shareholders should have a positive effect on 
firm value due to better monitoring and takeover bids placed by external large 
shareholders, which may alleviate the agency problem arising from the separation 
between ownership and control (Pagano and Roell, 1998).  The fact that the largest 
shareholder’s decision requires the consent of external large shareholders may also 
reduce its private benefit extraction (Maury and Pajuste, 2004). 
However, the efficiency of private benefit extraction can be increased when the other 
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large shareholders collude with the largest shareholder and form a controlling 
coalition (Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000).  In this case, 
Maury and Pajuste (2004) argues that certain coalition of multiple large shareholders 
can reduce the marginal cost of stealing either by increasing the voting power of the 
coalition or by adding extra knowledge and resources for hiding the diversion of 
profits.  Equation (4) proves that the private benefit extraction can be higher, and 
hence performance can be lower with greater voting power of the controlling coalition.  
Meanwhile, differentiating equation (2) with respect to p gives: 
0
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Equation (5) shows that the greater the contestability of the controlling coalition, the 
less the diversion of profits, and the higher the corporate performance.   
The negative impact of the controlling coalition can also be subject to the ex-post 
bargaining problems among controlling shareholders.  Gomes and Novaes (2001) 
argue that this problem may reduce the firm’s overall efficiency by under-investments.  
Additionally Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest that the control structure 
should be such as to prevent a single shareholder from taking unilateral actions that 
might hurt other shareholders.  This implies a structure with either a single large 
shareholder or shareholders of roughly the same size.  Equal-sized shareholders are 
the best way to avoid having small shareholders who contribute little cash flow to the 
controlling coalition. 
1.3  Endogeneity of ownership and performance 
Thus far, the argument treats ownership as exogenous, but it can equally well be 
argued that a firm’s ownership structure will be endogenously determined in 
equilibrium.  This is sometimes known as the “inverse effect” or “joint effect” 
hypothesis.  This suggests that ownership and performance are the joint outcomes of 
a maximizing process by shareholders and managers, which will be reflected in 
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share-trading as well as investment and dividend decisions.  This is particularly 
relevant for takeovers when the target firm’s ownership structure is decided by those 
who currently own the firm.  Thus, corporate performance could be a determinant of 
ownership concentration as well as being determined by it.  If an empirical 
specification includes all relevant exogenous variables which determine both 
ownership and performance, such specification would not be able to detect a relation 
between them, and could lead to an insignificant or non-linear empirical result (Coles 
et al. 2003).   
Natural selection theory holds that in long run only the most efficient organizations 
will survive.  This implies that there will be no systematic relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain 
why the manager’s “failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent 
with efficiency”.  They argue that investors will choose to invest in a firm with a 
certain kind of ownership structure if and only if the expected economic gains exceed 
the organizational and coordination costs implied by that particular ownership 
structure.  In this setting, a firm’s performance does not depend on the ownership 
structure and investors will choose a mix of insider versus outsider ownership, 
provided there is no restriction on the shareholders’ holdings. 
It can also be argued that other methods of corporate control, such as managerial 
labour markets, management compensation packages, product market competition, 
dividends, the market for corporate control, debt policy and bankruptcy risks, may 
substitute for ownership structure, depending on the relative costs of using different 
mechanisms.  Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Rediker and Seth (1995) argue that 
greater use of one mechanism may be substituted by less use of other mechanisms, 
resulting in equally good performance.  The possibility of their interdependence 
makes single-equation regressions spurious.  Rediker and Seth (1995) point out that 
in cross-sectional analysis of the impact of a single governance mechanism on 
performance, there is a reduced likelihood of finding an association if a number of 
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substitute mechanisms are important explanatory variables but are omitted from the 
analysis.  Moreover Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that in cross-sectional 
research, taking account of their interdependence, some of the control mechanisms 
which are decided internally, such as ownership structure, should have no effect on 
firm performance, since they are chosen to maximize firm value; while other ones 
which are determined externally, such as the market for corporate control, should have 
effects since they are not chosen to maximize firm value.  Their empirical study of 
400 large U.S. firms confirms no effect of insider shareholdings when all of the 
mechanisms are included in a single OLS regression or a simultaneous systems 
framework. 
2  Location of control and performance 
A number of studies suggest that simply examining ownership in terms of the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest party of shareholders may be not enough to 
give a comprehensive insight into the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance.  Identification of the shareholders, or the location of control, is 
crucial to the empirical tests.  Maher and Andersson (2000) suggest that transferring 
the “separation of ownership and control” view of monitoring in the U. S. and U. K. 
corporations to Continental Europe, Korea and Japan can be misleading because the 
agents who make the economic decisions are very different.  Ownership 
concentration and the identity of owners should be viewed as variables that exert a 
simultaneous, but different influence on firm performance.  
The location of control may be crudely divided into being external or internal to 
management, as suggested by Cubbin and Leech (1982).  The internal control to 
management is exerted by members of the board of directors and the external control 
is located in those shareholders other than members of the board of directors.  The 
identities of external control who are expected to have special implication in 
understanding the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
include financial institutions, non-financial corporations (including foreign ownership 
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and business group, etc), government, etc.  Other identities in the board of directors 
who own significant shares in the firm, such as the founder family ownership and top 
officers, also exert significantly different control over the firm.  To identify the 
ultimate location of control of firms, attention should be paid to the pyramid structure 
of shareholders among firms. 
2.1  Managerial ownership 
The incentive alignment effect occurs when management and ownership interests 
converge.  The argument is that the less the stake that managers have in the firm, the 
more risk and profit will be shared by others, and the higher the probability that 
managers will deviate from owners’ interest and pursue their own benefits.  Thus, 
alignment of managers’ and owners’ interests will improve firm performance.  
Models based on agency and contract theory are concerned with the derivation of 
optimal incentive schemes to motivate managers, to act for the owners’ benefit.  The 
seminal contributions are those of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Mirrlees (1976).  
Hart and Holmstrom (1987) present several principal-agent models of optimal 
management compensation schemes under various assumptions about management 
risk aversion and information asymmetry between management and shareholders.  
An optimal contract will typically pay managers more when profit is high, and 
increase managers’ expected income in the face of increased risk.  Managerial 
ownership is clearly one kind of incentive-compatible contract which rewards 
managers according to their efforts along these lines.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
assert that “the most powerful link between shareholder wealth and executive wealth 
is direct ownership of shares by the CEO”. 
However, managers may counter corporate governance mechanisms by entrenching 
themselves in a firm by making themselves costly to replace.  The entrenchment 
hypothesis asserts that higher managerial ownership tends to entrench managers so 
that they are less subject to market discipline.  Shleifer and Vishny (1989) set out a 
model of entrenchment in which managers choose “manager-specific” investments: 
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“those whose value is higher under … [the existing manager] than under the best 
alternative manager, even when such investments are not ex-ante value-maximizing”.  
On average there is a positive relationship between ownership and entrenchment, and 
therefore a negative relationship between ownership and firm value. 
More recently, it has been argued that we would expect incentive alignment effects to 
dominate for low insider ownership but, as managerial ownership increases, these 
benefits are eventually overtaken by the increase in managers’ ability to pursue 
non-value-maximizing activities without being disciplined by shareholders.  Thus a 
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and performance is 
hypothesized.  For example, Stulz (1988) argues that beyond a sufficiently high level 
of managerial ownership (but less than 50%) managers are more capable of opposing 
a takeover threat.  Since raiders will have to pay higher takeover premiums, the 
market for corporate control is less effective and corporate performance decreases.  
However, this effect will not occur if managerial ownership exceeds 50% as the firm 
is effectively management-controlled. 
The Inverse effect hypothesis emphasizes the endogeneity of ownership decisions.  
Since managers have superior information, they can vary their shareholdings in 
accordance with their expectations regarding future firm performance.  Although 
actions taken by managers immediately before important announcements are limited 
by insider legislation in most modern stock markets, managers can still profit further 
in advance of or after an announcement or in periods when no announcement is 
required (Mathiesen, 2002).  Thus managerial ownership concentration at time t may 
be positively affected by expected firm performance at time t+1, implying that 
ownership changes are a predictor of firm performance.  Management compensation 
in the form of stock options offers another possibility for firm performance to affect 
ownership structure (Agrawal and Chadha, 2006; Johnson et al., 2003; Peng and Roell, 
2003 and Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  Murphy (1985) finds that managerial 
compensation is positively related to corporate performance, suggesting that 
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ownership structure can represent an endogenous outcome of the compensation 
process.  Kole (1996) argues that managers may prefer equity compensation when 
they expect their firm to perform well and the value of the firm to increase.  
Therefore, managerial ownership concentration at time t may be positively affected by 
firm performance at time t-1, implying that firm performance may predict ownership 
changes. 
2.2  Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors are defined as professional money managers with discretionary 
control over assets (such as mutual funds, pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance 
companies) (Ferreira and Matos, 2007).  Their main objective is shareholder value 
(Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003).   
The efficient monitoring hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance.  The argument is that as large 
investors, institutional investors have more opportunities, resources and abilities to 
monitor management than small investors.  They are able to achieve sufficient 
benefits to have the incentive to monitor management.  Supporting evidence are 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Nesbitt, 1994, Smith, 1990 and Guercio and Hawkins, 
1999.  However, concerns arise when institutional investors hold relatively few 
shares in the firm (Maug, 1998).  Portfolio managers within institutional investor 
companies are often evaluated on a short-term basis.  They have a great desire to 
pursue short-term profits.  When institutional investors hold relatively few shares in 
the firm, shares are relatively more marketable.  Individual portfolio managers can 
dump their shares easily if a firm performs poorly during a short period.  Therefore 
these investors are less motivated to monitor management.   
The impact of institutional ownership may differ among different types of institutions.  
Banks and insurance companies may have current or potential business links with 
firms through their trust department.  They frequently derive benefits from lines of 
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business under management control.  Therefore they are less willing to challenge 
management decisions.  These investors are called pressure-sensitive institutions 
(Brickley et al, 1988), or passive institutions (Almazan et al, 2005), or grey 
institutions (Ferreira and Matos, 2008).  Other types of institutional investors, such 
as investment companies, independent investment advisors, pension fund advisors, 
mutual funds and foundations, are less subject to management influence.  Therefore 
they are more motivated to monitor management.  These investors are often called as 
pressure-insensitive institutions (Brickley et al, 1988), or active institutions (Ferreira 
and Matos, 2008).  In conclusion, pressure-insensitive institution ownership could 
have stronger positive impact on firm performance than pressure-sensitive institution 
ownership.  Differentiating types of institutions is important for a study on the 
impact of institutional ownership on firm performance. 
2.3  Other external control ownership 
The identities of the other external non-manager owners may also have special 
implications for ownership structure and firm performance, particularly including 
government, the founding family and non-financial corporations. 
One might expect government-owned firms to pursue political goals or other 
non-economic goals which reduce firm performance.  Thus a negative correlation 
between government ownership and firm value is predicted.  However, Eckel and 
Vermaelen (1986) and Hou and Robertson (2000) suggest that for minority investors, 
government ownership may be less harmful than other kinds of regulation.  For 
example, government-owned firms may benefit from lower costs of capital than 
private firms. 
Founder ownerships may exert more direct control over the firm because they act on 
their own behalf, and incentive problems will be solved by family loyalty (James, 
1999).  Founding family ownerships also invest in firm-specific human capital which 
may increase the firm’s value, thus increasing firm performance, especially in the 
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early part of a firm’s life.  However, founder-owners may be entrenched at 
comparatively low levels of ownership, because they possess more influence within 
the firm.  Furthermore they may be more risk-averse if they have a large amount of 
capital tied up in the firm.  These factors may reduce firm performance. 
Non-financial corporate ownership is exemplified by the Japanese Keiretsu, French 
cross-holding structures and the business groups which are prevalent in many 
emerging markets.  Corporations holding shares in other companies could be in the 
same industry or related by a vertical tie.  For those in the same industry, ownership 
may bring valuable technology and other specific resources that can improve the 
value of their affiliated companies.  For those at different stages of the value chain in 
the market, ownership brings economic benefits due to high asset specificity and 
transaction frequency (Williamson, 1996).  Thus foreign companies may intend to 
transfer proprietary resources, such as technology and skills to the 
subsidiaries/affiliates that they own.  Business groups in emerging markets are 
typically thought to benefit from diversification of risk and an efficient internal capital 
market, especially where the external market is fragmented and inefficient 
(Williamson, 1975).  Business groups may also have size-related advantages in 
political rent seeking (Ghemmawat and Khanna, 1998).  However, business groups 
may lack flexibility and experience deficient internal monitoring (Williamson, 1985).  
In addition, corporate owners are more inclined to extract wealth at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Kester, 1992).  Hoskisson et al. (2001) suggest that business 
groups may be efficient in the early stages of development, but lose their performance 
advantages as capital markets develop. 
3  Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the main theories and arguments concerning the relationship 
between ownership and performance.  A value-maximizing model of ownership 
concentration is developed, which leads directly to most of the hypotheses.  
Performance could be positively affected by the degree of ownership concentration 
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due to the monitoring effects of large shareholders on management, and higher cost of 
private benefits extraction associated with higher degree of ownership concentration.  
However the agency costs due to the conflict of interests between controlling 
shareholders and outsider investors, and the higher cost of capital associated with 
higher ownership concentration could be detrimental for firm performance.  The 
negative impact could only take effect beyond a certain degree of ownership 
concentration, which results in a non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance.  Concerning the impact of multiple large 
shareholders on firm performance, the value-maximizing model suggests that 
performance is positively affected by the contestability of the controlling coalition.  
However, the endogenous ownership structure theory suggests that ownership and 
performance could be two jointly determined variables, and the natural selection 
theory and the substitution effect of other corporate governance mechanisms predict 
that there will in fact be no relationship between ownership and performance.   
Management ownership could have a positive impact on firm performance due to the 
convergence of interests between managers and shareholders, but managers could also 
entrench themselves by making non-value-maximizing decisions.  In this case, 
management ownership imposes a negative effect on firm performance.  Institutional 
owners are assumed to be more motivated and efficient to monitor firms’ management 
than small investors.  However, their short-term profit goal could also be detrimental 
for firm performance.  The impact of institutional ownership also differs between 
pressure-sensitive institutions and pressure-insensitive institutions who are less 
subject to management influence.  Government ownership is generally considered to 
be harmful to firm performance due to its political goals conflicting with firms’ value 
maximizing goals.  However, a positive impact is also possible for minority 
investors due to low cost of capital.  Founder owners seem able to solve the agency 
problem.  But they also have a negative entrenchment impact on firm performance.  
Non-financial corporate ownership can improve firm performance through resources 
sharing effect, high asset specificity and high transaction frequency, while it could 
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also be harmful due to extraction of wealth at the expense of minority investors.  
Table 1.1 summaries the theoretical hypotheses and their supporting arguments.  To 
conclude, the degree of ownership concentration and the identity of the controlling 
shareholder could be two equally important determinants of firm performance. 
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Table 1.1  Theoretical hypotheses and supporting arguments 
Ownership identity Relationship Sign of Effect Supporting arguments 
General ownership 
concentration (Own) 
)( tt OwnfePerformanc =  0'>f  Monitoring effect Interest alignment effect 
)( tt OwnfePerformanc =  0'<f  Agency theory Cost of capital theory 
)( tt OwnfePerformanc =  non-linear Combination effects of less private benefits extraction and entrenchment costs 
Endogenous theory 
)( ntt ePerformancfOwn −=  0'>f  Endogenous theory 
None None Endogenous theory; 
Natural selection theory; 
Substitution effect of other corporate governance 
mechanisms 
)( tt VPfePerformanc =  
VP: Voting power of the controlling coalition; 
0'<f  Cost of private benefits extraction theory 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1.1  Theoretical hypotheses and supporting arguments (continued) 
Ownership identity Relationship Sign of Effect Supporting arguments 
Managerial ownership concentration 
(MOwn) 
)( tt MOwnfePerformanc =  0'>f  Convergence-of-interest effect 
)( tt MOwnfePerformanc =  0'<f  Linear entrenchment effect 
)( tt MOwnfePerformanc =  non-linear Combination of convergence-of-interest and entrenchment effects 
)( 1+= tt ePerformancfMOwn  0'>f  Insider information theory 
)( 1−= tt ePerformancfMOwn  0'>f  Performance-based compensation theory 
Non-manager 
controlling 
shareholder 
Founding family 
ownership (FFOwn) 
)( tt FFOwnfePerformanc =  0'>f Incentive alignment Firm-specific human capital investment 
0'<f More entrenchment and risk aversion 
General ownership 
concentration 
(NMOwn) 
)( tt NMOwnfePerformanc =  0'>f  Monitoring effect on management 
0'<f  Collusion with management 
Government ownership 
(GOwn) 
)( tt GOwnfePerformanc =  0'<f  Political goals argument 
0'>f  Government protection 
Cost of capital theory 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1.1  Theoretical hypotheses and supporting arguments (continued) 
Ownership identity Relationship Sign of Effect Supporting arguments 
Non-manager 
controlling 
shareholder 
(cont’d) 
Financial 
institutions 
ownership (FIOwn) 
)( tt FIOwnfePerformanc =  0'>f Efficient monitoring effect 
0'<f  Conflict of interest effect 
Strategic alignment effect 
Non- 
financial 
corporations 
ownership (COwn) 
)( tt COwnfePerformanc =  0'>f  Resources sharing effect High asset specificity  
High transaction frequency 
0'<f More extraction of wealth 
Business Group 
ownership 
(BGOwn) 
)( tt BGOwnfePerformanc =  0'>f  Risk diversification Internal capital markets 
Political rent seeking 
0'<f  Loss of flexibility 
Deficient mutual monitoring 
Multiple large shareholder 
ownership (MLSOwn) 
)( tt MLSOwnfePerformanc =  0'>f  Monitoring and control dilution 
0'<f  Collusion problem 
)( tt lityContestabifePerformanc =  0'>f  Monitoring effect 
)( tt BPfePerformanc =  
BP: Balance power, that is, the degree 
of equality of the distribution of votes 
among large shareholders 
0'>f  Balance of power theory 
 34
Chapter Two  Empirical Literature Review 
Berle and Means (1932) provide the seminal account of separation of ownership and 
control based on their anticipation of prevalent manager-controlled firms in modern 
economies.  Their followers such as managerial theorists and agency theorists focus on 
the inefficiency associated with controlling managers.  Recently more literature places 
emphasis on the efficiency of large shareholders, or concentrated ownership, in solving 
the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control.   
The previous chapter discusses the theoretical literature concerning the impact of 
ownership concentration and identities of owners on firm performance.  While the cost 
of private benefits extraction theory predicts a positive linear impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance, the agency cost and cost of capital theories predict a 
negative impact associated with ownership concentration.  The combined effects of less 
private benefits extraction and more agency cost and cost of capital associated with 
higher ownership concentration can be non-linear on firm performance, since controlling 
shareholders are more able and willing to entrench themselves at higher ownership 
concentration levels.  However, the natural selection theory and the substitution effect of 
other corporate governance mechanisms predict no relationship between ownership and 
performance.  Moreover, the endogenous ownership structure theory argues that 
ownership and performance could be two jointly determined variables.  
In addition to the degree of control, some theorists argue that the location of control also 
has an impact on firm performance.  Simply transferring the separation of ownership 
and control theories in the U.S. and the U.K. firms to Continental European firms without 
considering the identities of their owners can be misleading because the economic 
decision agents are very different.  Therefore ownership concentration and identities of 
controlling owners should be treated as two variables affecting firm performance 
simultaneously.   
This chapter investigates the empirical literature on the relationship between ownership 
and performance.  The prescriptive evidence on ownership concentration around the 
world is examined to focus attention on concentrated ownership, followed by evidence on 
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the linear impact of ownership concentration and owner identities on firm performance.  
Empirical test techniques taking account of the non-linear relationship and the 
endogeneity of ownership and performance are also discussed. 
1  Ownership and control around the world 
Modern corporations were described as becoming diffused in ownership by Berle and 
Means (1932).  They predicted that the dispersion of the ownership of modern 
corporations “is rapidly increasing and appears to be an inevitable development”.  
However, recent empirical studies on corporate ownership around the world show little 
evidence supporting their prediction.  On the contrary the degree of ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership is found to be higher today than earlier in the 
century in most studies. 
La Porta et al. (1998) assemble a database of up to the 10 largest (by market 
capitalization) nonfinancial and domestic companies which are either totally private or 
publicly traded in 49 countries from Europe, North and South America, Africa and 
Australia.  For each company they collect data on the three largest shareholders and 
computed the combined (cash flow) ownership stake of the three shareholders.  They 
find that in the world as a whole, the average ownership of the three largest shareholders 
is 46%, and the median is 45%.  
Instead of using first level ownership data, La Porta et al. (1999) identify the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of firms.  They investigate 27 wealthy economies   Using the 
20% definition of control, they find only 36% of the largest firms are widely held, and 
these companies are mainly in economies with very good shareholder protection.  In 
other economies, relatively few of the companies are widely held. 
Even in the U.S., there is a modest concentration of ownership.  La Porta et al. (1998) 
find that the average for the 10 most valuable companies in the U. S. is 20% and the 
median is 12%, which is still very high.  Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find in the U.S., 
several hundred traded firms with majority (greater than 51%) shareholders.   
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) calculate the ownership data of 456 of the Fortune 500 firms 
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in 1980, and find that “large shareholdings are extremely widespread and very substantial 
where present”.  Specifically they find 354 of the firms have at least one shareholder 
owning at least 5 percent of the firm and the average holding of the largest shareholder 
among the sample firms is 15.4 percent.  Smaller firms are expected to have a much 
higher figure.   
Moreover, Edwards and Fischer (1994), Franks and Mayer (1994) and Gorton and 
Schmid (1996) find significant concentration of ownership in Germany.  Prowse (1992) 
and Berglof and Perotti (1994) provide evidence in Japan.  Barca (1995) and Bianco and 
Casavola (1999) provide evidence in Italy.  The study of European Corporate 
Governance Network (1997) on seven OECD countries also finds higher ownership 
concentration today than earlier in the century. In developing countries, ownership is also 
found to be highly concentrated, see La Porta et al. (1998) and Xu and Wang (1999).   
Evidence on concentrated ownership in companies around the world suggests that in the 
long run, companies with concentrated ownership are the most efficient ones to survive 
the natural selection.  This result can be explained as that ownership concentration is a 
positive determinant of firm performance.  Companies with higher ownership 
concentration perform better than others and survive for longer time.  However, another 
explanation is that concentrated ownership is a result of good firm performance.  Since 
the most efficient firms associated with concentrated ownership survive the natural 
selection in the long run, we observe the prevalence of concentrated ownership.  
Moreover, it can not reject the possibility that ownership concentration and firm 
performance are two endogenously determined variables and do not affect each other 
directly.   
While the concentration of ownership around the world is evidenced to be not as 
dispersed as predicted, significant differences among countries are also found.  
Following Maher and Andersson (2000), there are two general systems: outsider systems 
characterized by relatively dispersed ownership (notably the U. S. and U. K.) and insider 
systems characterized by relatively concentrated ownership or control (notably 
Continental Europe).  La Porta et al. (1999) find that all 20 firms in the U. K., 18 out of 
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20 in Japan, and 16 out of 20 in the U. S. fit the widely held description.  In Argentina, 
Greece, Austria, Hong Kong, Portugal, Israel, or Belgium, there are hardly any widely 
held firms.  Maher and Andersson (2000) give some international comparisons of 
ownership concentrations across OECD countries and find the average equity holding of 
the largest shareholder and the bloc holdings in the U. K., U. S., Japan and Netherlands 
are substantially lower than in the Continental European countries.  Therefore national 
effects could be significant in cross-country studies. 
2  Linear impact of ownership and control on firm performance 
Hunt (1986), Short (1994) and Mathiesen (2002) provide extensive literature reviews of 
the findings of the effect of ownership and control structure on firm performance.  Most 
of the studies before the 1990’s classify control types as owner-controlled type and 
manager-controlled type.  They compare performance measures between firms of these 
types.  Studies since 1990 start to use continuous ownership concentration variables.  
The degree of internal control (managerial ownership) or external control (ownership 
concentration of bloc-shareholders) is largely investigated.  However, only a few among 
most recent studies investigate the impact of identities of external controllers on firm 
performance. 
2.1  Internal control vs. external control 
Most of the early studies apply fixed rules to define control types as owner controlled or 
manager controlled.  Palmer (1973) classifies firms with a single block of common 
stock less than 10% as management controlled, between 10% and 30% as weak owner 
controlled and more than 30% as strong owner controlled.  Based on a sample of the 
largest US firms, he finds a significantly lower average profit rate for management 
controlled firms than owner controlled firms, but only if the firm has monopoly power.  
Stano (1976), Holl (1977) and Bothwell (1980) apply the same control classifications as 
Palmer (1973), but extend Palmer’s study to using stock return, average market rate of 
return and profit margin as the measure of performance respectively.  They all find 
owner controlled firms significantly outperform manager controlled firms in the U. S..  
However McEachern (1975) suggests a further division in owner controlled firms 
 38
distinguishing between outsider owners who were not actively involved in management 
(externally controlled firms) and owners who were also managers.  He finds higher rates 
of return in owner controlled firms than those in manager controlle firms.  Firms 
controlled by owners who are also managers have significantly more market-based risk 
and retain significantly more earnings than other firms.   
Some other studies present different but ambiguous results.  Ware (1975) finds MC 
firms to be more profitable than OC firms but less efficient than OC firms.  Zeckhauser 
and Pound (1990) find that in industries with high asset specificity, the E/P 
(earnings/price) ratios are significantly lower for firms with large shareholders than firms 
without large shareholders, while in industries with low asset specificity there are no 
significant differences.  Kamerschen (1968), Elliott (1972), Sorenson (1974), Holl 
(1975), Round (1976), Jacquemin and Ghellinck (1980), Holderness and Sheehan (1988) 
and Murali and Welch (1989) also find no significant differences between control types.   
While most of other studies are on American or British firms, Thonet and Poensgen 
(1979) select 300 German public manufacturing companies and use the data for the years 
1961-70.  Control is classified into three groups: ownership-controlled where 25% of 
the shares or more are owned by a person or a group of persons, manager-controlled with 
no person or group of persons or other company own more than 25% of the shares, and 
all others where 25% or more of the shares are owned by another corporation, by the 
government, or by another institution.  They choose 25% as threshold for its legal 
significance.  Using ordinary least squares, they compared five criteria between these 
three control groups of firms. The five criteria are return on equity ratio, market to book 
value, growth rate, risk assumed by management and compensation of management.  
They find no evidence for better performance in ownership-controlled firms than those in 
manager-controlled firms.  Instead manager-controlled firms are associated with higher 
returns on equity than are ownership-controlled firms.  They also find that the category 
of firms neither manager-controlled nor ownership-controlled, that is, subsidiaries of 
another corporation, play a more important role in corporate activities in Germany than 
the categories of owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms. 
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2.2  Impact of degree of control 
More recent studies use continuous ownership concentration variables, that is, the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by management or largest shareholders.  For 
example Mehran (1995) collects a sample of 153 randomly selected US firms for the end 
of 1980’s.  He uses the percentage of equity held by managers and all outside bloc 
holders as measures of ownership and control.  Managers’ ownership is measured by the 
sum of their direct share ownership, their stock options outstanding and ownership by 
their immediate families.  They identify individual investors, institutional investors, and 
corporations who own at least 5% of the common stock of the company as outside bloc 
holders.  The OLS regressions in this study show that firm performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets) is positively correlated with the percentage of shares 
owned by CEOs. 
Leech and Leahy (1991) use fixed and variable rules in defining control types and several 
ownership concentration measures to test the impact of ownership and control structure 
on UK listed companies’ performance.  They find a significant positive relationship 
between variable rule-based control type and profit rates and growth which supports the 
convergence-in-interest hypothesis, while they also find a significant negative 
relationship between continuous ownership concentration and profitability and growth 
which provide evidence for the entrenchment hypothesis.   
Thomsen and Pedersen (1996) select the 100 largest non-financial companies in each of 6 
European countries for the period 1990-1993, and Thomsen and Pedersen (1997) select 
518 firms from the 100 largest non-financial companies in each of 12 EU countries for 
the period 1990-1993.  Ownership concentration is calculated as a logistic 
transformation of the percentage of voting ownership by largest owner in both of the 
studies.  They find that return on equity tends to decrease with ownership concentration, 
but the effect is insignificant.  Capital intensity and return variability are both found to 
be significant control variables.   
Seifert et al. (2002) explore the impact of equity ownership by insiders and the equity 
holdings of bloc holders and institutions on firm performance using a sample of firms 
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from the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Japan.  They use the ratio of net income to total 
assets as measure of firm performance.  The results of piecewise linear regressions 
suggest that for all four countries equity ownership by insiders has a positive impact on 
performance.  However, for Germany, the increases in firm performance are mostly 
subject to cases where the managers already own a significant portion (at least 25%) of 
the equity of the firm.  They find no evidence in support of the idea that managers can 
become entrenched after they own a significant amount of equity.  Also no significant 
relationships are found for either bloc holders or institutions and performance.  Their 
results also suggest that the governance systems in the four countries have more in 
common than some believe and may give some support for classifying governance 
systems according to the legal protections afforded to outside shareholders, rather than 
the market-centered vs. bank-centered classification.   
Using data from 87 European firms, which were foreign U.S. registrants during 
2000-2001, Krivogorsky (2006) finds a strong positive relation between the level of bloc 
shareholders ownership and profitability ratios, as well as a strong positive relation 
between the portion of independent board directors and profitability ratios.  No strong 
relation between managerial ownership and profitability is found. 
Studies concerning the impact of multiple large shareholders include Volpin (2002) who 
suggests that in Italy, valuation is higher when control is to some extent contestable as in 
the case in which a voting syndicate controls the firm, Lehman and Weigand (2000) who 
argue that in Germany the presence of a strong second largest shareholder enhances 
profitability, and Faccio et al. (2001) who conclude that the presence of multiple large 
shareholders dampens expropriation in Europe (due to monitoring), but exacerbates it in 
Asia (due to collusion). 
2.3  Impact of identities of external controllers 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) extend previous work based on the U. S./U. K. evidence to 
the different institutional setting of continental Europe and apply owner identities 
(including financial investors, non-financial companies, single individuals/families and 
governments) as well as ownership concentration as measures of ownership structure.  
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They select 435 of the 100 largest non-financial companies in each of 12 European 
nations for the period 1990-1995.  Ownership concentration is defined as the percentage 
of shares owned by the largest owner.  They find significant interaction effects between 
owner identities and ownership shares on firm performance, which indicates that the 
effect of ownership concentration on firm performance depends on owner identity.  
Specifically institutional ownership is generally associated with high market-to-book 
values, while a negative premium is found for companies controlled by a family, another 
company, or government.  Their results demonstrate that the inclusion of owner identity 
is crucial to the understanding of European corporate governance.   
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) study the 100 largest companies in each of the 11 
continental European countries.  They estimate a three-stage least squares simultaneous 
equation model.  After controlling for nation and industry effects they find that 
ownership concentration has a positive effect on firm value even after taking into account 
the observed positive feedback from firm value to ownership concentration.  But this 
effect only applies to financial and corporate owners.  For family owners it is 
insignificant and for government ownership it is negative.   
In addition to Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Pedersen and Thomsen (2003), there are 
some other studies investigating effects of owner identities on firm performance.   
Regarding financial institutional ownership, Brickley et al. (1988), Steiner (1996), Han 
and Suk (1998), and Woidtke (2002) support a positive monitoring effect of financial 
institutional owners while Pound (1988) finds a negative impact of financial institutional 
owners.   
Regarding government ownership, Shirley and Walsh (1998), Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001), D’Souze and Megginson (1999) and Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) support a 
negative government ownership impact on firm performance, while Eckel and Vermaelen 
(1986), Hausman and Neufeld (1991) and Kole (1996) find an insignificant correlation 
between government ownership and firm performance.   
Regarding family ownership, McConaughy et al. (1998), McConaughy et al. (2001) and 
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Mishra et al. (2001) support the incentive alignment effect of family ownership on firm 
performance; while Daily and Dalton (1992), Jayraman et al. (2000) and Pederson and 
Thomson (2003) find an insignificant effect of family ownership, and Morck et al. (1988) 
finds a positive relationship between family ownership and firm performance in young 
firms and a negative one in older firms.   
For firms as members of business groups, Hundley and Jacobson (1998) and Dewenter et 
al. (2001) find that they perform worse than other firms, while Khanna and Palepu (1999, 
2000) find positive relationship between profitability and group scale and scope beyond a 
certain point. Hoskisson et al. (2001) suggest that in the early stages of country 
development, business group may be efficient.  But with the development of capital 
markets, business groups may lose their performance advantages. 
3  Non-linear studies 
Important early literature documenting a non-monotonic relationship between ownership 
and performance include Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Morck et al. (1988), Stulz 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990).  Recent academic studies on the topic 
include Kole (1995), McConnell and Servaes (1995), Cho (1998), Han and Suk (1998), 
Holdernesss et al. (1999) and Short and Keasey (1999).  Piecewise linear and quadratic 
regressions are the two common methods. 
3.1  Piecewise linear regressions 
Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Holderness et al. (1999) estimate 
a piece-wise linear regression in which the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q as a proxy for 
corporate performance, and the primary independent variable is the fraction of shares 
owned by corporate insiders.  Morck et al. (1988) choose 5% and 25% of board 
ownership as the turning points for their regressions.  The 5% threshold is chosen based 
on Herman (1981), who uses the 5% ownership level as a focal stake beyond which 
ownership is no long negligible, and the Securities and Exchange Commission uses this 
level as a point of mandatory public disclosure of ownership.  The 25% threshold is 
used based on Weston (1979) who suggests 20%-30% as the ownership range beyond 
which a hostile bid for the firm cannot easily occur.  Letting BO as the fraction of board 
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ownership ( 10 ≤≤ BO ), the variables they use to estimate their regressions are: 
BRD.0to5 = BO if BO < 0.05; =0.05 if BO ≥ 0.05 
BRD.5to25 = 0 if BO < 0.05; = BO – 0.05 if 0.05 ≤ BO < 0.25; = 0.25 if BO ≥ 0.25 
BRD.OVER25 = 0 if BO < 0.25; = BO – 0.25 if BO ≥ 0.25 
One problem with their method is the arbitrariness of the choice of turning points.  They 
address this issue by specifying ownership variables with different turning points, such as 
2.5%, 7.5%, 15% and 20% for robustness tests.  They find that the R2 of the regression 
with 5% and 25% as turning points is higher than that of the other specifications they 
estimated.   
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Holderness et al. (1999) use a similar methodology to 
Morck et al. and get similar results.  Holderness et al. (1999) find similar shape of 
relation in their 1935 sample, but weaker relation in their 1995 sample.  They find a 
significant positive relation between firm performance and managerial ownership in the 
0-5% range of managerial shareholders but no statistically significant relation beyond 5% 
managerial shareholdings.   
However, Morck et al. (1988) note that there is no theoretical guidance for the choice of 
turning points.  Cho (1998) uses a grid search technique to find the two turning points.  
The procedure is as follows: first, find the level of insider ownership, starting with 0%, 
that produces the most significant slope coefficient on the first insider ownership variable 
in the regression; then fix this level, and search for the second ownership level that yields 
the most significant slope coefficients on the second and the third insider ownership 
variables in the regression; finally, using an iterated search technique around the two 
initial points, find the two levels of ownership that provide the most significant slope 
coefficients on the three insider ownership variables simultaneously.  Using a cross 
section of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms in 1991, he finds that Tobin’s Q and capital 
expenditure are significantly increasing for inside ownership in the [0,7%] range and 
significantly decreasing in the [7%, 38%] range.  He also finds that performance 
increases significantly with capital expenditure and vice-versa. 
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3.2  Quadratic and cubic regressions 
In addition to piecewise linear specifications in the regressions, which is at best ad hoc, 
some of the other studies, e.g. McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995) and Han and Suk 
(1998) introduce quadratic regression method to examine the non-linear relation between 
insider ownership and performance.  They include the square of insider ownership as 
one of the regressors and find the inflection points which are the percentage ownership of 
equity at which the value of Tobin’s Q reaches its maximum in the estimated regressions.   
McConnell and Servaes (1990) use some 1000 Compustat firms in two cross-sectional 
samples, one for 1976 and the other for 1986.  They find a significant curvilinear 
relation between Q and insider ownership with the curve sloping upward until insider 
ownership reaches approximately 40% to 50% and then slopes slightly downward.  
McConnell and Servaes (1995) extend their 1990 study to 1988 data and provide further 
evidence of the significant quadratic relation between Q and insider ownership. 
Their turning points are substantially higher than those found by Morck et al. (1988).  
Kole (1995) suspects that the reason for these different findings may be the differences in 
the sources of ownership data.  He contrasts three commonly used sources of managerial 
ownership data in the U.S., which are proxy materials provided by the firm, the CDE 
Stock ownership Profiles and Value Line Investment Surveys.  However the results of 
his empirical tests of the entrenchment of management through equity reveal a similar 
pattern of estimates for each of the three ownership sources, which reject the hypothesis 
that the contradictory findings are the results of differences in ownership data.  
Meanwhile he discovers that the size of sample firms may affect the incentive alignment 
effect of ownership in that the positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial 
ownership is sustained at higher levels of ownership for small firms than it is for large 
firms.  Hence the different findings of Morck et al. and McConnell and Servaes may be 
attributable to differences in the size of the firms analyzed.   
Han and Suk (1998) base their study on the 1988-1992 sample period.  They use stock 
returns as a measure of performance and both managerial ownership and its square as one 
of the independent variables.  They find that the level of insider ownership is positively 
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related to performance up to about 41.8 percent of insider ownership, but after that the 
relationship is negative.   
Short and Keasey (1999) note the problem of pre-determining the turning points, too.  
As a general extension of the piecewise model, their model includes three variables to 
describe managerial ownership, which are the percentage of shares owned by managers, 
the square and cube, respectively, of the percentage of shares owned by managers.  They 
argue that this method allows the coefficients on the managerial ownership variables to 
determine their own turning points.  They utilize both accounting (return on 
shareholders’ equity) and market (valuation ratio) measures of the performance of firms.  
Based on a sample of all British firms quoted on the Official List of the London Stock 
Exchange for the period 1988 to 1992, they test for a cubic form of the relationship 
between the performance of firms and managerial ownership with the percentage of 
shares owned by managers, its square and its cube as the measures of managerial 
ownership.  They argue that due to greater institutional monitoring and lesser ability to 
mount takeover defenses in the U. K. than in the U. S., management should become 
entrenched at higher levels of ownership in the U. K..  The empirical results confirm this 
hypothesis.  Moreover the results suggest that non-linear relationship found in the U. S. 
based studies is robust to the U. K. firms.   
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) select 435 of the 100 largest non-financial companies in 
each of 12 European nations for the period 1990-1995.  Ownership concentration is 
defined as the percentage of shares owned by the largest owner.  They find that 
ownership concentration is positively correlated to market-to-book value of equity and 
asset returns, but the effect is less for higher ownership shares.   
4  Endogeneity of ownership and performance 
In addition to the combination of convergence-of-interests and entrenchment 
interpretation of the non-linear relationship between ownership and performance, an 
alternative interpretation is that the inverted-U relation represents a value-maximizing 
relation between two endogenous variables.  In an OLS regression model, regressors 
and unobservables are assumed to be uncorrelated.  But if some characteristics that have 
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a direct effect on both left- and right- side variables are omitted (known as “unobserved 
heterogeneity”), reduced-form regressions will generate inconsistent parameter estimates 
which can lead to a misinterpretation of regression results and incorrect management 
decisions.  Examples of unobserved heterogeneity include superior monitoring 
technology, intangible assets, and degree of market power (Himmelberg et al., 1999).  
Himmelberg et al. (1999) also justifies through a simple empirical framework that it is 
reasonable to regard ownership structure as an exogenous variable for a short period of 
time when ownership structure remains stable.  However, over a long period ownership 
structure will adjust to economic circumstances.  Therefore for longer data periods the 
endogeneity problem is likely to exist and ordinary least squares will generate 
inconsistent parameter estimators. 
Other recent studies dealing with this problem include Lorderer and Martin (1997), Cho 
(1998), Cole and Mehran (1998), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Palia (2001), Firth et al. 
(2002) and Pedersen and Thomsen (2003).  The methods used include adding 
potentially-omitted control variables (xit), and different estimators such as instrumental 
variables, panel data methods, and simultaneous equations.  Sections 4.1 to 4.4 explain 
these methods respectively.  Additionally Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2003) specify a 
structural value-maximizing model of the firm.  Their model and estimates illustrate the 
potential for endogeneity issues to vitiate the interpretation of results from reduced form 
regressions of firm performance measures on corporate ownership measures.  In 
particular they examine the efficiency of standard econometric approaches to endogeneity 
and find the endogeneity problem is substantial and difficult to correct using any of the 
existing methods.  Details of their method are discussed in section 4.5.   
4.1  Controls for omitted variables 
To address the concern that the significant correlation between performance and 
ownership structure is a spurious result of a correlation between these two variables and a 
third omitted variable, the OLS solution is to find some control variables as proxy 
variables for the unobserved characteristics.  For example, Morck et al. (1988) include 
two sets of controls.  One set of variables are observable measures of intangible assets 
that affect Q, including R&D expenditures and advertising expenditures (both divided by 
 47
the replacement cost of assets, to be compatible with Q), the other set of variables are 
those that might affect both unobservable intangible assets and board ownership, 
including the ratio of the calculated market value of the firm’s long-term debt to assets as 
a measure of the value of corporate tax shields, assets as a measure of size, and 
three-digit SIC code dummies.  The R2 is substantially increased when including these 
control variables in their regressions and the coefficient of board ownership over 25% 
turns from negative to positive, which therefore suggests a curvilinear relationship.  
Following Morck et al. (1988), similarly, McConnell and Servaes (1990) include 
financial leverage, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and assets as control variables.  
However they find no change in their conclusions about the relation between corporate 
value and ownership structure after including these control variables, although most of 
the variables enter the regression significantly. 
4.2  Instrumental variables estimation 
Consider a simple traditional OLS model, 
εβ += 11 ii xy   
where 1ii νηε +=  
if the error term ε contains an omitted variable iη  that is correlated with one of the 
explanatory variable x, that is, Cov(xi1, ε )≠ 0,  xi1 is potentially endogenous and the 
OLS regression will generate inconsistent estimators.  But if an external instrument zi 
that is uncorrelated with both υi1 and ηi but correlated with xi1, that is, Cov(zi, iη )= 0, we 
can get a consistent estimator of β : 
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When there is more than one instrumental variable available for x, we have to decide 
which one to use.  The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is proved to be the most 
efficient one (details can be found in Wooldridge (2002) among others).   
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However, identifying instrumental variables is difficult in practice because the natural 
instruments—the observed firm characteristics xi1—are already included in the control 
variables, which means that the variables that plausibly determine the optimal level of 
ownership might also affect Tobin’s Q.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) use lagged 
explanatory variables as instruments for managerial ownership and find that the 
instrumental variable estimator increases the magnitude of the ownership effect on firm 
value.  They report that a Hausman specification test rejects the exogeneity assumption.  
However their choice of instruments is not validated.  Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue 
that using firm size and stock price volatility as instruments is more plausible because the 
effects of these two variables on performance are much weaker than other control 
variables do.  They find a large and statistically significant inverse-U relation between 
ownership and firm value in their pooling without controlling for industry or firm effects.  
This result is robust to the inclusion of industry effects, but not to firm effects.  The 
standard errors rise substantially.  Therefore the hypothesis that the firm effects are 
jointly zero cannot be rejected, which probably means that by using instrumental 
variables, the endogeneity problem has been controlled.   
4.3  Panel data: fixed effects 
The motivation for using panel data is its ability to control for possibly correlated, 
time-invariant heterogeneity without observing it.  Consider the above OLS model again.  
If the panel data of y and x are available, for example, yi2 and xi2 are observed, 
222 iiii xy νηβ ++=  
and both υi1 and υi2 satisfy E(υit / xi1, xi2, iη )=0.  Then β  is identified in the 
regression in first-differences even if iη  is not observed.  So that 
)()( 121212 iiiiii xxyy ννβ −+−=−                    
and  
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When iη , which captures the differences across units, is assumed to be a constant term, 
which means that the same units are repeatedly sampled for a given period holding 
constant the effect, this sampling process is called “fixed effect”.  Contrarily if iη  is 
treated as a random variable, the sampling process is called “random effect”. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) extend the Demsetz and Lehn study by adding new variables to 
explain the variation in ownership structure.  Except for instrumental variables, they 
also use a fixed effect panel data model to control for various possible unobserved 
heterogeneities.  They fit both the quadratic and linear piecewise forms to control for the 
non-linearity of the performance equation.  Controlling for the variables that are found 
to be significant relative to insider ownership (capital-to-sales, R&D-to-sales, 
advertising-to-sales and operating income to sales ratios), and for fixed firm effects, they 
find that changes in ownership holdings have no significant impact on performance.  
But when they use instrumental variables, they find a quadratic relationship between 
ownership and performance. 
4.4  Simultaneous equations 
Lorderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Palia (2001) 
and Firth et al. (2002) suggest using simultaneous equations to address the endogeneity 
problem.   
Lorderer and Martin (1997) use acquisition data to estimate a two-equation simultaneous 
model in which acquisition performance and insider holdings are endogenous.  In their 
model acquisition performance is determined by insider ownership, firm size and the 
medium of payment in the acquisition.  The determinants of insider ownership include 
acquisition performance, firm size and stock return volatility.  They estimate the model 
with 2SLS after confirming they meet the necessary conditions for identification.  Their 
results suggest that insider ownership fails to predict performance, while performance is a 
negative predictor of insider ownership.  Results are similar when they estimate a 
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three-equation simultaneous model (including an equation of the change in the equity 
ratio) with 2SLS. 
Cho (1998) estimates a simultaneous equations system of ownership structure, 
investment, and corporate value using the 2SLS and three-stage least squares method 
(which report similar results).  The model he constructs is as follows: 
Insider ownership = f (Market value of firm’s common equity; Corporate value; 
Investment; Volatility of earnings; Liquidity; Industry dummies) 
Corporate value = g (Insider ownership; Investment; Financial leverage; Assets size; 
Industry dummies) 
Investment = h (Insider ownership; Corporate value; Volatility of earnings; Liquidity; 
Industry dummies) 
Based on a sample of a cross-section of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms in 1991, he 
finds that investment affects corporate value, which, in turn, affects ownership structure, 
but not vice-versa.  This finding reverses the interpretation of the results from the 
piecewise OLS linear regression of corporate value on ownership structure. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) conduct a two-equation simultaneous system in which 
ownership is made multi-dimensional: 
Firm performance = f (percentage of shares owned by management; percentage of shares 
owned by the five largest shareholders; advertising expenditures as a fraction of sales 
revenues; R&D expenditures as a fraction of sales revenues; expenditures on fixed plant 
and equipment as a fraction a sales revenues; leverage; four-firm market concentration 
ratio; indicator variables for utilities industries; media industries and financial 
industries) 
Fraction of shares owned by management = g (firm performance; market risk of stock; 
firm-specific risk; firm size; leverage; indicator variables for utilities industries; media 
industries; and finance industries) 
They estimate both OLS and 2SLS regressions and compare their estimates.  No 
statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance is 
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found.  They explain it as that the market responds to forces that create suitable 
ownership structures for firms, and this removes any predictable relation between 
empirically observed ownership structures and firm rates of return.   
Firth et al. (2002) assume that there is a trade off between ownership patterns and 
governance control factors to achieve an optimal structure that reduces agency costs and 
increases firm value.  Therefore they hypothesize that while regression models may 
yield significant causal relationships between the performance and individual governance 
mechanism in isolation, the causal relationships may disappear when the endogeneity 
problem is controlled.  They develop a seven equation simultaneous equation model in 
which Equations 1-6 capture the interrelationships among six control mechanisms: 
institutional ownership, ownership concentration, capital structure, board of directors' 
control, managerial compensation, and government.  Equation 7 captures the 
relationship between the control mechanisms and firm performance.  They include 
several instrumental variables to enable the use of 2SLS estimates.  These include firm 
size, firm risk, firm age, average return on assets, board size and dummies for foreign 
shareholding, location, duality and paid chairman.  They compare the results of OLS 
and 2SLS regressions and find that generally, while there is evidence of significant 
relationships between the governance control mechanisms (including ownership structure) 
and firm performance, these do indeed disappear when using simultaneous equation 
estimation.   
However, Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Barnhart and Rosentein (1998) point out that the 
results using a simultaneous equation framework seem very dependent on model 
specification. 
4.5  Structural model of the firm 
Some recent studies of corporate finance, e.g. Zingales (2000) and Himmelberg et al. 
(2004) call for a quantitative theory of the firm that is empirically implementable and 
testable and that allows an assessment of the economic significance of various 
dimensions of the organization.  There was no such kind of structural model of the firm 
until Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2003) (CLM), who augment the principal-agent 
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model of Holmstom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1983) with an investment 
decision and specify a simple structural model of the firm.   
The definitions for the symbols in the CLM model are as follows: I, the firm’s investment; 
g, the manager’s effort; parameter y, the productivity of assets; parameter z, managerial 
effort; p, operating profit margin net of all input costs other than the cost of initial assets 
and the manager’s share; ),0(~~ 2σε N , idiosyncratic firm risk; parameter x; w~ , the 
uncertain wage; C(g), the money equivalent cost of effort; parameter r, the degree of risk 
aversion; δ, increasing in ownership; 
z
zn −= 1 . 
Firm cash flow, gross of initial investment, is defined by 
ε~~ xzy IgpIf +≡                (1) 
The manager’s utility function is 
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The manager’s reservation utility constraint is 
1][ )0( −=−≥ −reUE                (4) 
Maximizing his/her expected utility function, subject to the reservation utility constraint 
give the manager’s optimal effort (the incentive constraint):   
zypIzg −= 1
1
)(* δ                 (5) 
Shareholders’ expected total surplus is 
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Shareholders’ reservation utility constraint is 
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Maximizing shareholders’ expected total surplus (6) subject to their reservation utility 
constraint (7), the incentive constraint (the manager’s optimal effort) (5) and the 
requirement for shareholder participation (S≥0) gives the principal’s optimal choice of 
ownership and assets. 
The first-order conditions for the principal’s choice of ownership and assets are 
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Model generated Q is defined as the total of maximized surplus, optimal initial 
investment and the random shock, all scaled by optimal initial investment, or 
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They calibrate the model to data to obtain estimates of structural parameters.  Based on 
the model calibration, managerial ownership and total assets from the model match those 
in their sample of actual firms.  Their model provides an equilibrium explanation for the 
inverse-U shaped relation between performance and managerial ownership.  They then 
simulate the model to create a data panel for which the underlying structural model and 
appropriate empirical specification are all known.  As they point out, “one significant 
benefit of fitting a structural model to data is the ability to gauge the economic 
significance of the underlying structural parameters as determinants of organizational 
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form.”  They conclude that there are significant difficulties in using fixed effects and all 
other standard econometric remedies fail to provide a solution to the endogeneity 
problem as well.  The CLM model provides an example of how a structural model of the 
firm can isolate the important aspects of governance and quantify the economic 
significance of incentive mechanisms.   
However, due to the large number of exponents in the equations (8) and (9), a small 
change in the values of the estimates could make the model difficult or impossible to 
solve.  This high sensitivity to the data range implies that it is not as practical as 
standard econometric methods.  Moreover, this method models the relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance.  For the relationship between general 
ownership concentration or control structure and performance, further developments are 
required. 
5  Other studies 
Whilst most studies examine the ownership-performance relationship through comparing 
the performance of firms with different ownership structures, some relate ownership 
structure to actions or events which are believed to affect future corporate performance.   
Smith (1990) suggests that the major shift in corporate ownership structure and the 
monitoring environment after a management buyout should improve the firm’s operating 
performance.  He finds supportive evidence in 58 management buyouts of American 
public companies completed during the years of 1977 and 1986.  Lemon and Lins (2003) 
argue that during the East Asian Financial Crisis, firms’ values should decline the most in 
firms where managers employ ownership structures that allow them to effectively control 
the firm while reducing the cash flow rights associated with their control rights.  They 
find that cumulative stock returns of the firms in which managers and their families 
separate their control and cash flow rights through pyramid ownership structure are lower 
by 10-20 percentage points more during the crisis period compared to those of other 
firms.   
Studies on thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership also provide 
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dynamic evidence on the relationship between the changes in ownership and performance.  
Thrift institutions are chosen for two reasons.  One reason is that the Post-Conversion 
Anti-Takeover Rule restricts any insider or outsider from owning more than 10% of a 
converting thrift’s equity for three to five years following conversion, which protects 
insider managers from the discipline of the market for corporate control and prevent a 
recently converted institution from choosing the optimal percentage of insider ownership.  
The other reason is that the regulatory provisions for the thrift industry ensure the 
homogeneity of production technology and accounting practices, which allows the 
controlling of intra-industry differences across firms.  Cole and Mehran (1998) conduct 
an event study and OLS regressions using a sample of 94 thrift institutions that converted 
from mutual to stock ownership between 1983 and 1987.  They find a significant 
increase in the percentage of the firm owned by the largest inside stockholder and a 
significant improvement in firm performance after the anti-takeover provisions expired, 
and the greater the increase in insider ownership, the greater the improvement in 
performance.  No link is found between firm performance and ownership by the largest 
institutional or non-institutional outside bloc holders.  Literature on IPOs also 
contributes to researches on the relationship between ownership and performance. 
There are also some studies exploring the influence of ownership structure through 
examining the difference of agency costs associated with firms with different ownership 
structure.  For example, Ang et al. (2000) conduct a study to test Jenson and Meckling’s 
agency costs hypothesis.  Agency theory predicts that agency costs should be higher 
among firms that are not 100% owned by their managers than those that are totally 
managed by their owners.  Agency costs should also increase as managerial ownership 
declines.  Their results provide evidence for the hypotheses.  Additionally they find 
that delegated monitoring of small firms by banks reduces agency costs.  Singh and 
Davidson (2003) extend their work to large firms and provide complementary evidence to 
Ang et al.  They find that in large publicly traded corporations, managerial ownership 
significantly alleviates principal-agent conflicts even in the presence of other agency 
deterrent mechanisms. 
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6  Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the main empirical literature concerning the relationship between 
ownership and performance.  Descriptive evidence shows that the degree of ownership 
concentration around the world is not as dispersed as predicted by early literature such as 
Berle and Means (1932).  Relatively concentrated ownership is found in most countries 
around the world, even in the U.S.  However, the degree of ownership concentration 
differs among countries.  The U. S. and the U. K. are notably outsider systems where 
companies’ ownership is relatively dispersed, while continental European countries are 
notably insider systems where companies’ ownership is relatively concentrated.  This 
suggests national effects could be a significant controlling variable in cross-country 
studies. 
Most pre-1990 studies classify control types as owner-controlled type and 
manager-controlled type.  They compare firm performance between different control 
type firms to test the efficiency of bloc-shareholders in reducing agency costs.  While 
the majority of early studies find evidences for convergence-in-interest hypothesis, their 
results are often statistically insignificant (Short, 1994).  Post 1990 studies start to use 
continuous ownership concentration variables.  The impact of degree of internal control 
(managerial ownership) and external control (ownership concentration of 
bloc-shareholders) is extensively investigated.  Various firm performance and ownership 
measures are applied in these studies.  Some of the studies take consideration of 
controlling effects from the company’s market monopoly power or industry effects, or 
relate ownership structure to actions or events which are believed to affect future 
corporate performance.  Positive, negative, non-linear or insignificant results are 
evidenced across different studies.  This ambiguous conclusion calls for further 
investigation. 
Only a few among the most recent studies investigate the impact of the identities of 
external controllers on firm performance, which could be one of the reasons for the 
inconclusive results of previous studies.  Significant results are found despite of 
inconsistency of signs of the impacts.  This demonstrates that the inclusion of owner 
identity is crucial to the understanding of relationship between ownership and firm 
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performance.   
The reason for the inconclusive results of existing empirical studies may lie in the way 
two methodological issues are dealt with: non-monotonic relationships and the 
endogeneity problem.  Econometric methods to test a non-linear relationship include 
piecewise linear regression and quadratic and cubic regression.  The standard 
econometric approaches to deal with the endogeneity problem include adding 
potentially-omitted control variables, instrument variables, panel data methods and 
simultaneous equations.  The CLM structural model of the firm allows an assessment of 
the economic significance of various dimensions of the organization.  However, due to 
the sensitivity of the model to data, it is difficult to implement and test empirically.   
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Chapter Three  Ownership Data and Descriptive Evidence 
The previous two chapters investigate theoretical and empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship between ownership and control structure and performance.  Three key 
issues regarding ownership and control are identified: measurements of degree of control, 
location of control and the power of multiple large shareholders.   
While a conventional measurement of ownership concentration is to use the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest shareholder, more recent studies suggest that more precise 
measurements are required to capture the real degree of control of large shareholders.  
Moreover, the identities of controllers are very different among countries.  Degree of 
control and location of control should be viewed as variables that exert a simultaneous, 
but different influence on the performance of European companies.  Evidence also 
shows European companies have the history of having influential multiple large 
shareholders for long periods of time who actively monitor a firm’s performance 
(Krivogorsky, 2006).  The presence of multiple large shareholders is still common in 
European economics, although the threshold of defining bloc holders varies among 
countries.   
This chapter aims to provide descriptive evidence on the ownership and control structure 
of European companies.  It starts by introducing the ownership database and the sample 
used in this chapter.  Each of the three key issues is discussed in separate sections: Is 
ownership dispersed or concentrated? Who controls firms? And how great is the power of 
multiple large shareholders?  To investigate national and industry differences, results are 
presented as whole sample, by country and by industry respectively.  
1  Database and sample 
The Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (BvD) ownership database is used.  This database seeks 
to track control relationships rather than patrimonial relationships.  Voting shares data 
are recorded when both voting shares and non-voting shares data are available.   
The original sample consists of the largest 5000 European companies according to their 
market capitalization in 2004.  It covers 28 European countries and 55 industries under 
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the 2-digit NACE Rev.11.  The database provides cross-sectional information of the top 
20 shareholders’ ownership in each company by November 2004.   
After excluding companies with insufficient data, there are 3605 companies left.  
Excluding companies that are majority (≥50%) owned by other industrial companies, 
there are 1291 companies left.  These 1291 companies comprise the sample I use in this 
chapter.  This chapter focuses on the main countries and industries that have no less than 
35 companies in the sample.  These countries are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U. K..  These industries are: 
manufacture of food products and beverages (FBE), manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products (CHE), electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply (ELE), 
construction (CON), wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (WTR), retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, repair of 
personal and household goods (RTR), financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding (FINA), and other business activities (OTH).  
2  Dispersed or concentrated ownership 
2.1  Independence indicators 
The BvD independence indices measure the degree of independence of a company with 
regard to its shareholders.  The qualifications of independence indicators are presented 
in Table 3.1.  Since the more independent the company with regard to its shareholders, 
the less control of shareholders, the degree of independence is positively related to degree 
of dispersion of ownerships.  “A+”, “A”, “A-”, “B+”, “B”, “B-”, and “C” signify 
descending degrees of independence.  Companies belonging to categories “A+”, “A”, or 
“A-” have no recorded shareholder with an ownership over 24.99%. Therefore their 
ownership is relatively dispersed.  Companies belonging to categories “B+”, “B”, or 
“B-” have one or more shareholders with an ownership between 24.99% and 49.99%.  
Therefore their ownership is concentrated at a medium level.  The rest of companies 
have a recorded shareholder with an ownership over 49.99% or have an ultimate owner.  
They are regarded as highly concentrated companies with an independence index of “C”.  
In the original sample consisting 3605 companies, over 77% companies are indicated as 
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Table 3.1  Description of independence indicators 
Indicator Description 
A+ Any company with no recorded shareholder with an ownership over 24.99% (either direct or 
total), also companies with 6 or more identified shareholders whose ownership percentage is 
known 
A As above, but includes companies with 4 or 5 identified shareholders 
A- As above, but includes companies with 1 to 3 identified shareholders 
B+ Any company with no recorded shareholder with an ownership percentage (direct or total) 
over 49.99%, but having one or more shareholders with an ownership percentage over 24.99%, 
also companies with 6 or more identified shareholders whose ownership percentage is known 
B As above but includes companies with 4 or 5 identified shareholders 
B- As above but includes companies with 1 to 3 identified shareholders 
C Any company with a recorded shareholder with an ownership (direct or total) over 49.99%.  
The C indicator is also given to a company when a source indicates that the company has an 
Ultimate Owner. 
U Companies not falling into the categories above, indicating an unknown degree of 
independence 
Source: Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing, 2004. 
 “C”, which is consistent with the fact that over 64% companies in that sample are 
subsidiaries. The results for the sample excluding subsidiaries are shown in Table 3.2. 
In the whole sample, over 40% of the companies belong to category A group (A+, A and 
A-), indicating that they have no recorded shareholder with an ownership over 24.99%.  
On the other hand, over 36% of the companies belong to “C”, indicating that they have a 
recorded shareholder with an ownership over 49.99%.  The remaining 23.1% of 
companies have a medium level of ownership concentration (B, B+ or B-).  It appears 
that European companies tend to be either relatively dispersed or highly concentrated.   
In all except Belgium, France, Germany and Italy, relatively dispersed ownership (A+, A 
and A-) tend to dominate.  The U.K. has the highest percentage of companies with 
dispersed ownership.  Over 70% of British companies are classified as “A+”, “A” or 
“A-”.  In Finland, Netherlands and Switzerland, almost half of the companies have 
dispersed ownership.  However, a significant percentage (over 20%) of companies with 
highly concentrated ownership (C) is also found in these countries.  In Belgium, 
Germany and Italy, highly concentrated ownership (C) is the dominant ownership form.  
French companies’ ownership concentration pattern is less clear, since there are similar 
percentages of companies within the dispersed category (A+, A and A-) and the 
concentrated category “C”.  In none of the countries does a medium level of ownership 
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Table 3.2  Degree of control in Europe based on independence indicators 
 A+ A A- Total 
A group 
B+ B B- Total 
B group 
C Total 
Panel A Number of companies 
Whole sample 309 75 141 525 254 13 31 298 467 1291 
United Kingdom 84 50 58 192 5 4 6 15 63 477 
Belgium 4 1 6 11 5 0 2 7 17 53 
Finland 16 0 3 19 9 0 1 10 11 69 
France 60 1 6 67 43 0 1 44 60 282 
Germany 50 2 19 71 70 0 7 77 127 423 
Italy 10 0 9 19 11 1 2 14 44 110 
Netherlands 22 5 8 35 14 2 3 19 21 129 
Spain 16 2 6 24 19 0 2 21 16 106 
Sweden 16 2 1 19 16 2 0 18 10 84 
Switzerland 11 2 11 24 2 0 3 5 22 80 
FBE 6 2 8 16 7 2 0 9 19 69 
CHE 12 4 9 25 10 2 2 14 13 91 
ELE 9 2 4 15 18 0 1 19 34 102 
CON 16 6 12 34 9 3 2 14 9 105 
WTR 38 6 11 55 17 2 2 21 27 179 
RTR 27 5 9 41 5 0 1 6 33 127 
FINA 3 2 5 10 7 0 0 7 20 54 
OTH 89 13 29 131 68 3 7 78 127 545 
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: FBE: manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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Table 3.2  Degree of control in Europe based on independence indicators (continued) 
 A+ A A- Total 
A group 
B+ B B- Total 
B group 
C Total 
Panel B Percentage of companies (%) 
Whole sample 24.0 5.8 10.9 40.7 19.7 1.0 2.4 23.1 36.2 100.0 
United Kingdom 31.1 18.5 21.5 71.1 1.9 1.5 2.2 5.6 23.3 100.0 
Belgium 11.4 2.9 17.1 31.4 14.3 0.0 5.7 20.0 48.6 100.0 
Finland 40.0 0.0 7.5 47.5 22.5 0.0 2.5 25.0 27.5 100.0 
France 35.1 0.6 3.5 39.2 25.1 0.0 0.6 25.7 35.1 100.0 
Germany 18.2 0.7 6.9 25.8 25.5 0.0 2.5 28.0 46.2 100.0 
Italy 13.0 0.0 11.7 24.7 14.3 1.3 2.6 18.2 57.1 100.0 
Netherlands 29.3 6.7 10.7 46.7 18.7 2.7 4.0 25.4 28.0 100.0 
Spain 26.2 3.3 9.8 39.3 31.1 0.0 3.3 34.4 26.2 100.0 
Sweden 34.0 4.3 2.1 40.4 34.0 4.3 0.0 38.3 21.3 100.0 
Switzerland 21.6 3.9 21.6 47.1 3.9 0.0 5.9 9.8 43.1 100.0 
FBE 13.6 4.5 18.2 36.3 15.9 4.5 0.0 20.4 43.2 100.0 
CHE 23.1 7.7 17.3 48.1 19.2 3.8 3.8 26.8 25.0 100.0 
ELE 13.2 2.9 5.9 22.0 26.5 0.0 1.5 28.0 50.0 100.0 
CON 28.1 10.5 21.1 59.7 15.8 5.3 3.5 24.6 15.8 100.0 
WTR 36.9 5.8 10.7 53.4 16.5 1.9 1.9 20.3 26.2 100.0 
RTR 33.8 6.3 11.3 51.4 6.3 0.0 1.3 7.6 41.3 100.0 
FINA 8.1 5.4 13.5 27.0 18.9 0.0 0.0 18.9 54.1 100.0 
OTH 26.5 3.9 8.6 39.0 20.2 0.9 2.1 23.2 37.8 100.0 
 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
 63
concentration (B, B+ or B-) play a significant role.  
Chemical products manufacture (CHE), construction (CON), wholesale trade (WTR) and 
retail trade (RTR) seem to be dominated by relatively dispersed ownership (A+, A and 
A-), while companies in the industries of food and beverage product manufacture (FBE), 
utility suppliers (ELE) and financial intermediation (FINA) are characterised by highly 
concentrated ownership (C).  Again, no dominating pattern of medium concentration (B, 
B+ and B-) is found in any of the industries. 
2.2  Concentration indices 
Traditional continuous ownership concentration variables are defined as the total 
percentage ownership of a number of largest shareholders.  Cubbin and Leech (1983) 
suggest another dimension of the separation of ownership and control which is crucial to 
the empirical tests: the degree of control.  They construct a continuous variable which 
measures the discretion of the controlling part to pursue its own objectives and is related 
to its voting power: the Herfindahl index (H), defined as  
∑
=
=
N
i
ipH
1
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where N is the number of bloc shareholders and Pi equals the number of shares (votes) 
shareholder i holds divided by the total number of shares held by the N bloc shareholders. 
I use five concentration indices C1, C3, C5, C10, C20, which are defined as the 
percentage ownership or combined ownership of the largest 1, 3 5, 10, and 20 
shareholders.  I also use the Herfindahl index to take account of the degree of dispersion 
of the largest 20 shareholdings.  Variables are described in Table 3.3.  The average 
(un-weighted) values for the main countries and industries are shown in Table 3.4.  The 
data for the whole sample show that the ownership of the largest shareholder averages 
44.5% and that of the largest three shareholders averages 60%.  These figures are both 
similar to La Porta et al. (1998).  Differences between the averages of the combined 
ownership of the largest 3, 5, 10 and 20 shareholders are not significant, indicating that 
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there are normally less than three bloc-holders in the controlling coalitions.  
Table 3.3  Definitions of continuous ownership concentration variables 
Variable Description 
C1 Percentage ownership of the largest shareholder 
C3 Combined ownership of the largest 3 shareholders 
C5 Combined ownership of the largest 5 shareholders 
C10 Combined ownership of the largest 10 shareholders 
C20 Combined ownership of the largest 20 shareholders 
H Herfindahl index of up to top 20 shareholders 
Table 3.4  Degree of control in Europe based on continuous indices in Europe 
 C1 C3 C5 C10 C20 H 
Whole sample 44.50  60.02  64.51  67.26  67.88  0.35  
U.K.   29.29  36.90  40.19  41.82  41.96  0.21  
Belgium  41.82  53.41  55.93  56.64  56.72  0.28  
Finland  32.71  47.04  51.80  57.25  59.36  0.20  
France  52.96  72.14  77.39  80.97  81.85  0.42  
Germany  54.28  75.27  79.84  82.25  83.01  0.47  
Italy  45.22  58.26  61.51  63.57  63.79  0.32  
Netherlands  43.49  55.78  60.84  64.06  64.60  0.35  
Spain  36.60  53.45  59.25  65.94  67.96  0.25  
Sweden  43.22  59.86  65.50  71.78  72.77  0.31  
Switzerland  38.31  50.53  53.76  55.24  55.35  0.27  
FBE 46.70  59.98  63.67  65.25  65.28  0.38  
CHE 35.39  50.94  54.20  55.96  56.18  0.24  
ELE 48.12  64.02  68.61  70.94  71.33  0.38  
CON 25.03  39.17  44.04  47.17  47.65  0.16  
WTR 46.49  60.48  64.45  67.32  68.85  0.39  
RTR 43.88  55.23  58.40  60.77  61.16  0.35  
FINA 55.22  69.19  73.83  76.37  76.81  0.48  
OTH 46.72  62.48  67.14  70.65  71.37  0.36  
 
Note: Figures are in percentages except H.  FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, 
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply; CON, 
construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, 
retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, 
financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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The average ownership in British companies is the lowest compared to companies in 
other European countries, in terms of traditional ownership concentration indices C1, C3, 
C5, C10 and C20.  Finnish, Belgian, Spanish and Swiss companies also have lower than 
sample average figures. This indicates these companies are characterized by relatively 
dispersed ownership.  French and German companies have higher than sample average 
figures, which means that they are characterized by relatively concentrated ownership.  
The figures for Italy, Netherlands and Sweden are similar to the sample averages. 
The Herfindahl index (H) gives results similar to the traditional ownership concentration 
indices, but in the form of a single statistic than a multi-dimensioned measure.  
Companies in France and Germany have a higher than average value, indicating a 
relatively concentrated ownership pattern, while Dutch, Italian and Swedish companies 
are “representative” in that their H values are similar to the sample average.  All other 
countries are characterised by dispersed company ownership since their H values are 
significantly lower than the sample average. Among the latter, Finnish and British 
companies’ ownership are the most dispersed. 
Companies in chemical product manufacture (CHE), construction (CON) and retail trade 
(RTR) have lower than sample average values for most of the variables, indicating a 
relatively dispersed ownership pattern in these industries.  Among these construction 
(CON) is the most dispersed.  Financial intermediations (FINA) have the most 
concentrated ownership since their figures are the highest above the sample averages.  
Utility suppliers (ELE) are also characterized by relatively concentrated ownership.  For 
companies in food and beverage products manufacture (FBE) and wholesale trade 
industries (WTR), the values of the traditional concentration indices C1, C3, C5, C10 and 
C20 are similar to European average.  However, their values of the Herfindahl index H 
are much higher than European average.   
2.3  Dichotomous-type variables 
Most previous studies apply fixed rules to classify ownership.  They are chosen based 
on different criteria from the point of view of different researchers.  The percentage 
ownership of the largest shareholder is often chosen as the threshold for classification.  
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In this study I chose 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 50% and 100% as the thresholds for degree of 
control of the largest shareholder.   
In addition to the Herfindahl index as a continuous index for ownership concentration, 
Cubbin and Leech (1983) build a probabilistic voting model as a variable rule to classify 
control.  The degree of control is defined as the probability of the leading k shareholders 
securing majority support in a contested vote: 
)(
K
K
k V
CΠΦ≅α  
where (.)Φ  is the standard normal distribution function such that if z ~ N(0, 1), then Pr 
[z < x] = )(xΦ  for any x. Π  is the assumed probability that shareholder i exercises his 
vote.  Here it is assumed to be 16.  And 
∑== ki ik pC 1 ; 
∑ +== N ki ik pV 1 2 ; 
N and Pi are as defined before. 
When k=1, the above index indicates the probability of the largest shareholder securing 
majority support in a contested vote.  Therefore, 11 pC =  and ∑ == Ni ipV 2 21 .  The 
degree of control of the largest individual shareholder is: 
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In this study, 1α  values of 90%, 95%, and 99% are chosen as the cut-off points to 
classify degree of control of the largest shareholder.  Therefore, based on one tailed 
                                                        
6 This assumed value is arbitrary.  However, Cubbin and Leech (1983) show that the degree of control is only slightly 
sensitive to the assumed value of Π. Their results based on different assumed values of Π (1, 0.5, 0.1 and 0.01) are 
similar to each other. 
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t-test values, a dummy for 1α  over 90% equals one when 282.1)(/ 211 ≥− pHp .  
1α is over 95% when 645.1)(/ 211 ≥− pHp  and over 99% when 
327.2)(/ 211 ≥− pHp .   
Table 3.5 summarises the abbreviations and definitions of the dichotomous control-type 
variables.  The results for main countries and industries are shown in Table 3.6.   
Table 3.5  Definitions of dichotomous control-type variables 
Variable Description 
OC1 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 5% 
OC2 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 10% 
OC3 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 20% 
OC4 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 30% 
OC5 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 50% 
OC6 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding equals 100% 
OC90 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 90% using probabilistic model. 
OC95 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 95% using probabilistic model. 
OC99 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 99% using probabilistic model. 
In almost all companies, the largest shareholder owns more than 5% shares.  In over half 
of the companies, the largest shareholding is over 30%.  In 35% of the companies the 
largest shareholding is over 50%.  Around 18.4% of the companies are wholly owned by 
other non-industrial companies.  In terms of the degree of control of the largest 
shareholder using the probabilistic model, in around 56% companies the degree of control 
exceeds 95% and in slightly less than half of the companies the degree of control exceeds 
99%. 
In 86% of British companies, the largest shareholding exceeds 5%.  However in only 
one third of the companies the largest shareholding exceeds 20%.  The percentage of 
wholly owned companies (by non-industrial companies) (OC6) is similar to that of the  
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Table 3.6  Degree of control in Europe based on dichotomous variables 
  OC1 OC2 OC3 OC4 OC5 OC6 OC90 OC95 OC99 
Whole sample 95 84 70 57 35 18 66 56 48 
United Kingdom  86 62 34 26 23 18 57 45 37 
Belgium  91 83 77 66 31 6 77 74 71 
Finland  90 80 68 40 23 5 63 53 43 
France  99 92 87 80 44 16 74 61 54 
Germany  98 93 84 71 46 24 62 54 48 
Italy  92 88 75 64 42 6 75 66 62 
Netherlands  99 84 60 45 31 23 65 56 48 
Spain  95 89 69 49 20 10 62 57 46 
Sweden  100 94 85 53 28 15 70 57 43 
Switzerland  98 78 63 47 33 12 73 63 59 
FBE 93 77 64 57 34 23 75 68 61 
CHE 96 85 73 60 46 17 71 56 42 
ELE 94 85 76 63 34 16 63 54 47 
CON 95 70 53 40 25 16 63 53 46 
WTR 93 85 70 53 32 14 61 54 47 
RTR 93 76 61 50 25 9 59 45 38 
FINA 84 70 62 57 38 16 70 59 57 
OTH 97 88 77 62 38 21 68 59 51 
 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and 
commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance 
and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
whole sample.  The percentages of British companies are the lowest in terms of most of 
the variables.  Finnish results are also below the sample average values in terms of all of 
the variables.  These results indicate that British and Finnish companies are 
characterised by relatively dispersed ownership.  Belgium, French and German results 
are above the whole sample results in terms of most of the variables, suggesting relatively 
highly concentrated company ownership in these countries.   
Retail trade (RTR) companies are characterised to be most dispersed since the 
percentages are always below the whole sample results.  Chemical products 
manufacturers (CHE) and other industries (OTH) companies are relatively concentrated 
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since their results tend to be above the whole sample results. 
3  Identity of control 
The BvD ownership database identifies 12 types of shareholders. Their abbreviations and 
definitions are summarised in Table 3.7.  Unlike other ownership identities who are 
recorded as individual ownerships, D, L, M and Z are recorded as combined ownership.   
Table 3.7  Definitions of owner identity codes 
Codes Identifications 
A Insurance 
B Banks 
C Industrial companies 
D Individuals or families, unnamed 
E Mutual & pension funds/nominees/trusts/trustees 
F Financial companies 
I One of more known individuals or families 
J Foundations/research institutes 
L Bulk lists of companies and private owners
M Employees/managers/directors 
S Public authorities, states, governments
Z General public (only applies to publicly listed companies) 
3.1  Identity of direct control 
In this study, the direct controllers are defined as the largest owner of the firm.  Table 
3.8 presents distribution of companies by the 12 owner identity types.  Based on direct 
ownership information, industrial companies (C) are the major controlling shareholders 
of European companies, even though subsidiary companies have been excluded from the 
original 3605 companies.  Mutual & pension funds/nominees/trusts/trustees (E) are the 
second largest identity of direct controllers, followed by known individuals or families (I).  
However, insurance companies (A), banks (B), mutual & pension 
funds/nominees/trusts/trustees (E) and financial companies (F) are all institutional 
investors.  In this sense, they can be classified as one category.  Classified in this way, 
institutional investors turn out to be the dominating direct controllers.   
In the U.K., mutual and pension funds/nominees/trusts/trustees (E) are the dominating 
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Table 3.8  Distribution of direct control identities in Europe 
 A B C D E F H I J L M S Z Total 
Panel A Number of companies 
Whole sample 37 98 376 24 208 106 2 197 26 36 5 96 80 1291 
United Kingdom 19 21 44 1 120 31 0 26 0 5 2 1 0 270 
Belgium 0 0 17 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 0 1 5 35 
Finland 0 0 14 0 9 0 0 5 1 2 0 8 1 40 
France 1 5 48 13 5 16 0 18 2 4 1 13 45 171 
Germany 10 23 84 3 5 16 2 91 3 12 0 13 14 276 
Italy 1 10 18 1 2 23 0 9 0 0 0 10 3 77 
Netherlands 6 13 16 1 14 1 0 4 9 2 0 7 2 75 
Spain 0 7 32 0 4 7 0 8 0 0 0 2 1 61 
Sweden 0 1 22 1 7 0 0 1 3 4 0 7 1 47 
Switzerland 0 1 14 3 9 2 0 13 1 2 1 2 3 51 
FBE 1 2 15 1 9 5 0 6 1 2 0 2 0 44 
CHE 3 7 15 1 10 3 0 6 1 2 0 1 3 52 
ELE 1 6 28 0 7 3 0 0 0 1 0 22 0 68 
CON 4 4 21 0 13 6 0 6 0 1 0 1 1 57 
WTR 2 4 35 12 12 4 0 23 3 4 0 1 2 102 
RTR 2 6 13 1 18 6 0 25 3 2 0 3 1 80 
FINA 1 10 8 0 7 5 0 3 0 1 0 1 1 37 
OTH 9 12 91 4 42 16 1 75 11 14 4 16 42 337 
(continued on next page) 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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Table 3.8  Distribution of direct control identities in Europe (continued) 
 A B C D E F H I J L M S Z Total 
Panel B Percentage of companies 
Whole sample 2.9  7.6  29.1  1.9  16.1  8.2  0.2  15.3  2.0  2.8  0.4  7.4  6.2  100.0  
United Kingdom 7.0  7.8  16.3  0.4  44.4  11.5  0.0  9.6  0.0  1.9  0.7  0.4  0.0  100.0  
Belgium 0.0  0.0  48.6  0.0  5.7  17.1  0.0  2.9  5.7  2.9  0.0  2.9  14.3  100.0  
Finland 0.0  0.0  35.0  0.0  22.5  0.0  0.0  12.5  2.5  5.0  0.0  20.0  2.5  100.0  
France 0.6  2.9  28.1  7.6  2.9  9.4  0.0  10.5  1.2  2.3  0.6  7.6  26.3  100.0  
Germany 3.6  8.3  30.4  1.1  1.8  5.8  0.7  33.0  1.1  4.3  0.0  4.7  5.1  100.0  
Italy 1.3  13.0  23.4  1.3  2.6  29.9  0.0  11.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  13.0  3.9  100.0  
Netherlands 8.0  17.3  21.3  1.3  18.7  1.3  0.0  5.3  12.0  2.7  0.0  9.3  2.7  100.0  
Spain 0.0  11.5  52.5  0.0  6.6  11.5  0.0  13.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  1.6  100.0  
Sweden 0.0  2.1  46.8  2.1  14.9  0.0  0.0  2.1  6.4  8.5  0.0  14.9  2.1  100.0  
Switzerland 0.0  2.0  27.5  5.9  17.6  3.9  0.0  25.5  2.0  3.9  2.0  3.9  5.9  100.0  
FBE 2.3  4.5  34.1  2.3  20.5  11.4  0.0  13.6  2.3  4.5  0.0  4.5  0.0  100.0  
CHE 5.8  13.5  28.8  1.9  19.2  5.8  0.0  11.5  1.9  3.8  0.0  1.9  5.8  100.0  
ELE 1.5  8.8  41.2  0.0  10.3  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.0  32.4  0.0  100.0  
CON 7.0  7.0  36.8  0.0  22.8  10.5  0.0  10.5  0.0  1.8  0.0  1.8  1.8  100.0  
WTR 2.0  3.9  34.3  11.8  11.8  3.9  0.0  22.5  2.9  3.9  0.0  1.0  2.0  100.0  
RTR 2.5  7.5  16.3  1.3  22.5  7.5  0.0  31.3  3.8  2.5  0.0  3.8  1.3  100.0  
FINA 2.7  27.0  21.6  0.0  18.9  13.5  0.0  8.1  0.0  2.7  0.0  2.7  2.7  100.0  
OTH 2.7  3.6  27.0  1.2  12.5  4.7  0.3  22.3  3.3  4.2  1.2  4.7  12.5  100.0  
 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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direct controllers of firms.  In total, over 60% of companies are directly controlled by 
institutional investors (A+B+E+F).  This result is no surprise for the U.K., whose 
financial markets are among the most active ones in the world.  The other two largest 
categories of direct owners are industrial companies (C) and known individuals or 
families (I). 
It is interesting to know that similar to the U.K., the dominating direct owners of Italian 
companies are financial companies (F).  Institutional investors as a whole (A+B+E+F) 
directly control almost 40% of Italian companies.  Industrial companies (C), known 
individuals or families (I) and government (S) control are also prevalent among Italian 
companies. 
The results for other countries are rather different.  In Germany and Switzerland, known 
individuals or families (I) are the dominating direct owners of companies, while public 
control (Z) is common among French companies.  In other countries such as Belgium, 
Finland, Netherland and Sweden, industrial companies (C) are the controlling direct 
owners of companies.  Industrial companies are the dominating direct controllers of 
companies in most of the industry categories, except retail trade industries (RTR) and 
financial industry (FINA).  Private shareholders especially known individuals or 
families (I) are the main direct controllers in retail trade industries (RTR).  Banks are the 
dominating direct controllers of financial companies (FINA).   
3.2  Identity of ultimate control 
The BvD database also provides ultimate ownership data.  To identify the possible 
ultimate owner of a company, it uses the independent indicators set out in Table 3.1 above: 
if the company has an independent indicator “A”, by definition it has no ultimate owner; 
if the company has an indicator “B” or “C”, BvD follows the upward path (links with 
percentage over 24.99%) through its shareholders until reaching a company with an “A”, 
who is the ultimate owner, or a company with no known ultimate owner. 
Table 3.9 presents the distribution of companies ultimately owned by the 12 owner 
identity types.  In the whole sample, known individuals or families (I) turn out to be the  
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Table 3.9  Distribution of ultimate control identities in Europe 
 A B C D E F I J L M S Z Total 
Panel A Number of companies 
Whole sample 7 46 143 0 13 15 181 1 0 3 129 0 538 
United Kingdom 1 8 24 0 7 6 15 0 0 1 2 0 64 
Belgium 0 0 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 16 
Finland 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 7 0 14 
France 0 5 20 0 2 1 40 0 0 1 14 0 83 
Germany 5 15 25 0 0 4 65 0 0 0 19 0 133 
Italy 0 6 6 0 0 2 15 0 0 0 13 0 42 
Netherlands 0 2 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 9 0 24 
Spain 0 3 6 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 2 0 23 
Sweden 0 0 12 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 9 0 24 
Switzerland 0 0 5 0 2 0 11 0 0 1 2 0 21 
FBE 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 17 
CHE 0 2 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 7 0 21 
ELE 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 43 
CON 0 0 6 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 15 
WTR 0 2 9 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 2 0 28 
RTR 0 3 4 0 1 0 20 0 0 0 3 0 31 
FINA 0 12 3 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 22 
OTH 7 11 30 0 5 2 74 1 0 2 20 0 152 
(continued on next page) 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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Table 3.9  Distribution of ultimate control identities in Europe (continued) 
 A B C D E F I J L M S Z Total 
Panel B Percentage of companies 
Whole sample 1.3 8.6 26.6 0.0 2.4 2.8 33.6 0.2 0.0 0.6 24.0 0.0 100.0 
United Kingdom 1.6 12.5 37.5 0.0 10.9 9.4 23.4 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.1 0.0 100.0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 68.8 0.0 0.0 6.3 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 0.0 100.0 
Finland 0.0 0.0 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 
France 0.0 6.0 24.1 0.0 2.4 1.2 48.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 16.9 0.0 100.0 
Germany 3.8 11.3 18.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 48.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 100.0 
Italy 0.0 14.3 14.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.0 0.0 100.0 
Netherlands 0.0 8.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.5 0.0 100.0 
Spain 0.0 13.0 26.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 100.0 
Sweden 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 4.2 4.2 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.5 0.0 100.0 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 23.8 0.0 9.5 0.0 52.4 0.0 0.0 4.8 9.5 0.0 100.0 
FBE 0.0 0.0 47.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 100.0 
CHE 0.0 9.5 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 100.0 
ELE 0.0 0.0 32.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.4 0.0 100.0 
CON 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.7 0.0 100.0 
WTR 0.0 7.1 32.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 100.0 
RTR 0.0 9.7 12.9 0.0 3.2 0.0 64.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7 0.0 100.0 
FINA 0.0 54.5 13.6 0.0 4.5 9.1 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 100.0 
OTH 4.6 7.2 19.7 0.0 3.3 1.3 48.7 0.7 0.0 1.3 13.2 0.0 100.0 
 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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dominating ultimate controllers of European companies, instead of industrial 
companies (C) as dominating direct controllers.  However industrial companies still 
ultimately control a significant percentage of companies (26.6%).  The third largest 
owner is governments (S) who ultimately own over 24% of European companies.   
Similar to the whole sample, in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, the 
majority companies are ultimately owned by individuals or families (I).  In the U.K., 
Belgium and Sweden, industrial companies (C) are the dominating ultimate owners, 
while the governments (S) own the majority of companies in Finland and Netherland.  
Compared to the results of direct control identities, financial companies (B and F) and 
mutual and pension funds etc (E) have significantly less power in controlling British 
and Italian companies ultimately.   
For most of the industries except chemistry (CHE) and electricity etc (ELE), the 
results are the same as that of direct controller.  In food and beverage (FBE) and 
construction (CON) industries, industrial companies (C) are still the dominating 
ultimate controllers; companies in whole-sale trade (WTR) and retail trade (RTR) 
industries are ultimately owned by known individuals or families (I); and banks (B) 
are the dominating ultimate controller of financial companies (FINA).  Different 
from the results of direct control identities, companies in chemistry (CHE) and 
electricity etc (ELE) industries turn out to be ultimately owned by governments (S) 
rather than industrial companies (C). 
4  Power of multiple large shareholders 
The presence of multiple large shareholders can have two opposite impacts on firm 
performance.  The simple presence of multiple large shareholders can challenge the 
largest shareholder and reduce profit diversion.  Therefore firm’s performance 
should be improved by the existence of multiple large shareholders.  However, large 
shareholders could form a controlling coalition and increase the efficiency of private 
benefit extraction.  Therefore, the controlling coalition’s power to win in a contested 
vote could negatively affect firm’s performance.  In other words, the contestability of 
the controlling coalition’s power, should benefit firm’s performance. 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) propose two measures related to the controlling coalition’s 
 76
winning power.  They are: H_DIFF, which is the sum of squares of the differences 
between the largest and second largest, and the second and third largest ownership, 
and H_CON, which is the sum of squares of the three largest ownerships. 
Milnor and Shapley (1978) develop the Shapley value to measure the probability of a 
large shareholder to be pivotal in forming a majority coalition to win in a contested 
vote.  They define an oceanic game as a sequence of weighted majority games in 
which certain fixed fractions of the voting strength are held by a few “major” players, 
while the rest is scattered among a growing number of increasingly insignificant 
“minor” players.  In the interior oceanic game 
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where c is the majority quota; iw  is the weight (percentage of shares) of the major 
player i; m is the number of bloc shareholders; α  is a positive constant representing 
the total weight of the ocean defined as 
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α/iw  for Si∈  and α/iw  for SMi −∈  ( ii ww −= α ); 11 −−= nn naa . 
Therefore in a three shareholder voting game (m = 3), the Shapley value for the 
largest shareholder is calculated as 332321 /)( αwwwww + .  I assume the majority 
quota c to be 50%, so the Shapley value equals 1 when the largest ownership exceeds 
50%. 
I identify large shareholders as those who hold more than 10% ownership of the 
company.  The measures that describe the power of multiple large shareholders are 
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summarised in Table 3.10.  The results of calculating these measures for the sample 
are shown in Table 3.11.  On average 1.5 large shareholders hold more than 10% 
ownership in European companies.  In German and Belgian companies, there are 
around two large shareholders.  France, Sweden and Spain are also higher than the 
European average.  U.K. companies have the fewest large shareholders, with an 
average less than unity.  The patterns of the main industries are very close to each 
other, with ELE companies having the most large shareholders and CON companies 
having the least large shareholders. 
Table 3.10  Definitions of power of multiple large shareholders variables 
Variable Description 
H_diff =(OW1-OW2)2+(OW2-OW3)2
OW1: Largest shareholdings; OW2: Second largest shareholdings; OW3: Third 
largest shareholdings 
H_con =OW12+OW22+OW32
Definitions for OW1, OW2 and OW3 are the same as above. 
SV The Shapley value solution for the largest shareholder in a three large shareholder 
voting game 
In terms of variables related to contestability of the controlling coalition’s power 
(H_DIFF, H_CON and SV), German companies have the highest values implying the 
lowest contestability, while British companies have the lowest values implying the 
highest contestability.  This means that in the U.K. the controlling coalition is least 
able to extract private benefit, while in Germany the controlling coalition has the 
greatest power to collude with each other and increase the efficiency of private benefit 
extraction.  French companies have the second highest values.  Construction (CON) 
companies have the highest contestability level since their H_DIFF, H_CON and SV 
values are the lowest among industries.   
5  Conclusion 
This chapter discusses various measurements of ownership and control of a firm, 
including the independence indicators describing the degree of independence of a 
company with regard to its shareholders, continuous and dichotomous ownership 
concentration variables describing the degree of control, identities of direct and 
ultimate control describing the location of control, and variables to measure the power 
of the controlling coalition.  Table 3.12 selects some representative measurements 
and summarizes their results. 
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Table 3.11  Power of multiple large shareholders in Europe 
 
Number of 
large 
shareholders 
(Average) 
H_DIFF 
(Medium) 
H_CON 
(Medium) 
SV 7 
(Medium) 
Whole sample 1.53  0.06  0.02  0.71  
U.K.   0.77  0.00  0.02  0.14  
Belgium  1.94  0.10  0.20  0.67  
Finland  1.40  0.06  0.09  0.36  
France  1.78  0.11  0.28  1.00  
Germany  1.98  0.12  0.35  1.00  
Italy  1.45  0.11  0.24  0.87  
Netherlands  1.44  0.03  0.12  0.41  
Spain  1.66  0.04  0.13  0.45  
Sweden  1.72  0.04  0.14  0.40  
Switzerland  1.51  0.03  0.14  0.34  
FBE 1.45  0.07  0.25  1.00  
CHE 1.40  0.03  0.08  0.34  
ELE 1.68  0.07  0.23  1.00  
CON 1.18  0.00  0.04  0.18  
WTR 1.38  0.04  0.19  0.78  
RTR 1.30  0.04  0.14  0.42  
FINA 1.54  0.05  0.35  1.00  
OTH 1.61  0.07  0.23  0.83  
 
Note: FBE, manufacture of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade 
and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial intermediation, 
except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
In the whole sample, European companies have relatively high concentration indices 
values with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company.  
Over half of European companies are characterised by concentrated ownership 
measured by traditional dichotomous variables such as OC3 or OC95 using 
probability model, although the independence indices show that most independent (A 
total) companies are also prevalent among European companies. 
British companies are the most dispersed companies since they have the lowest values 
for all of the measures.  For Finnish companies, although they have high values for 
traditional concentration measures such as C3 and OC3, they have the lowest value 
for Herfindahl index and second lowest values for OC95, H_CON, SV and the 
                                                        
7 Maury and Pajuste (2004)’s Finnish results are: 0.0671 for H_diff, 0.0754 for H_con, and 0.51 for SV 
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Table 3.12  Summary statistics for the ownership data of European companies 
 Independence 
Indices 
C3 
(%) 
H OC3 
(%) 
OC95 
(%) 
Direct 
control 
Ultimate 
control 
Number of  
large shareholders 
H_CON  
(Medium) 
SV 
(Medium) 
Whole sample A total and C 60 0.35 70 56 C I and C 1.53 0.02 0.71  
U.K. A total 37 0.21 34 45 E C 0.77 0.02 0.14  
Belgium C 53 0.28 77 74 C C 1.94 0.2 0.67  
Finland A total 47 0.2 68 53 C S 1.4 0.09 0.36  
France A total 72 0.42 87 61 Z and C I 1.78 0.28 1.00  
Germany C 75 0.47 84 54 I and C I 1.98 0.35 1.00  
Italy C 58 0.32 75 66 F I and S 1.45 0.24 0.87  
Netherlands A total 56 0.35 60 56 C S and C 1.44 0.12 0.41  
Spain A total 53 0.25 69 57 C I 1.66 0.13 0.45  
Sweden A total 60 0.31 85 57 C C 1.72 0.14 0.40  
Switzerland A total 51 0.27 63 63 I and C I 1.51 0.14 0.34  
FBE C 60 0.38 64 68 C C and I 1.45 0.25 1.00  
CHE A total 51 0.24 73 56 C S 1.4 0.08 0.34  
ELE C 64 0.38 76 54 C and S S 1.68 0.23 1.00  
CON A total 39 0.16 53 53 C C 1.18 0.04 0.18  
WTR A total 60 0.39 70 54 I and C I 1.38 0.19 0.78  
RTR C 55 0.35 61 45 I I 1.3 0.14 0.42  
FINA C 69 0.48 62 59 B B 1.54 0.35 1.00  
OTH A total 62 0.36 77 59 C and I I 1.61 0.23 0.83  
Notes: “A total”, “C”: any company with no single shareholding over 24.99% (A total), over 49.99% or has an ultimate owner (C). C3 (%), combined ownership of the largest three shareholders; 
H: the Herfindahl index; OC3, the largest shareholding exceeds 20%; OC95, the vote winning probability of the largest shareholding exceeds 95%. Owner identities: “B”, banks; “C”, industrial 
companies; “E”, mutual & pension funds/nominees/trusts/trustees; “I”, one of more known individuals or families; “S”, public authorities, states, governments; “Z”, general public in publicly 
listed companies.  Large shareholders: whose shareholding exceeds 10%. H_CON: The sum of squares of the three largest owners’ shareholdings. SV: the Shapley Value.  FBE, manufacture 
of food products and beverages; CHE, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; ELE, electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply; CON, construction; WTR, wholesale trade and 
commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; RTR, retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods; FINA, financial 
intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; OTH, other business activities. 
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number of large shareholders.  This result suggests that Finnish companies might be 
characterized by dispersed ownership rather than concentrated ownership.  It also 
suggests that traditional concentration measures may not be able to discover some 
underlying characteristics and results of future research in this area will be sensitive to 
which measurement is used.  Among other countries, Germany, France, Belgium and 
Italy seem to have values suggesting relatively concentrated ownership.  Among 
industries, the construction (CON) companies seem to have the most dispersed 
ownership, while the ownership of electricity etc (ELE) and financial (FINA) 
companies are the most concentrated.  
Another important preliminary result is that the distribution of identities of the 
ultimate owners is different from that of direct owners.  Industrial companies hold a 
majority direct control of European non-subsidiary companies which may be 
explained as that most of European countries are early industrializers, while private 
shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners of European non-subsidiary 
companies.  Moreover, in the U.K. and Italy, financial companies (B and F) and 
mutual and pension funds etc (E) have significantly less power in controlling their 
companies ultimately than directly.  This strongly suggests that the previous studies 
using direct ownership information may be unable to capture the real location of 
control.  Industry wise, companies in chemistry (CHE) and electricity etc (ELE) 
industries are directly owned by industrial companies (C), while ultimately owned by 
governments (S). 
The result that there is more than one large shareholder for each company suggests 
that multiple large shareholders are common in European companies.  The 
controlling shareholders in British companies turn out to have the highest 
contestability, while those in German, French and perhaps Italian companies have 
relatively lower contestability.  Industry wise, controlling shareholders in financial 
(FINA), electricity etc (ELE) and food and beverage manufacture (FBE) companies 
seems to have the lowest contestability, while in construction (CON) companies, the 
contestability is the highest.  This chapter not only uncovers the current ownership 
and control pattern in Europe by using a comprehensive range of measurements, it 
also provides the base for my future research to test the relationship between 
ownership and firm performance. 
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Chapter Four  Testing the Impact of Ownership and Control on Firm 
Performance: Data and variables 
The arguments regarding the relationship between ownership, control and 
performance started one century ago, and are still on-going.  Ownership 
concentration could benefit firm performance via monitoring effects on management, 
or the conflicts of interests between large shareholders and minor investors could be 
detrimental for firm performance.  However, ownership could also be inversely 
affected by firm performance.  They might be two jointly determined variables 
according to the endogenous ownership structure theory, or un-related variables 
according to the natural selection theory and the substitution effects of other corporate 
governance mechanisms.  Moreover, the relationship between degree of control and 
firm performance could be affected by location of control, country and industry. 
This chapter and chapters five and six investigate the impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance.  They aim to reveal whether the causality from 
ownership and control to firm performance exists.  This chapter explains how the 
linear impact of degree of control on firm performance should be modelled.  Various 
measurements for ownership concentration and performance are discussed.  
Competing models with different measurements are compared using various test 
methods.  
The first section introduces the database used in this study and discusses the variables 
to model the ownership-performance relationship.  Specifically, this section reviews 
various measurements for performance and ownership concentration.  Section Two 
tests competing models with different measurements for performance and ownership 
concentration.  Nested t tests, non-nested J tests and Cox-Pesaran tests are used to 
test competing models using different measurements of ownership.  Modified P tests 
are used to compare different measurements of firm performance.  The third section 
concludes. 
1  Data and variables 
1.1  Data 
The sample used in this chapter is extracted from the sample used in Chapter Three, 
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based on the availability of financial data.  Among the 1291 companies whose 
ownership data are available from the BvD database as of November of 2004, 655 
companies have financial data available from the Datastream.  Therefore these 655 
companies comprise the sample for my empirical studies.  Table 4.1 summarises the 
distribution of countries and industries in the sample. 
1.2  Measurements of performance 
Empirical studies are sensitive to the measurements used for performance.  Three 
categories of measurement are used in regression models: accounting rates of return, 
market returns, and combinations of accounting-based and market-based 
measurements, such as Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio of equity.   
The disadvantages of using accounting rates of return as measures of performance are 
that they convey little information about economic rates of return (Fisher and 
McGowan, 1983; Benston, 1985; Mehran, 1995); they are backward-looking and only 
partially involves estimates of future events (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001); and they 
are measured by the accountant constrained by accounting practices (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001).  But accounting rates of return are highly important in 
determining executive compensation (Antle and Smith, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Ely, 1991).  The accounting rates of return that have been used to measure 
performance in studies on ownership structure include return on assets (Mehran, 1995; 
Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), return on shareholders’ capital (Leech and Leehy, 1991) 
and return on shareholders’ equity (Short and Keasey, 1999).  Leech and Leehy 
(1990) also used ratios related to profit margins, including operating profit margin 
ratio and gross profit margin ratio, to compare the impact of ownership structure. 
Mehran (1995) argues that stock return as a proxy for firm performance is most 
appropriate for all-equity firms.  Han and Suk (1998) state that stock returns have 
more important implications to the business community than the Q ratio.  However, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that stock market rates of return presumably adjust 
for any divergences between the interests of professional managers and owners, so it 
is not appropriate to use them in regression studies on ownership structure.  The 
empirical studies that are using market returns should always be designed as event  
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Table 4.1  Distribution of countries and industries in the sample 
Panel A  Distribution of countries Number Percentage (%) 
Austria  9 1.37  
Belgium  18 2.75  
Czech Republic  2 0.31  
Denmark  18 2.75  
Finland  25 3.82  
France  99 15.11  
Germany  92 14.05  
Greece  4 0.61  
Hungary  2 0.31  
Ireland  11 1.68  
Italy  42 6.41  
Luxembourg  4 0.61  
Netherlands  29 4.43  
Norway  9 1.37  
Poland  4 0.61  
Portugal  12 1.83  
Russian Federation  11 1.68  
Slovak Republic  1 0.15  
Spain  31 4.73  
Sweden  36 5.50  
Switzerland  34 5.19  
United Kingdom  162 24.73  
Grand Total  655 100 
Panel B  Distribution of industries8   
N11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; 
service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction 
excluding surveying 
8 1.22  
N13 Mining of metal ores 4 0.61  
N14 Other mining and quarrying 3 0.46  
N15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 18 2.75  
N18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur 
3 0.46  
N21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 9 1.37  
N22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
10 1.53  
N23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel 
8 1.22  
N24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 41 6.26  
N25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4 0.61  
N26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 7 1.07  
N27 Manufacture of basic metals 9 1.37  
N28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
2 0.31  
N29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 18 2.75  
(continued on next page) 
                                                        
8 Two-digit RACE Rev 1.1 code 
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Table 4.1  Distribution of countries and industries in the sample (continued) 
  Number Percentage (%) 
N30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 2 0.31  
N31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 7 1.07  
N32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
7 1.07  
N33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
3 0.46  
N34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 8 1.22  
N35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 5 0.76  
N36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 4 0.61  
N40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 28 4.27  
N41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 7 1.07  
N45 Construction 38 5.80  
N50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
7 1.07  
N51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
32 4.89  
N52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of personal and household goods 
27 4.12  
N55 Hotels and restaurants 9 1.37  
N60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 7 1.07  
N61 Water transport 3 0.46  
N62 Air transport 7 1.07  
N63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies 
9 1.37  
N64 Post and telecommunications 20 3.05  
N65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension 
funding 
11 1.68  
N67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 3 0.46  
N70 Real estate activities 5 0.76  
N71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and 
of personal and household goods 
4 0.61  
N72 Computer and related activities 10 1.53  
N73 Research and development 1 0.15  
N74 Other business activities9 206 31.45  
N75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security 
1 0.15  
N90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 2 0.31  
N92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 9 1.37  
N93 Other service activities 1 0.15  
unknown Industry classification unclear 28 4.27  
Grand Total  655 100 
 
                                                        
9 These activities include legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market research and public 
opinion polling; business and management consultancy; holdings; architectural and engineering activities and related technical 
consultancy; technical testing and analysis; advertising; labour recruitment and provision of personnel; investigation and security 
activities; industrial cleaning; other business activities n.e.c. 
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studies.  Han and Suk (1998) also warn that short-term stock returns are too volatile 
to be used as a reliable measure of corporate performance.  But they argue that 
long-term returns well capture corporate performance and can be used in studies other 
than event studies.  Cole and Mehran (1998) use average annual stock return as 
measure of performance and Han and Suk (1998) use the geometric average return for 
a firm for the five year period (Jan 1, 1988 to Dec 31, 1992).   
Tobin’s Q measures investors’ expectations for the future profitability of firms.  
Since investors do not ignore the past in their attempt to determine reasonable 
expectations, it reflects accounting-based as well as market-based rates of return.  
This combination enables it to reveal both economic and market performance of the 
firm.  However, it also means that it has the similar short-comings of those of 
accounting-based measurements, such as artificial accounting problems.  Moreover, 
the numerator of Q partly reflects the value investors assign to a firm’s intangible 
assets, while the denominator of Q does not include investments the firm has made in 
intangible assets.  This distorts performance comparisons of firms that rely on 
differing degrees on intangible capital.  The firm’s future revenue stream is treated as 
if it can be generated from investments made only in tangible capital.  Another 
concern raised is that Tobin’s Q is heavily affected by share prices.  Therefore 
Tobin’s Q represents market responses more than firm’s long-term performance.  
Since a large number of previous studies use Tobin’s Q when testing the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance, I include Tobin’s Q as well as traditional 
accounting measurements of firm performance in this study.  The purpose is to 
compare their results and to recover the true recipient of the impact of ownership 
concentration. 
Market-to-book ratio of equity is measured by the market value of the firm divided by 
the book value of equity.  The market value of the firm measures the discounted 
present value of its expected future income stream, while the book value of equity 
measures the investment by shareholders in the assets utilized to generate that income 
stream.  It therefore provides a measure of management’s ability to generate a certain 
income stream from an asset base and can be seen as an approximation to Tobin’s Q.  
Representative studies using this measure of performance include Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000), Leech and Leehy (1991), Short and Keasey (1999), etc. 
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In this study I consider three groups of performance variables: accounting return 
ratios including return on total assets ratio (ROA), return on invested capital ratio 
(ROC) and return of equity ratio (ROE); profit margin related ratios including gross 
profit margin (PMG) and operating profit margin (PMO); and combination of 
accounting and market based measurements including Tobin’s Q (TQ) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB).  The variables and their calculations are presented in 
Table 4.2, and their descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.2  Definitions of firm performance variables 
Performance 
Variables 
Definitions 
ROA Return on assets ratio = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest 
Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Last Year's Total 
Assets 
ROC Return on invested capital ratio = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + 
((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / (Last 
Year's Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long 
Term Debt) 
ROE Return on equity ratio = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred 
Dividend Requirement) / Last Year's Common Equity 
PMG Gross profit margin = Gross Income / Net Sales or Revenues 
PMO Operating profit margin = Operating Income / Net Sales or Revenues 
TQ Tobin’s Q = market capitalization/total assets 
MTB Market to book ratio of equity = market capitalization / ordinary capital 
reserves 
Table 4.3  Descriptive statistics for performance variables 
 N Min Max Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Median 
ROA 655 -0.31  0.35 0.06 0.06 0.13 9.42  0.05 
ROC 655 -1.22  0.92 0.09 0.12 -1.42 30.62  0.09 
ROE 655 -4.40  1.86 0.11 0.34 -6.96 88.01  0.13 
PMG 646 -0.04  0.95 0.26 0.18 1.00 3.84  0.23 
PMO 655 -0.60  1.09 0.08 0.10 1.79 25.85  0.06 
TQ 652 0.02  6.36 0.86 0.73 2.65 13.45  0.65 
MTB10 649 -52.35  29.35 2.29 4.03 -5.37 92.00  1.77 
1.3  Measurements of ownership concentration 
Three groups of ownership concentration variables are discussed in the previous 
chapter: continuous measurements of ownership concentration (H, C1, C3, C5, C10 
and C20); dichotomous measurements of ownership concentration (OC1, OC2, OC3, 
OC4, OC5, OC6, OC90, OC95 and OC99) and power of multiple large shareholders 
                                                        
10 Extreme values are treated as missing values.  There are two such cases. 
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(H_DIFF, H_CON and SV).  Their definitions are reminded in Table 4.4.  Table 4.5 
presents their descriptive statistics in the sample. 
Table 4.4  Definitions of ownership variables 
Continuous ownership concentration variables 
C1 Percentage ownership of the largest shareholder 
C3 Combined ownership of the largest 3 shareholders 
C5 Combined ownership of the largest 5 shareholders 
C10 Combined ownership of the largest 10 shareholders 
C20 Combined ownership of the largest 20 shareholders 
H Herfindahl index of up to top 20 shareholders 
Dichotomous control-type variables 
OC1 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 5% 
OC2 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 10% 
OC3 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 20% 
OC4 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 30% 
OC5 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 50% 
OC6 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding equals 100% 
OC90 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 90% using probabilistic model. 
OC95 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 95% using probabilistic model. 
OC99 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 99% using probabilistic model. 
Power of multiple large shareholders 
H_DIFF =(OW1-OW2)2+(OW2-OW3)2
OW1: Largest shareholdings; OW2: Second largest shareholdings; OW3: Third 
largest shareholdings 
H_CON =OW12+OW22+OW32
Definitions for OW1, OW2 and OW3 are as above. 
SV The Shapley value solution for the largest shareholder in a three large shareholder 
voting game 
1.4  Owner identities 
In this study, the direct location of control is defined as the identity of the largest 
owner of the company.  The ultimate owner is identified as indicated by the BvD 
database11.  If no ultimate owner is indicated, it is identified as the largest direct 
owner who holds no less than 10% of total shares.  When no ultimate owner is 
indicated, and no single shareholder owns more than 10% of total shares, the company 
                                                        
11 The BvD database identify the ultimate owner using the independence indicators as illustrated in Chapter Three 
(or refer to Appendix 1): if the company has an independent indicator “A”, by definition it has no ultimate owner; 
if the company has an indicator “B” or “C”, BvD follows the upward path (links with percentage over 24.99%) 
through its shareholders until reaching a company with a “A”, who is the ultimate owner, or a company with no 
known ultimate owner. 
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is classified as a widely held company.   
The BvD ownership database identifies 12 types of shareholders.  Their codes and 
definitions are presented in Table 4.6, together with the summary of direct / ultimate 
controllers by each type of owner identities.   
Table 4.5  Descriptive statistics for ownership concentration variables 
Panel A Continuous variables 
 N Min Max Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Median 
C1 655 0.00  1  0.34 0.24 0.72 2.79  0.29 
C3 655 0.01  1  0.51 0.29 0.14 1.74  0.50 
C5 655 0.01  1  0.56 0.30 -0.04 1.68  0.56 
C10 655 0.01  1  0.60 0.31 -0.19 1.66  0.62 
C20 655 0.01  1  0.60 0.32 -0.21 1.65  0.63 
H 655 0.00 1 0.21 0.22 1.52 5.30 0.14 
H_DIFF 655 0.00  1  0.12 0.20 2.69 10.79  0.03 
H_CON 655 0.00  1  0.20 0.22 1.54 5.31  0.13 
SV 655 0.00  1  0.61 0.59 1.61 6.66  0.39 
Panel B Dichotomous variables 
 OC1 OC2 OC3 OC4 OC5 OC6 OC90 OC95 OC99 
Sum 621 530 411 323 177 10 413 327 260 
Table 4.6  Distribution of direct and ultimate owner identities 
Code Definition 
Direct owner identities Ultimate owner identities 
Number % Number % 
A Insurance 19 2.90  10 1.53 
B Banks 43 6.56  32 4.89 
C Industrial companies 244 37.25  187 28.55 
D Individuals or families, unnamed 3 0.46  3 0.46 
E Mutual & pension funds / 
nominees / trusts / trustees 
125 19.08  60 9.16 
F Financial companies 32 4.89  16 2.44 
I One of more known individuals or 
families 
48 0.15  88 13.44 
J Foundations/research institutes 14 7.33  12 1.83 
L Bulk lists of companies and 
private owners 
23 2.14  16 2.44 
M Employees/managers/directors 2 3.51  1 0.15 
S Public authorities, states, 
governments 
26 0.31  52 7.94 
Z General public (only applies to 
publicly listed companies) 
75 3.97  57 8.7 
WH Widely held n.a. n.a. 121 18.47 
Total  655 100 655 100 
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1.5  Other variables 
Firm size is hypothesized to be positively correlated with performance because of the 
following reasons.  First, survivor bias states that exceptionally well-performing 
firms in general grow faster and therefore are larger.  Second, monopoly pricing 
states that large firms in general are more able to earn monopoly profits than small 
firms.   Third, earnings volatility states that small firms in general are less 
diversified than large firms and therefore more often are producing negative earnings.  
However large size may also have a negative impact on performance because of 
agency problems.  The proxy used in this study for firm size is total assets.  The 
squared terms of size are included to control for the non-linear impact of size on 
performance.  The impact of size on performance could be delayed for one year to 
take full effect.  Therefore size data is from the year 2003, which is one year before 
performance data of the year 2004. 
Leverage is believed to be a potentially important governance structure like ownership.  
The squared leverage is included to identify a possible optimal capital structure.  
Firms with strong financial performance prefer not to borrow and firms with high debt 
levels may perform better because it provides more incentives.  A significant 
negative coefficient of leverage and a significant positive coefficient of the squared 
leverage are predicted.  The proxy for leverage used in this study is the percentage of 
long term debt to total assets. 
Another control variable is intangible assets ratio.  This measures the research and 
development effect and advertising effect.  Firms with higher R&D investment may 
perform better because they are more foresighted and have more potential for 
profitable inventions.  Advertising may also affect performance positively since 
products can be sold at probably higher price than those of other firms.   
Systematic risk is included to control for differences in accounting or market 
performance that are the result of differences in firm risk.  I use the beta coefficient 
of the Security Characteristic Line: 
iaa rmra εβα ++=  
where ra is the return of an individual asset, and rm is the return of a market portfolio.  
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For each country I choose a representative stock index as the market portfolio.  Table 
4.7 lists the stock indices I’ve chosen.  Returns are calculated as monthly changes in 
market prices.  This Beta coefficient measures the volatility of individual stock price 
compared to market price, therefore it measures individual stock risk relative to 
overall market risk.  It is expected that higher risk is  
Table 4.7  Market indices used in calculating Beta 
Country Market Index 
Austria ATX 
Belgium BEL 20 
Czech Republic Prague PX 50 
Denmark Copenhagen KFX DS 
Finland Finland DS General Inds 
France SBF 250 
GER ATHEX General 
Hungary BUX 
Ireland ISEQ 
Italy Italy DS General Inds 
Luxembourg LUXX Index 
Netherlands AEX Index 
Norway OSLO SE Industry DS 
Portugal PSI General 
Russia Republic RTS Index 
Slovenia SBI 20 
Spain Madrid SE General 
Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN General Index 
Switzerland SMI MID Index 
U.K. FTSE All Share 
associated with greater potential for higher return or loss.  Therefore it has a positive 
impact on expected return.  However, this impact should not be applied to other 
performance measures.  Instead, empirical literature finds that risk is negatively 
related to management’s performance-based pay, and hence higher risk is associated 
with lower incentive for managers to perform (Wulf, 2007).  This risk-incentive 
trade-off predicts a negative impact of risk on firm’s performance.   
Table 4.8 summarizes the control variables and their definitions, and table 4.9 presents 
their descriptive statistics in the sample.   
2  Testing competing models with different measurements of ownership 
concentration and firm performance 
2.1  Testing measurements of ownership concentration 
The relationship between variables C1, C3, C5, C10 and C20 (the ownership of the  
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Table 4.8  Definitions of other variables 
Control variable Definition 
SizeTA Log(Total assets) 
Lev Long term debt/total assets 
IAInt Intangible assets/total assets 
Beta Market risk variable, which is the beta coefficient of the Security 
Characteristic Line: 
ra = αa + βa rm + εi 
where ra is the return of an individual asset, and rm is the return of a 
market portfolio (a representative stock index).  Returns are calculated as 
monthly changes in market prices. 
Table 4.9  Descriptive statistics of other variables 
 N Min Max Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Median 
SizeTA12 653 5.12  9.05 6.54 0.61 0.64 3.17  6.44 
Lev 655 0.00  0.71 0.19 0.14 0.79 3.71  0.17 
IAInt 653 0.00  0.80 0.15 0.15 1.44 5.02  0.11 
Beta 644 -3.65  6.88 0.89 0.88 1.07 9.03  0.83 
largest one, three, five, ten and twenty shareholders) can be understood as follows:  
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where C3-C1, C5-C3, C10-C5 and C20-C10 are difference terms.  The economic 
implications are that C3-C1 is the combined ownership of second and third largest 
shareholders, C5-C3 is the combined ownership of fourth and fifth largest 
shareholders, and so on.  Therefore models using variables C1, C3, C5, C10 and C20 
as the independent variable respectively are nested models.  To test which 
measurement among these nested variables is the best, the following regression is 
constructed: 
ε
ββββββ
+−
+−+−+−++=
)1020(
)510()35()13(1 543210
CC
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By testing the significance of the coefficients, it can be revealed that which variable 
provides the best fit.  It is the same case with models using variables OC1, OC2, 
OC3, OC4, OC5 and OC6 (dummies for the ownership of the largest shareholder 
                                                        
12 Size values are from the year of 2003, which is one year before other variable values. 
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exceeding 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 50% and equalling 100% respectively).  The 
following regression is constructed to test which measurement among the nested 
variables provides the best fit: 
εδδ
δδδδδ
+−+−
+−+−+−++=
)21()32(
)43()54()65(6
65
43210
OCOCOCOC
OCOCOCOCOCOCOCePerformanc
 
Models using OC90, OC95 and OC99 (dummies for the probability that the largest 
shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%, 95% and 
99% respectively) are also nested models.  The following regression is tested to 
reveal the best measurement: 
εγγγγ +−+−++= )9590()9995(99 3210 OCOCOCOCOCePerformanc  
Table 4.10 summarizes the t-test results for the coefficients.  When performance is 
measured as PMG or MTB, C1 is found to have a significant impact on performance, 
while no impact is found from any of the difference terms.  5δ  is found significant 
in some of the regressions, indicating that variable OC2 may contain the most valid 
information as to the ownership-performance relationship among its peer.  Moreover, 
2γ  is significant in only one occasion (when performance is measured as TQ), while 
no significant result is found on 3γ .  Therefore OC95 may have the strongest 
explanatory power than OC90 and OC99.  Therefore, C1, OC2 and OC95 are 
selected for further comparisons. 
The rest groups of ownership concentration to compare are: continuous measurements 
H and C1; dichotomous measurements OC2 and OC95, and power of multiple large 
shareholders measurements H_DIFF, H_CON and SV.  Models using these variables 
are non-nested models in the sense that none of them is a subset of another.  I 
conduct J tests and Cox-Pesaran tests to compare the competing models within each 
group of variables.  The results are illustrated in Table 4.11.  Four possibilities can 
arise as the results of non-nested tests: H0 may stand against H1, H1 may stand 
against H0, both hypotheses may be rejected, and neither hypothesis may be rejected.  
Only in the first two cases do J test and Cox-Pesaran test deliver definitive verdict.   
Few significant results are found in models comparing H and C1.  However, all the 
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Table 4.10  T-tests for nested models with different ownership concentration measurements 
 
 ROA ROC ROE PMG 
 Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. 
1β  -0.0014  -0.14 0.0054  0.26 -0.0073  -0.13 -0.0522  -1.72* 
2β  -0.0006  -0.03 -0.0196  -0.47 0.0174  0.15 -0.0051  -0.08 
3β  -0.0435  -0.72 -0.0173  -0.14 -0.1502  -0.43 -0.2468  -1.37 
4β  -0.0292  -0.48 -0.0570  -0.45 -0.4068  -1.16 0.0890  0.48 
5β  0.1747  1.36 0.1534  0.57 0.8956  1.21 -0.0242  -0.06 
1δ  -0.0061  -0.28  -0.0287  -0.65  -0.0049  -0.04  0.0252  0.69  
2δ  -0.0168  -1.50  -0.0241  -1.04  -0.0285  -0.43  -0.0357  -1.86*  
3δ  -0.0188  -1.66*  -0.0333  -1.42  -0.0562  -0.84  -0.0361  -1.86* 
4δ  -0.0241  -2.00**  -0.0365  -1.46  -0.0771  -1.09  -0.0439  -2.13**  
5δ  -0.0249  -2.15**  -0.0592  -2.48**  -0.0976  -1.43  -0.0267  -1.34  
6δ  -0.0129  -1.08  -0.0040  -0.16  0.0153  0.22  -0.0197  -0.96  
1γ  0.0024  0.45  0.0047  0.43  0.0014  0.04  0.0011  0.07  
2γ  -0.0038  -0.46  0.0120  0.70  -0.0475  -1.02  0.0350  1.39  
3γ  0.0095  1.27  0.0188  1.21  0.0508  1.20  -0.0010  -0.05  
(continued on next page)  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; PMO, operating profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.10  T-tests for nested models with different ownership concentration measurements (continued) 
 
 PMO TQ MTB 
 Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. Coefficient t stat. 
1β  -0.0173  -1.02 -0.1379  -1.14 -1.8213  -2.72***  
2β  -0.0214  -0.62 -0.0276  -0.11 0.0011  0.08  
3β  -0.0447  -0.44 -0.9173  -1.26 -0.0155  -0.38  
4β  0.0932  0.89 0.1604  0.22 0.0095  0.23  
5β  0.1044  0.47 -0.5147  -0.33 -0.0346  -0.40  
1δ  -0.0147  -0.23  -0.1491  -0.57  -0.0091  -0.63  
2δ  -0.0335  -0.97  -0.1909  -1.40  -0.0153  -2.02**  
3δ  -0.0461  -1.33  -0.3142  -2.2** -0.0192  -2.51**  
4δ  -0.0294  -0.80  -0.1605  -1.09  -0.0148  -1.83* 
5δ  -0.0067  -0.19  -0.2401  -1.70*  -0.0085  -1.09  
6δ  -0.0171  -0.47  -0.1459  -1.00  -0.0082  -1.02  
1γ  -0.0058  -0.63  0.0149  0.23  -0.8452  -2.35***  
2γ  -0.0104  -0.73  0.2033  2.02***  0.4656  0.83  
3γ  0.0007  0.05  -0.0470  -0.52  -0.4522  -0.90  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; PMO, operating profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.11  J Tests and Cox-Pesaran Tests for competing models with different 
ownership variables  
Hypotheses: M1: 11 XbaY += ; M2: 22 ZbaY +=  
 J-Test value Cox-Pesaran Test 
Y X Z H0: M1 
H1: M2 
H0: M2 
H1: M1 
H0: M1 
H1: M2 
H0: M2 
H1: M1 
ROA 
 
H C1 0.75 0.77 0.27 -1.14 
OC2 OC95 -0.24  1.86* 0.19  -21.74*** 
H_DIFF H_CON -0.15 0.25 0.13 -0.32 
H_DIFF SV -0.09  0.27  0.06  -2.10  
H_CON SV -0.12  0.28  0.07  -1.95  
ROC H C1 -0.82 0.93 0.63 -1.43* 
OC2 OC95 0.97  2.98*** 0.40  -109.00*** 
H_DIFF H_CON 0.07 0.17 -0.07 -0.18 
H_DIFF SV -0.20  0.61  0.13  -4.25*** 
H_CON SV -0.27  0.67  0.18  -4.38*** 
ROE H C1 -0.71 0.77 0.48 -1.53 
OC2 OC95 0.30  1.76* -0.38  -8.07*** 
H_DIFF H_CON -0.35 0.54 0.30 -0.73 
H_DIFF SV 0.37  0.67  0.14  -6.17*** 
H_CON SV 0.36  0.59  0.14  -3.85*** 
PMG H C1 1.01 -0.57 -1.13 0.53 
OC2 OC95 0.89  1.17  -0.53  -2.87*** 
H_DIFF H_CON 1.63 -1.16 -2.41*** 0.93 
H_DIFF SV 0.84  0.39  -1.61  -0.52  
H_CON SV 0.48  0.94  -0.65  -1.56  
PMO H C1 1.46 -1.12 -1.80* 0.93 
OC2 OC95 0.33  1.76* -0.42  -7.91*** 
H_DIFF H_CON 1.10 -0.78 -1.61 0.33 
H_DIFF SV 0.53  0.28  -0.99  -0.38  
H_CON SV 0.29  0.65  -0.36  -1.11  
TQ H C1 0.65 -0.40 -0.74 0.37 
OC2 OC95 1.70* 2.13*** -1.19  -4.54*** 
H_DIFF H_CON 0.74 -0.46 -0.98 0.40 
H_DIFF SV 0.65  0.15  -1.46  -0.18  
H_CON SV 0.48  0.42  -0.71  -0.59  
MTB H C1 1.37  -0.61  -1.49  0.58  
OC2 OC95 0.89  1.83* -1.54  -5.69*** 
H_DIFF H_CON 1.17  -0.22  -1.31  0.20  
H_DIFF SV 2.92*** 0.57  -6.73*** -0.66  
H_CON SV 2.71*** 0.66  -5.14*** -0.77  
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross 
profit margin; PMO, operating profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity.  *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
models using OC95 are superior to those using OC2, suggesting that OC95 is a better 
explanatory variable for the ownership-performance relationship than OC2.  It also 
provides strong evidence on that a variable rule to classify control such as the way 
OC95 is defined is better than the conventional fixed rule as OC2 is defined.  In 
terms of power of multiple large shareholders, SV is superior to H_DIFF and H_CON 
when performance is measured as ROC or ROE, while being least favourable when 
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performance is measured as MTB.  H_DIFF is found to be superior to that using 
H_CON only when performance is measured as PMG.  Therefore, H, C1, OC95, 
H_DIFF and SV can not be rejected based on these tests.  
2.2  Testing measurements of performance 
Green (1989) provides a modified P test to deliver a consistent estimator of the 
different measures of the endogenous variables.  It runs an auxiliary regression using 
the estimated residuals of the two competing models, instead of fitted values of the 
one same endogenous variable as in the P test ( Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981).  
Table 4.12 shows the modified P test results for the three groups of performance 
variables respectively. 
Green (1989) points out the modified P estimator will tend to accept H0 more 
frequently than should be the case, however, on the other hand, it can be used to reject 
H0 since the t test of the estimator understate the true significance of the estimator.  
The modified P tests show that PMO can be rejected in favour of PMG.  However, 
for the other models, both of the hypotheses are significant.  Therefore none of them 
can be rejected.  
3  Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the data used in this chapter and the chapters thereafter, and 
investigates variables to model the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance.  Three groups of measurements for performance are discussed: 
accounting rates of return (ROA, ROC and ROE), profit margin measurements (PMG 
and PMO) and combinations of accounting and market return (TQ and MTB).  The 
measurements for ownership concentration are the same as discussed in Chapter 
Three: continuous ownership concentration variables (H, C1, C3, C5, C10 and C20), 
dichotomous ownership concentration variables (OC1, OC2, OC3, OC4, OC5, OC6 
OC90, OC95 and OC99) and power of multiple large shareholders variables (H_DIFF, 
H_CON and SV).  Size, leverage, intangible assets and risk are also included in the 
model as control variables.  A summary of definitions for all the variables is 
available in Appendix 1.   
Competing models using various measurements for ownership concentration and firm 
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Table 4.12  Modified P tests for competing models with different firm performance measurements 
Hypotheses: M1: Y1 = Xb + e0 ; M2: Y2= Xg + e1 
 X H C1 OC95 H_DIFF SV 
Y1 Y2 H0: M1; 
H1: M2 
H0: M2; 
H1: M1 
H0: M1; 
H1: M2 
H0: M2; 
H1: M1 
H0: M1; 
H1: M2 
H0: M2; 
H1: M1 
H0: M1; 
H1: M2 
H0: M2; 
H1: M1 
H0: M1; 
H1: M2 
H0: M2; 
H1: M1 
ROA ROC -17.61*** 59.03*** 7.84*** 6.81*** -17.62*** -59.06*** -17.61*** -59.02*** -17.61*** -59.05*** 
ROA ROE -13.86*** 166.12*** -13.86*** -188.63*** -13.86*** -166.01*** -13.85*** -166.02*** -13.86*** -166.14*** 
ROC ROE -13.10*** 90.46*** -13.10*** -90.45*** -13.11*** -90.39*** -13.09*** -90.43*** -13.10*** -90.45*** 
PMG PMO 40.06*** 0.68 41.06*** -0.70 40.96*** -0.67 41.07*** -0.67 41.06*** -0.68 
TQ MTB 16.45*** 42.95*** 47.91*** 7.76*** 472.54*** 7.81*** 473.58*** 7.80*** 476.07*** 7.78*** 
 
Note: H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; 
H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; ROA, return on 
assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; PMO, operating profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity.  
*, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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performance are tested.  Models using C1, C3, C5, C10 or C20 (the ownership of the 
largest one, three, five, ten and twenty shareholders) as the independent ownership 
variables are nested models in the sense that these variables are included in each other.  
It is the same case with models using OC1, OC2, OC3, OC4, OC5 or OC6 (dummies 
for the ownership of the largest shareholder exceeding 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 50% and 
equalling 100% respectively), and models using OC90, OC95 or OC99 (dummies for 
the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested 
vote exceeding 90%, 95% and 99% respectively).  T-tests for nested models are 
applied to investigate the significance of difference terms between these variables.  
C1, OC2 and OC95 are found to contain the most valid information regarding the 
ownership-performance relationship among their peer.  To compare the rest 
ownership concentration measurements: continuous measurements H and C1; 
dichotomous measurements OC2 and OC95, and power of multiple large shareholders 
measurements H_DIFF, H_CON and SV, non-nested J tests and Cox-Pesaran tests are 
applied.  The test results reject OC2 in favour of OC95, and reject H_CON in favour 
of H_DIFF and SV.  In conclusion, the tests in this chapter are in favour of H, C1, 
OC95, H_DIFF and SV than other ownership concentration variables. 
The modified P tests are used to test competing models using different measures of 
performance as the dependent variables.  The operating profit margin (PMO) is 
rejected in favour of gross profit margin (PMG).  However, none of other measures 
can be rejected by this test. 
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Chapter Five  Testing the Impact of Ownership Concentration on 
Firm Performance: Linear regression results 
Previous empirical studies regarding the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance reach inconclusive results.  These studies are different in the 
measurements of performance, measurements of ownership concentration and 
regression methods.  Chapter Four investigates modelling the impact of ownership 
concentration on performance, and compares various measurements of firm 
performance and ownership concentration.  The measurements for performance 
within three groups are tested: accounting rates of return, profit margin ratios and 
combination of accounting and market return ratios.  The measurements for 
ownership concentration within three groups are also compared: continuous variables, 
dichotomous variables and power of multiple large shareholders variables.   
Based on the variables discussed in Chapter Four, this chapter will test the linear 
impact of ownership concentration on performance.  To control the problems arising 
from the restrictions of OLS assumptions, this chapter investigates various regression 
methods and applies them to the tests.  In addition to the aggregated regressions, 
regressions controlling for country and industry effects are also carried out to identify 
any difference of the impact caused by nation or industry, and provide further 
evidence on the linear impact of ownership on performance.   
The first section introduces the model and summarizes the hypotheses regarding the 
linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance.  The second section 
tests the validity of basic OLS regressions and discusses solutions for violations of 
OLS assumptions.  Regression results for the adjusted model are presented.  The 
third section tests the country and industry effects on the ownership-performance 
relationship.  Dummies for country and industry, and their interaction variables with 
ownership concentration are added to the original model.  The final section 
concludes.  
1  Model and hypotheses 
The previous chapter investigates modelling the impact of ownership concentration on 
firm performance.  Various measurements for performance and degree of control are 
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discussed and competing models using these measurements are compared.  The 
model is summarised as: 
εβββ
ββββα
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where performance variables are return on assets (ROA), return on capital (ROC), 
return on equity (ROE), gross profit margin (PMG), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB); ownership variables are Herfindahl index (H), the 
largest shareholding (C1), dummy for the controlling power of largest shareholding 
exceeding 95% (OC95), variables for the power of multiple large shareholders 
(H_DIFF and SV); SizeTA is the total assets value, Lev is calculated as long term debt 
to common equity ratio, IAInt is the intangible assets ratio, and Beta is the risk 
element. 
The hypotheses regarding the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance 
are discussed in detail in Chapter One and summarized in Table 1.1 at the end of 
Chapter One.  Performance could be positively affected by the degree of ownership 
concentration due to the higher cost of private benefits extraction associated with 
higher degree of ownership concentration.  However high ownership concentration 
can also be detrimental for firm performance due to the agency cost arising from the 
conflicting interests between controlling shareholders and outsider investors, and the 
cost of capital arising from low market liquidity.  Additionally the natural selection 
theory and the substitution effect of other corporate governance mechanisms predict 
that there will in fact be no relationship between ownership and performance.  The 
simple presence of multiple large shareholders could benefit firm performance via the 
monitoring effect of other large shareholders on the controlling shareholder.  
However, if the multiple large shareholders form a controlling coalition and collude 
with each other, the extraction of private benefit could be more efficient and therefore 
firm performance could be sacrificed.  In this sense, the probability of multiple large 
shareholders to form a controlling coalition can negatively affect firm performance, 
and the contestability of outsider investors to challenge the controlling coalition 
should have a positive impact on firm performance. 
Firm size is hypothesized to be positively correlated with performance because of the 
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following reasons.  First, survivor bias states that exceptionally well-performing 
firms in general grow faster and therefore are larger.  Second, monopoly pricing 
states that large firms in general are more able to earn monopoly profits than small 
firms.   Third, earnings volatility states that small firms in general are less 
diversified than large firms and therefore more often are producing negative earnings.  
However large size may also have a negative impact on performance because of 
agency problems.  The proxy used in this study for firm size is total assets.  The 
squared terms of size are included to control for the non-linear impact of size on 
performance.  The impact of size on performance could be delayed for one year to 
take full effect.  Therefore size data is from the year 2003, which is one year before 
performance data of the year 2004. 
Leverage is believed to be a potentially important governance structure like ownership.  
The squared leverage is included to identify a possible optimal capital structure.  
Firms with strong financial performance prefer not to borrow and firms with high debt 
levels may perform better because it provides more incentives.  A significant 
negative coefficient of leverage and a significant positive coefficient of the squared 
leverage are predicted.  Most literature I have reviewed use current leverage ratio as 
the control variable for current firm performance.  Some academics argue that lagged 
leverage might impose a stronger impact on current firm performance than current 
leverage.  However, leverage measured as the long term debt ratio is not expected to 
change in a short period of time.  Therefore in my study, I use current long term debt 
ratio as the proxy for leverage. 
Another control variable is intangible assets ratio.  This measures the research and 
development effect and advertising effect.  Firms with higher R&D investment may 
perform better because they are more foresighted and have more potential for 
profitable inventions.  Advertising may also affect performance positively since 
products can be sold at probably higher price than those of other firms.   
Systematic risk is included to control for differences in accounting or market 
performance that are the result of differences in firm risk. 
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2  OLS regressions and tests for the validity of OLS assumptions 
2.1  Tests for the validity of OLS assumptions 
OLS regressions are strictly based on several assumptions.  Failure to meet these can 
lead to incorrect modelling, biased estimates of coefficients and especially biased 
estimates of the standard errors.  For cross-sectional data as used in this study, there 
are four assumptions to test: no multi-collinearity, normality of residuals, 
homoskedasticity (constant variance) of residuals, and no influential outliers.  To test 
the multi-collinearity in the independent variables, the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
are used.  This is a scaled version of the multiple correlation coefficients between 
variable j and the rest of the independent variables.  Specifically, )1/(1 2jj RVIF −=  
where jR  is the multiple correlation coefficient.  If jR  equals zero (i.e., no 
correlation between jX and the remaining independent variables), then jVIF  equals 1.  
This is the minimum value.  There is no formal threshold value of VIF for 
determining the presence of multi-collinearity.  It is suggested that a value greater 
than 10 is an indication of potential multi-collinearity problems, while in a weaker 
model a value over 2.5 might be the threshold.   
The Kolmogorov-Smirnv test can be applied to test the normality of residuals.  This 
tests the cumulative distribution of the residuals against that of the theoretical normal 
distribution with a chi-square test to determine whether there is a statistically 
significant difference.  The Cook-Weisberg test can be used to test the 
homoskedasticity of residuals.  It is also known as Breusch-Pagan test, which 
performs a score (Lagrange multiplier) test for null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
against multiplicative heteroskedasticity.  To detect influential outliers, I use the 
Cook’s D.  Cook’s D measures the influence of each observation on the value of the 
estimated parameters, and indicates the difference in the estimated parameters in a 
model fitted to all the observations and a model fitted to the sample that omits the ith 
observation.  If Cook’s D is large for the ith observation, the ith observation has an 
overwhelming effect on parameter estimates.  I use the value of 4/(number of 
observation) as cut-off, that is, any Cook’s D larger than 4/(number of observation) is 
considered to be large Cook’s D, and that observation is considered to be an outlier.   
Table 5.1 presents the OLS regression of different firm performance variables on 
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Table 5.1  OLS regressions of firm performance on Herfindahl index H and validity tests of OLS assumptions 
 
Panel A  OLS regression results 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H -0.0083  -0.81 -0.0178  -0.94  -0.0217  -0.37  -0.0550  -1.75* -0.1720  -1.41  -1.6926  -2.38*** 
SizeTA 0.0884  1.41  -0.0226  -0.19  0.0769  0.21  0.7729  3.60***  1.9575  2.59*** 4.8857  1.10  
(SizeTA)2 -0.0066  -1.41 0.0009  0.11  -0.0039  -0.15  -0.0548  -3.44*** -0.1580  -2.85*** -0.3580  -1.09  
Lev -0.0451  -1.92*  -0.1361  -3.10*** -0.1239  -0.92  -0.0173  -0.24  -2.0259  -7.14*** -6.4246  -3.91***  
(Lev)2 2.70E-07 0.05  1.16E-05 1.19  -2.97E-05 -0.98  1.28E-05 0.80  0.0004  6.79*** 0.0012  3.27*** 
IAInt -0.0165  -1.06  -0.0268  -0.92  -0.0275  -0.31  0.1988  4.18*** 0.7619  4.10*** 2.8695  2.64*** 
Beta -0.0107  -4.13*** -0.0217  -4.49*** -0.0867  -5.80*** -0.0101  -1.25  0.0300  0.94  0.4579  2.53** 
Constant 0.0718  14.39*** 0.1178  12.67*** 0.2045  7.13*** 0.2701  17.54*** 0.7192  12.02*** 1.6964  4.88*** 
F 5.72***  7.78***  6.99***  7.65***  12.25***  4.64***  
R-sq 0.06  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.12  0.05  
Adj R-sq 0.05  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.04  
No. of obs. 640  640  640  631  637  637  
Panel B  Test results for the validity of OLS assumptions 
VIF values ROA ROC ROE PMG TQ MTB 
H 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 
SizeTA 285.72 285.72 285.72 342.37 285.87 294.52 
(SizeTA)2 284.97 284.97 284.97 341.49 285.13 293.65 
Lev 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 
(Lev)2 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.81 1.81 1.8 
IAInt 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.07 
Beta 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Constant 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Kolmogorov-Smirnv test -*** -*** -*** 67.93*** -*** -*** 
Cook-Weisberg test 6.82*** 52.98*** 12571.81*** 291.69*** 2244.41*** 9285.83*** 
Cook’s D> 4/n (No. of obs.) 35 38 16 28 24 25 
Total no. of obs. 640 640 640 631 637 637 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; VIF, the variance inflation factors.  *, **, and 
*** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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ownership concentration measured as the Herfindahl index H, and the validity test 
results for OLS assumptions.  The result shows a typical multi-collinearity problem 
in a polynomial model, with very high VIF values for SizeTA and SizeTA squared 
variables.  Lev and Lev squared variables also have relatively high VIF values than 
the other variables.  High multi-collinearity may increase the standard error of 
estimates for the variables which have multi-collinearity problem and mislead the 
interpretation of regression coefficients of these variables.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnv 
tests are significant in all regressions, rejecting the null hypothesis of normality of 
residuals.  It is the same case with the results of the Cook-Weisberg tests.  
Homoskedasticity is rejected in all regressions, suggesting the problem of 
heteroskedasticity.  The statistics under “Cook’s D > 4/n” show the number of 
observations with a Cook’s D value more than 4/n, where n is the total number of 
observations.  The number of outliers based on this test is between 16 and 38. 
In conclusion, all four OLS assumptions are violated in the model.  The problem of 
multi-collinearity is found in size and leverage variables, and their squared variables.  
The residuals are found non-normally distributed, and are heteroscedastic (with 
non-constant variances).  A substantial number of influential outliers are also found 
in each regression. 
2.2  Solutions to violations of OLS assumptions 
A solution to the multi-collinearity problem in the polynomial variables is to replace 
the values of the variables by their deviations from the mean, so that these values and 
their squared values are no longer correlated.  Suppose a model: 
εβββ +++= 2210 xxy  
Let ∑−= ixnx 1  and define xxz −= .  Then fit the model 
εγγγ +++= 2210 zzy  
We can get the estimates of theβ ’s from the estimates of theγ ’s: 
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Therefore the values of SizeTA and Lev are replaced by their deviations from the 
mean, defined as SizeTA-d and Lev-d respectively. To deal with the non-normality 
and heteroskedasticity problems in the residuals, the OLS regressions can be carried 
out with robust standard errors which take these issues into account.  For the 
influential outlier problem, one solution is to simply drop these observations 
considered as influential outliers.  But the sample is too small to drop such a 
considerable number of them.  Robust regression methods can provide compromises 
between dropping the outliers and seriously violating the assumptions of OLS 
regression.  One type of robust regressions is to use iteratively re-weighted least 
squares of modified maximum likelihood-like estimators.  This regression method 
assigns a weight to each observation, with higher weights given to better behaved 
observations.  In STATA (which is the data analysis package used in this study), it is 
implemented by dropping the most influential points (Cook’s D larger than 1) and 
then down-weighting cases with large absolute residuals.  This method is also able to 
address the issues of non-normality and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
2.3  Regression results 
Table 5.2 summarises the regression results of different firm performance variables on 
different ownership concentration variables.  Table 5.2 (1), (2) and (3) present the 
results using OLS regressions, OLS regressions with robust standard error and 
iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions, respectively.   
The OLS regression results in Table 5.2 (1) show that ownership concentration 
measured as the Herfindahl index H or the largest shareholding C1 has a significant 
negative impact on firm performance measured as gross profit margin (PMG) or 
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Table 5.2 (1)  OLS regressions of firm performance 
 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H -0.0083  -0.81 -0.0178  -0.94  -0.0217  -0.37  -0.0550  -1.75* -0.1720  -1.41  -1.6926  -2.38*** 
SizeTA-d 0.0046  1.09 -0.0038  -0.48  0.0218  0.89  0.0684  5.15*** -0.0112  -0.22  0.1524  0.50  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.41 0.0009  0.11  -0.0039  -0.15  -0.0548  -3.44*** -0.1580  -2.85*** -0.3580  -1.09  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.49*** -0.0017  -4.66*** -0.0025  -2.26*** -0.0004  -0.73  -0.0158  -6.77*** -0.0396  -2.88*** 
(Lev-d)2 2.70E-07 0.05  1.16E-05 1.19  -2.97E-05 -0.98  1.28E-05 0.80  0.0004  6.79*** 0.0012  3.27*** 
IAInt -0.0165  -1.06  -0.0268  -0.92  -0.0275  -0.31  0.1988  4.18*** 0.7619  4.10*** 2.8695  2.64*** 
Beta -0.0107  -4.13*** -0.0217  -4.49*** -0.0867  -5.80*** -0.0101  -1.25  0.0300  0.94  0.4579  2.53** 
Constant 0.0718  14.39*** 0.1178  12.67*** 0.2045  7.13*** 0.2701  17.54*** 0.7192  12.02*** 1.6964  4.88*** 
F 5.72***  7.78***  6.99***  7.65***  12.25***  4.64***  
R-sq 0.06  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.12  0.05  
Adj R-sq 0.05  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.04  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 -0.0101  -1.09  -0.0225  -1.30  -0.0359  -0.67  -0.0558  -1.95* -0.1629  -1.46  -1.6921  -2.61*** 
SizeTA-d 0.0047  1.11  -0.0036  -0.45  0.0224  0.91  0.0686  5.17*** -0.0109  -0.21  0.1577  0.52  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.41  0.0009  0.11  -0.0040  -0.15  -0.0548  -3.43*** -0.1579  -2.84*** -0.3567  -1.08  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.52*** -0.0017  -4.70*** -0.0026  -2.29*** -0.0004  -0.74  -0.0158  -6.77*** -0.0397  -2.90*** 
(Lev-d)2 2.64E-07 0.05  1.16E-05 1.19  -2.96E-05 -0.98  1.26E-05 0.79  0.0004  6.78*** 0.0012  3.26*** 
IAInt -0.0166  -1.07  -0.0271  -0.94  -0.0283  -0.32  0.1985  4.18*** 0.7618  4.10*** 2.8601  2.64*** 
Beta -0.0108  -4.15*** -0.0219  -4.52*** -0.0871  -5.82*** -0.0103  -1.27  0.0293  0.91  0.4506  2.49** 
Constant 0.0736  13.26*** 0.1219  11.79*** 0.2125  6.66*** 0.2778  16.27*** 0.7392  11.11*** 1.9243  4.98*** 
F 5.80***  7.90***  7.04***  7.76***  12.27***  4.81***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.12   0.05   
Adj R-sq 0.05   0.07   0.06   0.07   0.11   0.04   
(continued on next page)   
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; H_DIFF, sum of 
squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total 
assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.2 (1)  OLS regressions of firm performance (continued) 
 
Panel C  Dichotomous ownership concentration as OC95 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
OC95 -0.0033  -0.72  -0.0066  -0.78  -0.0362  -1.39  0.0058  0.42  0.0632  1.16  -0.3994  -1.26  
SizeTA-d 0.0045  1.06  -0.0041  -0.51  0.0226  0.92  0.0670  5.04*** -0.0187  -0.37  0.1177  0.39  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.42  0.0009  0.10  -0.0045  -0.17  -0.0541  -3.38*** -0.1567  -2.82*** -0.3612  -1.09  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.43*** -0.0017  -4.59*** -0.0025  -2.26** -0.0003  -0.56  -0.0154  -6.64*** -0.0364  -2.66*** 
(Lev-d)2 1.05E-07 0.02  1.13E-05 1.16  -3E-05 -1.01  1.22E-05 0.76  0.0004  6.75*** 0.0012  3.18*** 
IAInt -0.0162  -1.04  -0.0262  -0.90  -0.0277  -0.31  0.2006  4.21*** 0.7704  4.14*** 2.9364  2.70*** 
Beta -0.0108  -4.13*** -0.0218  -4.49*** -0.0877  -5.87*** -0.0095  -1.17  0.0346  1.08  0.4632  2.55**  
Constant 0.0718  14.10*** 0.1175  12.39*** 0.2194  7.52*** 0.2550  16.30*** 0.6467  10.63*** 1.5377  4.33*** 
F 5.7***  7.74***  7.27***  7.2***  12.14***  4.03***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.07   0.12   0.04   
Adj R-sq 0.05   0.07   0.06   0.06   0.11   0.03   
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H_DIFF -0.0045  -0.39  -0.0077  -0.36  -0.0041  -0.06  -0.0350  -0.99  -0.1143  -0.84  -1.6385  -2.06* 
SizeTA-d 0.0045  1.05  -0.0042  -0.52  0.0213  0.87  0.0676  5.09*** -0.0139  -0.27  0.1383  0.46  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.41  0.0009  0.11  -0.0039  -0.15  -0.0547  -3.42*** -0.1586  -2.85*** -0.3688  -1.12  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.44*** -0.0017  -4.60*** -0.0025  -2.23*** -0.0004  -0.63  -0.0156  -6.70*** -0.0384  -2.80*** 
(Lev-d)2 1.81E-07 0.03  1.14E-05 1.17  -0.00003 -0.99  1.23E-05 0.77  0.0004  6.75*** 0.0012  3.24*** 
IAInt -0.0163  -1.05  -0.0263  -0.91  -0.0267  -0.30  0.1996  4.19*** 0.7654  4.11*** 2.8880  2.66*** 
Beta -0.0107  -4.11*** -0.0216  -4.46*** -0.0865  -5.79*** -0.0100  -1.23  0.0306  0.95  0.4568  2.52** 
Constant 0.0706  14.95*** 0.1149  13.07*** 0.2003  7.39*** 0.2628  17.99*** 0.6968  12.31*** 1.5468  4.70*** 
F 5.64***  7.66***  6.97***  7.32***  12.04***  4.43***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.12   0.05   
Adj R-sq 0.05   0.07   0.06   0.07   0.11   0.04   
(continued on next page)   
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; H_DIFF, sum of 
squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total 
assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.2 (1)  OLS regressions of firm performance (continued) 
Panel E  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
SV -0.0028  -0.71  -0.0074  -1.02  -0.0183  -0.82  -0.0166  -1.40  -0.0483  -1.04  -0.9240  -3.43*** 
SizeTA-d 0.0046  1.08  -0.0037  -0.47  0.0227  0.92  0.0684  5.15*** -0.0123  -0.24  0.1794  0.59  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.42  0.0007  0.08  -0.0045  -0.17  -0.0548  -3.43*** -0.1593  -2.87*** -0.3859  -1.18  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.46*** -0.0017  -4.64*** -0.0025  -2.28** -0.0004  -0.64  -0.0156  -6.70*** -0.0390  -2.86*** 
(Lev-d)2 1.65E-07 0.03  1.14E-05 1.17  -3E-05 -0.99  1.23E-05 0.77  0.0004  6.75*** 0.0012  3.24*** 
IAInt -0.0164  -1.05  -0.0266  -0.92  -0.0282  -0.32  0.1992  4.18*** 0.7654  4.11*** 2.8639  2.65*** 
Beta -0.0108  -4.14*** -0.0219  -4.51*** -0.0874  -5.84*** -0.0104  -1.28  0.0297  0.93  0.4330  2.40**  
Constant 0.0719  13.92*** 0.1188  12.36*** 0.2120  7.15*** 0.2692  16.93*** 0.7135  11.53*** 1.9421  5.43*** 
F 5.70***  7.80***  7.07***  7.48***  12.10***  5.54***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.12   0.06   
Adj R-sq 0.05   0.07   0.06   0.07   0.11   0.05   
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  631  637  637  
 
Table 5.2 (2)  OLS with robust standard errors regressions of firm performance  
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H -0.0083  -0.85  -0.0178  -1.10 -0.0217  -0.48 -0.0550  -1.74 -0.1720  -1.60 -1.6926  -1.48  
SizeTA-d 0.0046  1.03  -0.0038  -0.30 0.0218  1.06 0.0684  5.49*** -0.0112  -0.24 0.1524  0.62  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.47  0.0009  0.07 -0.0039  -0.22 -0.0548  -3.94*** -0.1580  -3.81*** -0.3580  -1.52  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.00*** -0.0017  -3.84*** -0.0025  -1.94* -0.0004  -0.68 -0.0158  -5.37*** -0.0396  -2.00** 
(Lev-d)2 2.70E-07 0.07  1.16E-05 1.49 -2.97E-05 -1.39 1.28E-05 0.68 0.0004  6.54*** 0.0012  3.11*** 
IAInt -0.0165  -1.08  -0.0268  -1.01 -0.0275  -0.36 0.1988  3.80*** 0.7619  4.48*** 2.8695  2.70*** 
Beta -0.0107  -2.19*** -0.0217  -1.98** -0.0867  -2.07** -0.0101  -1.33 0.0300  0.86 0.4579  2.00** 
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 
90%; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, 
LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 
10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.2 (2)  OLS with robust standard errors regressions of firm performance (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Constant 0.0718  12.61*** 0.1178  10.49*** 0.2045  6.06*** 0.2701  16.81*** 0.7192  14.05*** 1.6964  4.01*** 
F 5.72***  7.78***  6.99***  7.65***  12.25***  4.64***  
R-sq 0.06  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.12  0.05  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 -0.0101  -1.12  -0.0225  -1.47  -0.0359  -0.85  -0.0558  -1.96**  -0.1629  -1.57  -1.6921  -1.74  
SizeTA-d 0.0047  1.05  -0.0036  -0.29  0.0224  1.10  0.0686  5.51***  -0.0109  -0.23  0.1577  0.63  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.47  0.0009  0.07  -0.0040  -0.22  -0.0548  -3.92*** -0.1579  -3.80*** -0.3567  -1.51  
Lev-d -0.0007  -3.03*** -0.0017  -3.88*** -0.0026  -1.95* -0.0004  -0.69  -0.0158  -5.40*** -0.0397  -2.02**  
(Lev-d)2 2.64E-07 0.07  1.16E-05 1.49  -2.96E-05 -1.38  1.26E-05 0.67  0.0004  6.54*** 0.0012  3.07***  
IAInt -0.0166  -1.09  -0.0271  -1.02  -0.0283  -0.37  0.1985  3.79***  0.7618  4.49*** 2.8601  2.71***  
Beta -0.0108  -2.20** -0.0219  -2.00** -0.0871  -2.07**  -0.0103  -1.36  0.0293  0.84  0.4506  1.99**  
Constant 0.0736  11.72*** 0.1219  10.00*** 0.2125  6.07*** 0.2778  15.67*** 0.7392  12.80*** 1.9243  4.43***  
F 5.80***  7.90***  7.04***  7.76***  12.27***  4.81***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.12   0.05   
Panel C  Dichotomous ownership concentration as OC95 
OC95 -0.0033  -0.73  -0.0066  -0.80  -0.0362  -1.33  0.0058  0.42  0.0632  1.16  -0.3994  -1.30  
SizeTA-d 0.0045  0.99  -0.0041  -0.32  0.0226  1.14  0.0670  5.37***  -0.0187  -0.40  0.1177  0.45  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.47  0.0009  0.06  -0.0045  -0.25  -0.0541  -3.91*** -0.1567  -3.79*** -0.3612  -1.57  
Lev-d -0.0007  -2.95***  -0.0017  -3.77*** -0.0025  -1.96**  -0.0003  -0.52  -0.0154  -5.22*** -0.0364  -1.96**  
(Lev-d)2 1.05E-07 0.03  1.13E-05 1.44  -3E-05 -1.45  1.22E-05 0.65  0.0004  6.56*** 0.0012  3.04***  
IAInt -0.0162  -1.06  -0.0262  -0.99  -0.0277  -0.36  0.2006  3.81***  0.7704  4.53*** 2.9364  2.81***  
Beta -0.0108  -2.20**  -0.0218  -1.99**  -0.0877  -2.07**  -0.0095  -1.26  0.0346  0.99  0.4632  2.01**  
Constant 0.0718  12.97***  0.1175  10.06*** 0.2194  5.48***  0.2550  16.03*** 0.6467  12.59*** 1.5377  4.34***  
F 5.7***  7.74***  7.27***  7.2***  12.14***  4.03***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.07   0.12   0.04   
(continued on next page)   
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; H_DIFF, sum of 
squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total 
assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.2 (2)  OLS with robust standard errors regressions of firm performance (continued) 
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H_DIFF -0.0045  -0.42  -0.0077  -0.46 -0.0041  -0.11 -0.0350  -1.00 -0.1143  -1.00 -1.6385  -1.26  
SizeTA-d 0.0045  0.99  -0.0042  -0.33 0.0213  1.04 0.0676  5.43*** -0.0139  -0.30 0.1383  0.55  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.48  0.0009  0.07 -0.0039  -0.22 -0.0547  -3.95*** -0.1586  -3.82*** -0.3688  -1.57  
Lev-d -0.0007  -2.96***  -0.0017  -3.79*** -0.0025  -1.95* -0.0004  -0.58 -0.0156  -5.28*** -0.0384  -1.97**  
(Lev-d)2 1.81E-07 0.05  1.14E-05 1.46 -0.00003 -1.41 1.23E-05 0.65 0.0004  6.47*** 0.0012  3.13***  
IAInt -0.0163  -1.07  -0.0263  -0.99 -0.0267  -0.35 0.1996  3.80*** 0.7654  4.50*** 2.8880  2.72***  
Beta -0.0107  -2.18**  -0.0216  -1.98** -0.0865  -2.06** -0.0100  -1.32 0.0306  0.88 0.4568  2.01**  
Constant 0.0706  13.15***  0.1149  10.56*** 0.2003  5.79*** 0.2628  17.16*** 0.6968  14.41*** 1.5468  3.97***  
F 5.64***  7.66***  6.97***  7.32***  12.04***  4.43***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.12   0.05   
Panel E  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV -0.0028  -0.83  -0.0074  -1.30 -0.0183  -0.89 -0.0166  -1.50 -0.0483  -1.22 -0.9240  -1.56  
SizeTA-d 0.0046  1.02  -0.0037  -0.30 0.0227  1.13 0.0684  5.49*** -0.0123  -0.26 0.1794  0.68  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0066  -1.49  0.0007  0.05 -0.0045  -0.25 -0.0548  -3.95*** -0.1593  -3.83*** -0.3859  -1.66  
Lev-d -0.0007  -2.98***  -0.0017  -3.82*** -0.0025  -1.95* -0.0004  -0.59 -0.0156  -5.28*** -0.0390  -2.01**  
(Lev-d)2 1.65E-07 0.04  1.14E-05 1.46 -3E-05 -1.39 1.23E-05 0.65 0.0004  6.46*** 0.0012  3.07***  
IAInt -0.0164  -1.07  -0.0266  -1.01 -0.0282  -0.37 0.1992  3.79*** 0.7654  4.49*** 2.8639  2.84***  
Beta -0.0108  -2.19**  -0.0219  -2.00** -0.0874  -2.08** -0.0104  -1.37 0.0297  0.85 0.4330  2.00**  
Constant 0.0719  12.14***  0.1188  10.16*** 0.2120  6.34*** 0.2692  16.51*** 0.7135  13.19*** 1.9421  7.40***  
F 5.70***  7.80***  7.07***  7.48***  12.10***  5.54***  
R-sq 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.12   0.06   
Adj R-sq 0.05   0.07   0.06   0.07   0.11   0.05   
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  631  637  637  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; H_DIFF, sum of 
squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total 
assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.2 (3)  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H -0.0183  -2.55***  -0.0223  -2.01**  -0.0147  -0.79  -0.0457  -1.53  -0.1478  -2.10** -0.0771  -0.38  
SizeTA-d 0.0023  0.78  0.0015  0.32  0.0115  1.48  0.0606  4.81***  -0.0160  -0.54  -0.0868  -1.01  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.71*  -0.0085  -1.68*  -0.0016  -0.19  -0.0415  -2.74*** -0.0770  -2.41** 0.0580  0.62  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.06***  -0.0018  -8.44*** -0.0012  -3.41*** -0.0002  -0.37  -0.0077  -5.74*** -0.0018  -0.45  
(Lev-d)2 -2.2E-06 -0.59  8.8E-06 1.54  -4.3E-05 -4.52*** 0.0001  2.22**  0.0003  7.58*** -0.0001  -1.37  
IAInt -0.0140  -1.28  -0.0333  -1.97**  -0.0433  -1.52  0.2241  4.96***  0.7280  6.80*** 1.7730  5.74***  
Beta -0.0060  -3.27***  -0.0060  -2.11**  -0.0096  -2.02**  -0.0088  -1.15  -0.0234  -1.27  0.0384  0.74  
Constant 0.0678  19.37***  0.1067  19.66*** 0.1543  16.93*** 0.2332  15.37*** 0.5816  16.88*** 1.6186  16.35***  
F 7.06***  15.56***  10.98***  9.01***  16.20***  5.43***  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 -0.0177  -2.70***  -0.0218  -2.15**  -0.0085  -0.50  -0.0421  -1.55  -0.1682  -2.63*** -0.1508  -0.82  
SizeTA-d 0.0024  0.79  0.0015  0.33  0.0114  1.45  0.0606  4.81***  -0.0143  -0.49  -0.0841  -0.97  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.71*  -0.0085  -1.69*  -0.0016  -0.19  -0.0412  -2.72*** -0.0765  -2.40** 0.0591  0.63  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.07***  -0.0018  -8.46*** -0.0012  -3.37*** -0.0002  -0.34  -0.0078  -5.79*** -0.0019  -0.50  
(Lev-d)2 -2.1E-06 -0.58  8.74E-06 1.53  -4.3E-05 -4.53*** 0.0001  2.20**  0.0003  7.62*** -0.0001  -1.40  
IAInt -0.0148  -1.36  -0.0337  -1.99**  -0.0432  -1.52  0.2242  4.97***  0.7238  6.79*** 1.7700  5.73***  
Beta -0.0061  -3.34***  -0.0060  -2.14*** -0.0096  -2.01**  -0.0089  -1.16  -0.0248  -1.35  0.0366  0.71  
Constant 0.0703  18.04**  0.1096  18.17*** 0.1541  15.18*** 0.2378  14.22*** 0.6087  15.96*** 1.6562  15.04***  
F 7.34***  15.69***  10.90***  9.04***  16.65***  5.54***  
Panel C  Dichotomous ownership concentration as OC95 
OC95 -0.0030  -0.92  -0.0005  -0.11  0.0057  0.69  0.0104  0.80  -0.0074  -0.23  0.0752  0.84  
SizeTA-d 0.0021  0.69  0.0010  0.21  0.0106  1.36  0.0591  4.70***  -0.0193  -0.65  -0.0940  -1.10  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0058  -1.76*  -0.0087  -1.70  -0.0015  -0.18  -0.0412  -2.72*** -0.0783  -2.43** 0.0623  0.67  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.86***  -0.0018  -8.26*** -0.0012  -3.33*** -0.0001  -0.16  -0.0074  -5.45*** -0.0013  -0.34  
(continued on next page)   
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; H_DIFF, sum of 
squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total 
assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.2 (3)  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance (continued) 
Panel C  Dichotomous ownership concentration as OC95 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
(Lev-d)2 -2.4E-06 -0.63  8.59E-06 1.49  -4.3E-05 -4.49*** 0.0001  2.17**  0.0003  7.39*** -0.0001  -1.44  
IAInt -0.0130  -1.18  -0.0327  -1.91**  -0.0416  -1.46  0.2243  4.98***  0.7369  6.83*** 1.7697  5.78***  
Beta -0.0060  -3.25***  -0.0058  -2.03**  -0.0093  -1.94*  -0.0081  -1.05  -0.0204  -1.09  0.0410  0.80  
Constant 0.0653  18.12***  0.1020  18.26*** 0.1477  15.83*** 0.2173  14.24*** 0.5526  15.64*** 1.5533  15.52***  
F 6.30***  14.89***  10.79***  8.76***  15.26***  5.57***  
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H_DIFF -0.0137  -1.70*  -0.0113  -0.91  -0.0020  -0.10  -0.0235  -0.70  -0.0779  -0.99  0.1336  0.59  
SizeTA-d 0.0021  0.71  0.0011  0.24  0.0111  1.42  0.0597  4.73***  -0.0179  -0.61  -0.0929  -1.08  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0057  -1.74  -0.0086  -1.70*  -0.0017  -0.20  -0.0414  -2.73*** -0.0787  -2.45** 0.0588  0.63  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.96***  -0.0018  -8.27*** -0.0012  -3.34*** -0.0001  -0.26  -0.0075  -5.58*** -0.0013  -0.32  
(Lev-d)2 -2.2E-06 -0.60  8.53E-06 1.49  -4.3E-05 -4.51*** 0.0001  2.22*  0.0003  7.48*** -0.0002  -1.48  
IAInt -0.0135  -1.23  -0.0326  -1.91*  -0.0429  -1.50  0.2250  4.98***  0.7333  6.81*** 1.7766  5.77***  
Beta -0.0060  -3.29***  -0.0060  -2.09**  -0.0096  -2.00*** -0.0086  -1.12  -0.0222  -1.20  0.0419  0.81  
Constant 0.0656  19.71***  0.1032  20.01*** 0.1514  17.49*** 0.2261  15.70*** 0.5596  17.09*** 1.5810  16.96***  
F 6.59***  14.94***  10.81***  8.73***  15.57***  5.52***  
Panel E  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV -0.0038  -1.39  -0.0053  -1.24  0.0007  0.10  -0.0096  -0.86  -0.0464  -1.74*  -0.0691  -0.90  
SizeTA-d 0.0022  0.74  0.0013  0.28  0.0110  1.40  0.0600  4.75***  -0.0143  -0.49  -0.0832  -0.97  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0058  -1.78*  -0.0088  -1.72*  -0.0017  -0.20  -0.0411  -2.71*** -0.0795  -2.49** 0.0578  0.62  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.93***  -0.0018  -8.28*** -0.0012  -3.32*** -0.0001  -0.23  -0.0074  -5.56*** -0.0017  -0.45  
(Lev-d)2 -2.3E-06 -0.61  8.43E-06 1.47  -4.3E-05 -4.51*** 0.0001  2.21**  0.0003  7.51*** -0.0002  -1.48  
IAInt -0.0138  -1.25  -0.0333  -1.96**  -0.0428  -1.50  0.2248  4.98***  0.7227  6.77*** 1.7656  5.73***  
Beta -0.0061  -3.30***  -0.0061  -2.13**  -0.0095  -1.98**  -0.0087  -1.13  -0.0234  -1.27  0.0359  0.70  
Constant 0.0664  18.19***  0.1054  18.69*** 0.1506  15.91*** 0.2288  14.69*** 0.5800  16.33*** 1.6470  16.15***  
F 6.30***  15.07***  10.79***  8.77***  15.53***  5.59***  
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  631  637  637  
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; OC95, dummy for the probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a contested vote exceeding 90%; H_DIFF, sum of 
squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total 
assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 113
market-to-book ratio (MTB).  The power of multiple large shareholders measured as 
H_DIFF and SV also has significantly negative impact on the market-to-book ratio 
(MTB).  However, after controlling for the non-normality and heteroskedasticity 
issues in residuals, OLS regressions with robust standard errors produce few 
significant results, as shown in Table 5.2 (2).  Only the largest shareholding C1 has a 
significant negative impact on performance measured as PMG.  The iteratively 
re-weighted least squares regressions address potential problems arising from 
influential outliers and reveal more significant results, as shown in Table 5.2 (3).  
Ownership concentration measured as the Herfindahl index H or the largest 
shareholding C1 has a significant negative impact on performance measured as return 
on assets (ROA), return on invested capitals (ROC) and Tobin’s Q (TQ).  Some 
significant negative impacts are also found from the power of multiple large 
shareholders H_DIFF and SV.  No significant impact is found when ownership 
concentration is measured as dichotomous variable OC95.  Firm performance 
measured as return on equity seems not being affected by any of the ownership 
concentration variables.   
To conclude, the estimates of basic OLS regressions with or without robust standard 
errors are severely biased by the influential outliers.  The iteratively re-weighted 
least squares regressions are able to deliver more efficient results.  A significant 
impact of ownership concentration on accounting rates of return and market return 
can be detected only when continuous measurements, rather than dichotomous 
measurements, are used.  This impact is more possible to be negative than positive.  
Firm’s profit margin seems to be irrelevant to ownership concentration. 
The negative impact of ownership concentration on firm performance suggests that 
the costs of high ownership concentration, including agency cost arising from 
conflicting interests of large shareholders and outsider investors, and the increased 
cost of capital due to less market liquidity, seem to be stronger than any benefits it 
produces, such as the more effective monitoring effect of large shareholders on 
management.  The negative impact of power of multiple large shareholders suggest a 
positive impact of contestability of controlling coalitions, and stresses the collusion 
issue arising from multiple large shareholders. 
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Significant non-linear effects are found of size on gross profit margin PMG.  The 
coefficient for size is positive and negative for its squared term, suggesting an 
inverted-bell shaped relationship.  The explanation is that bigger is better for profit 
margin, but the agency costs associated with large sizes start to dominate above a 
certain size level.   
Leverage is found to have a significant negative impact on all performance measures, 
while the positive impact of squared term of leverage is only significant on Tobin’s Q 
and MTB.  This result confirms that leverage is associated with lower accounting 
rates of return, which suggests that firms with strong financial performance prefer not 
to borrow.  However, no positive monitoring impact from debt holders is found for 
accounting rates of return.  For Tobin’s Q and MTB, which are heavily affected by 
market responses, a bell-shaped impact of leverage is found.  Higher leverage seems 
to be beneficial for firm’s market performance when it is above a certain level.  
These results seem to be contrary to the traditional agency cost hypothesis of capital 
structure, and suggest that leverage is beneficial for firm’s market return, rather than 
accounting measures of return.   
The impact of intangible assets is different on different measures of performance.  
Accounting rate of return ROC seems to be negatively affected by intangible assets 
ratio, while gross profit margin PMG, Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio MTB are 
positively affected by this ratio.  The positive impact on gross profit margin confirms 
the hypothesis that investments in advertising or brands enable higher prices on 
products and larger profit margin.  Research and development investments also mean 
more potential for profitable inventions, and hence positively affect investor’s 
expectation on the firm’s performance, which will be positively reflected in the 
market return.  The negative impact on ROC is inconsistent with the positive 
hypothesis, suggesting that there are costs associated with intangible assets that are 
detrimental for the accounting calculation of return on invested capital ROC. 
Systematic risk Beta seems to have a significant negative impact on accounting rates 
of return ROA, ROC and ROE, which strongly supports the risk-incentive trade-off 
theory.  No significant impact is found on gross profit margin PMG, Tobin’s Q or 
market-to-book ratio MTB.   
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3  Results controlling for country and industry effects 
The impact of degree of control on performance can also be subject to country and 
industry, due to different economic environment, such as product market competition 
and the structure of capital and labour markets (Maher and Andersson, 2000), and 
political environments, such as the degree of investor protection (Himmelberg and 
Hubbard, 2004).  Chapter Three provides descriptive statistics for European 
ownership and control structure based on a sample of 1291 companies among the 
largest 5000 European companies.  Significant country and industry differences are 
found for degree of control variables.   
In this section, the main effects of country and industry on firm performance are 
controlled by including dummy variables in the original models.  The effects of their 
interaction with ownership structure variables on firm performance are tested by 
interaction variables between the country or industry dummy and ownership 
concentration variables.  OC95 is a dichotomous variable, and therefore not suitable 
for this purpose. 
3.1  Country effects 
Table 5.3 present the iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm 
performance on ownership concentration after controlling for country effects.  
Greece seems to be the only country that interacts with ownership concentration 
variables H and C1 to affect firm performance significantly.  The coefficients for 
their interaction variables are positive, indicating that in Greece, a high ownership 
concentration is associated with significant higher performance value than in general 
European countries.  Moreover, a significant negative main effect is found of Greece 
on most firm performance measurements, suggesting that Greek companies perform 
worse than general companies in the sample.   
Significant negative interaction effects of France and Germany with the Shapley value 
are found in the regressions, indicating that in France and Germany, the impact of the 
Shapley value on firm performance is weaker than in other countries.  Again, Greece 
has a significant positive interaction effect with the Shapley value.   
These results suggest that in Greece, the corporate governance effect of ownership 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects13 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H -0.0061  -0.05  -0.0312  -0.17  0.0335  0.10  -0.3552  -0.72  0.0281  0.02  0.3411  0.10  
Belgium -0.0137  -0.34  -0.0239  -0.39  -0.0343  -0.32  -0.2149  -1.33  -0.1012  -0.26  -0.3293  -0.30  
Czech Republic 0.0028  0.01  -0.0065  -0.02  0.0735  0.10  -0.9867  -0.92  -2.5832  -0.99  -1.8799  -0.26  
Denmark 0.0274  0.70  0.0348  0.58  0.0620  0.59  -0.1598  -1.01  -0.1202  -0.31  0.1544  0.15  
Finland -0.0035  -0.09  -0.0071  -0.12  0.0102  0.10  -0.1396  -0.89  -0.0527  -0.14  0.2898  0.27  
France -0.0210  -0.55  -0.0264  -0.45  0.0142  0.14  -0.1499  -0.98  -0.1961  -0.53  0.1704  0.17  
Germany -0.0232  -0.61  -0.0262  -0.46  -0.0128  -0.13  -0.0677  -0.45  -0.1643  -0.45  0.1950  0.19  
Greece -0.3657  -2.64*** -0.3891  -1.84*  -0.8096  -2.19**  -0.3747  -0.67  -4.2161  -3.11*** -6.3729  -1.71  
Hungary 0.1137  1.58  0.1320  1.20  0.3088  1.61  -0.1479  -0.51  0.2094  0.30  -0.0853  -0.04  
Ireland 0.0106  0.26  0.0139  0.22  0.0820  0.75  -0.0242  -0.15  0.3681  0.92  1.0423  0.95  
Italy -0.0175  -0.45  -0.0252  -0.42  0.0118  0.11  0.0673  0.43  -0.0583  -0.15  0.5113  0.49  
Netherlands -0.0040  -0.10  -0.0031  -0.05  0.0002  0.00  -0.0945  -0.61  -0.1036  -0.28  0.1783  0.17  
Norway -0.0266  -0.64  -0.0467  -0.73  -0.0639  -0.57  -0.1372  -0.82  0.1249  0.31  0.1560  0.14  
Portugal -0.0071  -0.17  -0.0094  -0.15  0.0094  0.08  -0.2552  -1.53  -0.1672  -0.41  0.2855  0.26  
Russian Federation -0.0157  -0.25  -0.0823  -0.85  -0.1267  -0.75  -0.0182  -0.07  -0.4781  -0.77  -0.8110  -0.48  
Slovak Republic 0.0937  1.01  0.1057  0.74  0.0513  0.21  0.2119  0.57  0.0955  0.10  -1.1308  -0.45  
Spain -0.0036  -0.09  -0.0072  -0.12  0.0371  0.36  -0.1283  -0.82  -0.0394  -0.10  0.3760  0.36  
Sweden 0.0058  0.15  0.0090  0.15  0.0210  0.20  -0.1104  -0.71  0.2066  0.55  0.7913  0.76  
Switzerland -0.0036  -0.10  -0.0079  -0.14  0.0182  0.18  -0.0753  -0.49  0.1447  0.39  1.3220  1.29  
United Kingdom 0.0001  0.00  0.0048  0.08  0.0095  0.10  -0.0989  -0.66  0.0586  0.16  0.6495  0.65  
Belgium*H 0.0194  0.15  0.0555  0.28  0.0821  0.24  0.3509  0.68  0.3062  0.24  1.7501  0.51  
Czech Republic*H -0.0349  -0.06  -0.0438  -0.05  -0.3105  -0.19  2.1792  0.90  5.4997  0.93  2.3677  0.15  
Denmark*H -0.0675  -0.53  -0.0601  -0.31  -0.1916  -0.56  0.4155  0.80  -0.0830  -0.07  0.0398  0.01  
Finland*H -0.0210  -0.16  -0.0284  -0.14  -0.1531  -0.43  0.4111  0.77  0.2275  0.18  -1.1858  -0.33  
France*H 0.0032  0.03  0.0379  0.20  -0.0599  -0.18  0.2994  0.60  0.0161  0.01  0.5323  0.16  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the 
second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, 
deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                        
13 Dummy for Austria is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Germany*H 0.0077  0.06  0.0240  0.13  -0.0397  -0.12  0.2680  0.54  -0.0514  -0.04  -0.3178  -0.10  
Greece*H 1.3341  2.95***  1.4865  2.15**  3.2341  2.68***  1.5218  0.84  15.9065  3.60***  26.9484  2.21**  
Hungary*H -0.6982  -1.33  -0.9191  -1.15  -2.2643  -1.62  0.7950  0.38  -0.4879  -0.10  0.3527  0.03  
Ireland*H -0.0854  -0.35  -0.0532  -0.14  -0.6771  -1.03  0.0252  0.03  -1.8342  -0.76  0.1688  0.03  
Italy*H -0.0147  -0.12  -0.0102  -0.05  -0.1430  -0.42  0.2724  0.53  -0.1712  -0.14  -1.3474  -0.39  
Netherlands*H 0.0145  0.11  0.0313  0.16  0.0451  0.13  0.3598  0.70  0.5860  0.47  1.3709  0.40  
Norway*H 0.0767  0.53  0.2236  1.01  0.2680  0.69  0.5756  0.99  -0.2100  -0.15  0.4327  0.11  
Portugal*H 0.0019  0.01  0.0306  0.15  0.2276  0.62  0.3317  0.60  -0.0768  -0.06  1.7145  0.46  
Russian 
Federation*H 
-0.0548  -0.24  0.0444  0.13  0.1400  0.23  0.0434  0.05  1.2321  0.55  0.6955  0.11  
Spain*H 0.0356  0.27  0.1316  0.65  0.0687  0.19  0.3395  0.64  0.7759  0.60  2.7702  0.78  
Sweden*H -0.0101  -0.07  0.0089  0.04  0.0676  0.19  0.3925  0.72  -0.8084  -0.61  -2.6338  -0.72  
Switzerland*H 0.0367  0.29  0.0674  0.35  -0.0065  -0.02  0.4792  0.95  0.3402  0.28  -0.6884  -0.20  
United Kingdom*H 0.0113  0.09  0.0460  0.24  -0.0216  -0.06  0.4609  0.92  0.6689  0.55  0.3610  0.11  
SizeTA-d 0.0055  1.80*  0.0056  1.21  0.0150  1.85*  0.0538  4.30***  0.0213  0.71  0.0061  0.07  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0034  -1.04  -0.0056  -1.12  0.0017  0.20  -0.0389  -2.63*** -0.0599  -1.88*  0.0712  0.80  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.13*** -0.0018  -8.34*** -0.0012  -3.22***  0.0000  -0.05  -0.0083  -6.06*** -0.0029  -0.77  
(Lev-d)2 -2.5E-06 -0.70  -2.5E-06 1.39  -4.6E-05 -4.73***  8.5E-06 0.58  0.0003  7.70***  -0.0003  -2.62***  
IAInt -0.0085  -0.77  -0.0291  -1.72*  -0.0529  -1.79*  0.2521  5.61***  0.7827  7.22***  1.6135  5.40***  
Beta -0.0071  -3.67*** -0.0098  -3.34*** -0.0143  -2.79***  -0.0009  -0.11  -0.0189  -0.97  -0.0181  -0.35  
Constant 0.0717  1.93*  0.1135  2.00  0.1471  1.48  0.3214  2.15**  0.5568  1.53  1.1628  1.16  
F 2.96***  4.12***  3.26***  3.39***  5.52***  3.21***  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 0.0063  0.04  -0.0010  0.00  0.0515  0.13  -0.1336  -0.22  1.3061  0.90  3.5711  0.88  
Belgium -0.0122  -0.18  -0.0244  -0.23  -0.0566  -0.31  -0.1767  -0.64  0.3928  0.58  0.6733  0.36  
Czech Republic 0.0560  0.07  0.0943  0.08  0.3766  0.18  -2.5310  -0.80  -6.8486  -0.89  -2.5429  -0.12  
Denmark 0.0367  0.54  0.0501  0.48  0.0930  0.52  -0.1437  -0.52  0.4585  0.69  1.5592  0.84  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the 
second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, 
deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Finland 0.0045  0.07  0.0078  0.08  0.0321  0.18  -0.0972  -0.36  0.5081  0.77  1.8590  1.01  
France -0.0150  -0.22  -0.0181  -0.18  0.0272  0.15  -0.0798  -0.30  0.3386  0.52  1.4320  0.79  
Germany -0.0192  -0.29  -0.0181  -0.18  -0.0024  -0.01  -0.0166  -0.06  0.4053  0.63  1.6284  0.90  
Greece -0.2135  -1.71  -0.2597  -1.35  -0.4323  -1.31  -0.2817  -0.56  -1.6015  -1.32  -1.6418  -0.49  
Hungary 0.1530  1.41  0.1870  1.12  0.4316  1.51  -0.1264  -0.29  0.7876  0.75  1.2576  0.43  
Ireland 0.0050  0.07  0.0090  0.08  0.0629  0.33  0.0067  0.02  0.8649  1.25  2.1113  1.09  
Italy -0.0100  -0.15  -0.0160  -0.15  0.0272  0.15  0.1640  0.60  0.5632  0.85  2.0455  1.11  
Netherlands -0.0022  -0.03  0.0027  0.03  0.0067  0.04  -0.0547  -0.20  0.3890  0.60  1.4768  0.81  
Norway -0.0196  -0.28  -0.0406  -0.37  -0.0552  -0.30  -0.1223  -0.43  0.7486  1.09  1.6070  0.84  
Portugal -0.0031  -0.04  -0.0017  -0.02  0.0116  0.06  -0.2134  -0.77  0.4186  0.62  1.6474  0.87  
Russian Federation 0.0898  0.80  -0.0624  -0.36  -0.1586  -0.54  0.0309  0.07  0.1616  0.15  0.7276  0.24  
Slovak Republic 0.0867  0.93  0.0859  0.60  0.0474  0.19  0.0431  0.12  -0.6036  -0.67  -2.8953  -1.15  
Spain -0.0005  -0.01  -0.0034  -0.03  0.0404  0.23  -0.0687  -0.25  0.5451  0.83  1.6417  0.89  
Sweden 0.0132  0.19  0.0189  0.18  0.0255  0.14  -0.0669  -0.25  0.7911  1.20  2.2649  1.23  
Switzerland 0.0003  0.00  -0.0022  -0.02  0.0279  0.16  -0.0345  -0.13  0.6364  0.98  2.7984  1.54  
United Kingdom 0.0055  0.08  0.0159  0.16  0.0291  0.17  -0.0639  -0.24  0.5750  0.89  2.0903  1.16  
Belgium*C1 0.0097  0.06  0.0361  0.15  0.0978  0.24  0.1418  0.23  -0.9489  -0.63  -1.2499  -0.30  
Czech Republic*C1 -0.1080  -0.09  -0.1903  -0.10  -0.6829  -0.21  3.8027  0.79  9.8330  0.84  1.4406  0.04  
Denmark*C1 -0.0651  -0.42  -0.0723  -0.30  -0.1929  -0.47  0.2541  0.41  -1.3948  -0.93  -3.2814  -0.78  
Finland*C1 -0.0288  -0.19  -0.0456  -0.19  -0.1372  -0.34  0.1687  0.27  -1.1905  -0.79  -4.4519  -1.06  
France*C1 -0.0106  -0.07  0.0065  0.03  -0.0701  -0.18  0.0440  0.07  -1.2295  -0.84  -2.6410  -0.64  
Germany*C1 -0.0035  -0.02  -0.0026  -0.01  -0.0516  -0.13  0.0534  0.09  -1.3534  -0.92  -3.5881  -0.88  
Greece*C1 0.5302  2.03**  0.6625  1.65*  1.1068  1.60  0.7512  0.72  4.9144  1.94*  6.5828  0.93  
Hungary*C1 -0.3752  -1.21  -0.4956  -1.04  -1.2221  -1.50  0.3616  0.29  -1.5389  -0.51  -3.0868  -0.37  
Ireland*C1 0.0235  0.12  0.0549  0.18  -0.0650  -0.12  0.0953  0.12  -1.6471  -0.84  -1.0147  -0.19  
Italy*C1 -0.0239  -0.16  -0.0231  -0.10  -0.1221  -0.30  -0.0376  -0.06  -1.5454  -1.04  -4.4445  -1.07  
Netherlands*C1 0.0092  0.06  0.0134  0.06  0.0220  0.05  0.1492  0.24  -0.6989  -0.47  -2.0901  -0.50  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the 
second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, 
deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Norway*C1 0.0264  0.16  0.1148  0.46  0.1289  0.30  0.3416  0.53  -1.6097  -1.02  -3.2228  -0.73  
Portugal*C1 -0.0067  -0.04  0.0057  0.02  0.1471  0.35  0.1214  0.19  -1.4129  -0.92  -1.9746  -0.46  
Russian 
Federation*C1 
-0.2767  -1.10  -0.0163  -0.04  0.1485  0.22  -0.0527  -0.05  -0.7625  -0.31  -3.2700  -0.48  
Spain*C1 0.0145  0.09  0.0711  0.30  0.0315  0.08  0.0779  0.13  -0.9674  -0.64  -1.4024  -0.33  
Sweden*C1 -0.0219  -0.14  -0.0102  -0.04  0.0274  0.07  0.1505  0.24  -1.7938  -1.19  -4.8507  -1.15  
Switzerland*C1 0.0159  0.10  0.0333  0.14  -0.0229  -0.06  0.2184  0.36  -0.9151  -0.62  -3.9564  -0.96  
United Kingdom*C1 -0.0089  -0.06  -0.0098  -0.04  -0.0937  -0.23  0.2393  0.40  -0.7509  -0.51  -3.4019  -0.83  
SizeTA-d 0.0057  1.87*  0.0066  1.41  0.0171  2.12**  0.0549  4.38*** 0.0208  0.70  0.0176  0.21  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0035  -1.07  -0.0060  -1.19  0.0013  0.15  -0.0408  -2.75*** -0.0625  -1.96** 0.0632  0.70  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.10*** -0.0018  -8.32*** -0.0012  -3.32***  -2.6E-05 -0.05  -0.0083  -6.02*** -0.0034  -0.87  
(Lev-d)2 -2.5E-06 -0.68  8.0E-06 1.43  -4.58E-05 -4.73***  8.14E-06 0.55  0.0003  7.65*** -0.0003  -2.93***  
IAInt -0.0099  -0.89  -0.0311  -1.82  -0.0541  -1.84  0.2549  5.66*** 0.7716  7.11*** 1.5417  5.09***  
Beta -0.0066  -3.38*** -0.0089  -3.00*** -0.0128  -2.50***  -0.0007  -0.08  -0.0181  -0.93  -0.0078  -0.15  
Constant 0.0667  1.01  0.1040  1.02  0.1326  0.76  0.2784  1.05  0.0001  0.00  -0.2493  -0.14  
F 2.88***  4.00***  3.02***  3.42***  5.45***  3.12***  
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H_DIFF -0.0140  -0.06 -0.0801  -0.24  -0.1698  -0.30  0.3750  0.43  1.6828  0.79  3.7483  0.64  
Belgium -0.0134  -0.46 -0.0273  -0.61  -0.0654  -0.86  -0.0601  -0.52  0.1103  0.39  0.1253  0.16  
Czech Republic -0.0266  -0.16 -0.0622  -0.24  -0.1564  -0.36  0.4543  0.69  1.5482  0.97  0.3203  0.07  
Denmark 0.0189  0.66 0.0248  0.56  0.0181  0.24  -0.0140  -0.12  0.0333  0.12  0.4219  0.55  
Finland -0.0024  -0.08 -0.0052  -0.12  -0.0142  -0.19  -0.0024  -0.02  0.1465  0.53  0.5437  0.71  
France -0.0193  -0.71 -0.0230  -0.55  -0.0185  -0.26  -0.0322  -0.30  -0.0173  -0.07  0.5585  0.77  
Germany -0.0220  -0.81 -0.0257  -0.62  -0.0421  -0.60  0.0649  0.60  0.0091  0.03  0.4700  0.65  
Greece -0.0401  -0.79 -0.0418  -0.53  -0.1583  -1.19  -0.0769  -0.38  -0.2075  -0.42  0.7703  0.57  
Hungary 0.0811  1.62 0.0873  1.14  0.1759  1.35  0.0123  0.06  0.3606  0.75  0.2387  0.18  
Ireland -0.0025  -0.08 -0.0023  -0.05  -0.0081  -0.10  0.1372  1.11  0.3813  1.27  1.1223  1.36  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the 
second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, 
deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Italy -0.0188  -0.67 -0.0284  -0.66  -0.0294  -0.40  0.2111  1.89  0.1168  0.43  0.7982  1.07  
Netherlands -0.0052  -0.19 -0.0057  -0.13  -0.0266  -0.37  0.0396  0.36  0.0901  0.33  0.5296  0.71  
Norway -0.0230  -0.74 -0.0331  -0.70  -0.0697  -0.87  0.0230  0.19  0.2334  0.79  0.4586  0.56  
Portugal -0.0111  -0.37 -0.0124  -0.27  0.0069  0.09  -0.1268  -1.06  -0.0033  -0.01  0.7851  0.98  
Russian Federation -0.0324  -0.88 -0.0992  -1.75  -0.1458  -1.52  -0.0125  -0.09  -0.0322  -0.09  -0.3385  -0.35  
Spain 0.0002  0.01 0.0027  0.06  0.0212  0.29  0.0068  0.06  0.1971  0.73  0.9343  1.26  
Sweden -0.0017  -0.06 -0.0060  -0.14  -0.0236  -0.32  0.0200  0.18  0.2505  0.93  0.8842  1.19  
Switzerland 0.0018  0.07 -0.0004  -0.01  -0.0036  -0.05  0.0719  0.65  0.3375  1.26  1.6493  2.24  
United Kingdom 0.0004  0.01 0.0056  0.14  -0.0178  -0.25  0.0428  0.40  0.2360  0.91  0.9384  1.31  
Belgium*H_DIFF 0.0355  0.16 0.1345  0.39  0.3653  0.63  -0.4555  -0.51  -1.3416  -0.62  -1.0575  -0.18  
Czech 
Republic*H_DIFF 
0.0484  0.09 0.1473  0.18  0.4034  0.29  -1.8294  -0.88  -6.1416  -1.21  -5.8178  -0.42  
Denmark*H_DIFF -0.0396  -0.18 0.0095  0.03  0.0362  0.06  -0.3298  -0.37  -1.6834  -0.78  -3.1415  -0.53  
Finland*H_DIFF -0.0462  -0.2 -0.0442  -0.12  -0.0927  -0.15  -0.2322  -0.25  -1.5742  -0.71  -4.9282  -0.81  
France*H_DIFF 0.0029  0.01 0.0792  0.23  0.1489  0.26  -0.3498  -0.40  -1.6545  -0.78  -2.7193  -0.46  
Germany*H_DIFF 0.0133  0.06 0.0712  0.21  0.1673  0.29  -0.4729  -0.54  -1.7483  -0.82  -3.6673  -0.63  
Greece*H_DIFF 0.5425  1.66 0.6523  1.31  1.4381  1.70  0.8056  0.63  6.9301  2.21  3.8479  0.45  
Hungary*H_DIFF -0.4852  -1.13 -0.5866  -0.89  -1.4109  -1.27  -0.0629  -0.04  -2.0012  -0.49  -3.2159  -0.28  
Ireland*H_DIFF 0.5135  0.72 0.8535  0.78  1.5280  0.82  -3.6761  -1.30  2.3118  0.34  12.4270  0.65  
Italy*H_DIFF -0.0057  -0.03 0.0456  0.13  0.0862  0.15  -0.5142  -0.58  -1.9279  -0.90  -5.1558  -0.87  
Netherlands*H_DIFF 0.0446  0.2 0.1162  0.34  0.3095  0.53  -0.3088  -0.35  -0.8769  -0.40  -1.2383  -0.21  
Norway*H_DIFF 0.1063  0.45 0.2937  0.82  0.4962  0.82  -0.1784  -0.19  -1.4952  -0.67  -2.5777  -0.42  
Portugal*H_DIFF 0.0452  0.19 0.1255  0.35  0.4271  0.71  -0.3309  -0.36  -1.7444  -0.78  -0.9780  -0.16  
Russian 
Federation*H_DIFF 
0.0549  0.17 0.3687  0.74  0.5672  0.67  0.3265  0.25  -1.1244  -0.36  -2.7951  -0.32  
Spain*H_DIFF 0.0320  0.14 0.1737  0.50  0.2402  0.41  -0.3568  -0.40  -0.8603  -0.39  -0.8359  -0.14  
Sweden*H_DIFF 0.1020  0.43 0.3475  0.96  0.6775  1.11  -0.1385  -0.15  -1.2179  -0.54  -6.1263  -0.98  
Switzerland*H_DIFF 0.0291  0.13 0.0920  0.27  0.1730  0.30  -0.2642  -0.30  -1.4780  -0.69  -4.4943  -0.76  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to 
book ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the 
second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, 
deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
United 
Kingdom*H_DIFF 
0.0268  0.12 0.1080  0.32  0.1984  0.34  -0.2634  -0.30  -0.9438  -0.44  -2.9652  -0.50  
SizeTA-d 0.0053  1.72 0.0060  1.27  0.0162  2.03  0.0535  4.29  0.0074  0.25  -0.0125  -0.15  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0034  -1.03 -0.0065  -1.29  0.0000  0.00  -0.0411  -2.79  -0.0511  -1.61  0.0716  0.81  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.11 -0.0018  -8.49  -0.0013  -3.52  3.33E-05 0.06  -0.0082  -6.01  -0.0030  -0.80  
(Lev-d)2 -2.36E-06 -0.64 8.98E-06 1.59  -4.56E-05 -4.76  6.88E-06 0.47  0.0003  7.60  -0.0003  -2.77  
IAInt -0.0101  -0.9 -0.0330  -1.92  -0.0547  -1.88  0.2499  5.58  0.7668  7.10  1.5869  5.33  
Beta -0.0069  -3.53 -0.0093  -3.11  -0.0136  -2.68  -0.0001  -0.02  -0.0181  -0.93  -0.0033  -0.06  
Constant 0.0714  2.67 0.1129  2.75  0.1745  2.51  0.1820  1.72  0.3882  1.51  0.8648  1.22  
F 2.88***  4.28***  3.29***  3.55***  5.94***  3.33***  
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV 0.0013  0.07  -0.0004  -0.02  -0.0083  -0.18  0.1094  1.56  0.2349  1.36  0.4451  0.92  
Belgium 0.0037  0.14  -0.0199  -0.49  -0.0557  -0.80  0.0239  0.23  0.3290  1.26  0.1639  0.23  
Czech Republic -0.0139  -0.45  -0.0309  -0.65  -0.0582  -0.72  -0.0857  -0.70  -0.1533  -0.51  -0.8200  -0.97  
Denmark -0.0102  -0.39  -0.0017  -0.04  -0.0129  -0.19  0.0733  0.69  0.0592  0.23  0.6096  0.85  
Finland -0.0045  -0.18  -0.0019  -0.05  -0.0144  -0.22  0.0603  0.61  0.1831  0.75  0.7234  1.06  
France -0.0110  -0.49  -0.0066  -0.19  0.0051  0.09  0.0814  0.91  -0.0124  -0.06  0.6060  0.98  
Germany -0.0230  -1.03  -0.0225  -0.65  -0.0322  -0.55  0.1198  1.35  0.0746  0.34  0.5289  0.86  
Greece -0.0538  -0.94  -0.0763  -0.86  -0.1822  -1.21  0.1450  0.64  0.3304  0.59  -0.0798  -0.05  
Hungary 0.0897  1.77*  0.1039  1.33  0.2076  1.56  0.0687  0.34  0.4032  0.81  0.2243  0.16  
Ireland -0.0020  -0.07  0.0017  0.04  0.0026  0.03  0.2032  1.78*  0.4022  1.42  1.0375  1.32  
Italy -0.0314  -1.30  -0.0396  -1.06  -0.0483  -0.76  0.2362  2.45**  0.1785  0.75  0.6696  1.01  
Netherlands -0.0073  -0.32  -0.0038  -0.11  -0.0179  -0.30  0.1149  1.26  0.0659  0.29  0.6530  1.03  
Norway -0.0112  -0.40  -0.0092  -0.21  -0.0329  -0.44  0.0823  0.73  0.3812  1.36  0.6775  0.87  
Portugal -0.0063  -0.22  -0.0043  -0.10  -0.0212  -0.28  -0.0549  -0.48  0.0772  0.27  0.5223  0.66  
Russian Federation -0.0155  -0.45  -0.0578  -1.10  -0.0832  -0.93  0.1284  0.95  0.2707  0.81  -0.1501  -0.16  
Spain 0.0027  0.11  0.0149  0.41  0.0284  0.46  0.0733  0.78  0.3186  1.37  1.0924  1.69*  
Sweden 0.0012  0.05  0.0078  0.22  0.0010  0.02  0.1041  1.15  0.3017  1.35  0.8131  1.30  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market 
to book ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the 
second and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, 
deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 5.3  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for country effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Switzerland 0.0058  0.26  0.0094  0.27  0.0086  0.14  0.1453  1.60  0.3945  1.75*  1.7730  2.82***  
United Kingdom 0.0049  0.23  0.0178  0.54  0.0017  0.03  0.0970  1.14  0.2992  1.43  1.0335  1.76  
Belgium*SV -0.0090  -0.42  0.0108  0.32  0.0435  0.76  -0.1431  -1.66  -0.3168  -1.48  -0.0281  -0.05  
Denmark*SV 0.0405  1.52  0.0366  0.89  0.0395  0.56  -0.1305  -1.19  -0.2047  -0.78  -0.5224  -0.71  
Finland*SV -0.0012  -0.05  -0.0093  -0.23  -0.0107  -0.15  -0.0844  -0.80  -0.1949  -0.74  -0.9084  -1.24  
France*SV -0.0108  -0.56  -0.0106  -0.36  -0.0112  -0.22  -0.1604  -2.08** -0.1813  -0.95  -0.2501  -0.47  
Germany*SV 0.0027  0.14  0.0042  0.14  0.0071  0.13  -0.1356  -1.70*  -0.2919  -1.49  -0.4754  -0.87  
Greece*SV 0.1205  1.89*  0.1707  1.74*  0.4035  2.41**  -0.0826  -0.33  -0.1913  -0.31  2.4457  1.40  
Hungary*SV -0.0472  -1.23  -0.0611  -1.03  -0.1378  -1.37  -0.0799  -0.52  -0.2597  -0.69  -0.3720  -0.35  
Ireland*SV 0.0390  0.62  0.0642  0.67  0.1043  0.63  -0.3142  -1.26  0.1626  0.26  1.2305  0.72  
Italy*SV 0.0099  0.49  0.0134  0.43  0.0225  0.42  -0.0984  -1.22  -0.2933  -1.47  -0.5457  -0.98  
Netherlands*SV 0.0140  0.66  0.0202  0.62  0.0395  0.71  -0.1212  -1.43  0.1268  0.61  -0.1885  -0.32  
Norway*SV 0.0002  0.01  0.0070  0.16  0.0173  0.23  -0.0723  -0.65  -0.3446  -1.25  -0.5275  -0.69  
Portugal*SV 0.0030  0.09  0.0126  0.24  0.1488  1.70*  -0.1162  -0.88  -0.3051  -0.93  0.7156  0.78  
Russian Fed.*SV -0.0122  -0.44  -0.0113  -0.27  -0.0097  -0.13  -0.1288  -1.17  -0.4195  -1.54  -0.5609  -0.74  
Spain*SV 0.0014  0.07  0.0072  0.22  0.0225  0.40  -0.1141  -1.35  -0.2627  -1.25  -0.2508  -0.43  
Sweden*SV 0.0051  0.26  0.0123  0.41  0.0309  0.61  -0.1197  -1.56  -0.2090  -1.10  -0.4614  -0.87  
Switzerland*SV -0.0005  -0.02  0.0002  0.00  0.0073  0.13  -0.1016  -1.24  -0.1986  -0.98  -0.7836  -1.39  
United Kingdom*SV -0.0094  -0.47  -0.0151  -0.49  -0.0277  -0.53  -0.0554  -0.70  -0.2117  -1.08  -0.5989  -1.00  
SizeTA-d 0.0059  1.92*  0.0065  1.37  0.0167  2.07**  0.0560  4.47*** 0.0110  0.36  0.0071  0.08  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0030  -0.91  -0.0059  -1.16  0.0013  0.15  -0.0394  -2.65*** -0.0551  -1.70*  0.0676  0.73  
Lev-d -0.0007  -4.75*** -0.0019  -8.83*** -0.0013  -3.51***  -0.0001  -0.20  -0.0084  -6.07*** -0.0050  -1.27  
(Lev-d)2 -1.84E-06 -0.50  8.92E-06 1.57  -4.61E-05 -4.77***  9.31E-06 0.63  0.0003  7.40*** -0.0002  -2.21**  
IAInt -0.0093  -0.83  -0.0323  -1.87*  -0.0593  -2.02**  0.2543  5.65*** 0.7481  6.77*** 1.5320  4.97***  
Beta -0.0063  -3.26*** -0.0085  -2.84*** -0.0126  -2.48**  0.0007  0.09  -0.0140  -0.71  -0.0017  -0.03  
Constant 0.0682  3.25*** 0.1040  3.21*** 0.1633  2.96***  0.1184  1.42  0.3434  1.66  0.8453  1.47  
F 3.13***  4.24***  3.28***  3.43***  4.56***  2.83***  
No. of Obs. 640  640  640  631  637  637  
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, 
**, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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concentration is relatively strong, while in France and Germany, this effect is weaker 
than other European countries.  Although the reason behind this is not 
straightforward, these results confirm that the efficiency of using ownership structure 
as a corporate governance mechanism can be different among countries.  By taking 
this country effect into consideration, a more efficient approach to using this 
governance mechanism can be achieved. 
3.2  Industry effects 
Table 5.4 presents the iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm 
performance after controlling for industry effects.  Due to the substantial number of 
industry dummies, only results on ownership concentration measured as the 
Herfindahl index H are presented in the table.  Regressions on the other 
measurements are carried out as robust tests.  Their results are similar.  The 
manufacture of fabricated metal products (N28), manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment (N32) and water transport (N61) are found to have 
significant negative interaction effects with ownership concentration on most firm 
performance measures, indicating that in these industries, the impact of ownership 
concentration is weaker than in other industries.  The manufacture of machinery and 
equipment (N29), manufacture of medical, precision and optical instrument (N33) and 
real estate activities (N70) have significant positive interaction effects, suggesting a 
stronger impact of ownership concentration in these industries.   
Some significant main effects from industry are also found.  The manufacture of 
fabricated metal products (N28) and water transport (N61) industries seem to perform 
better than other industries, while the manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments (N33) and renting of machinery and equipment (N71) industries seem to 
perform worse than other industries. 
Again, these results confirm the interaction effect of ownership concentration and 
industry.  A more efficient approach to ownership governance should take industry 
effects into consideration. 
4  Conclusion 
Based on the data and variables discussed in Chapter Four, this chapter starts from  
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Table 5.4  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for industry effects14 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
H -0.0465  -0.58  -0.1214  -0.97  -0.1644  -0.81  0.3114  0.94  0.0723  0.09  0.6646  0.30  
N13 0.0079  0.20  -0.0169  -0.28  -0.3716  -3.79***  0.0059  0.04  2.0062  5.35***  3.4722  3.26***  
N14 0.0782  1.01  0.0732  0.61  0.6535  3.35***  0.4294  1.34  0.2595  0.35  4.0819  1.92*  
N15 0.0142  0.54  -0.0006  -0.02  0.0102  0.16  0.1236  1.15  0.2929  1.17  1.0952  1.54  
N18 0.1015  1.29  0.2148  1.76*  0.0446  0.46  -0.0017  -0.01  -0.1935  -0.26  0.0812  0.08  
N21 -0.0087  -0.28  -0.0528  -1.09  -0.0277  -0.35  0.0114  0.09  0.2378  0.79  1.3709  1.61  
N22 -0.0197  -0.71  -0.0361  -0.84  -0.0324  -0.47  0.0443  0.38  0.2173  0.82  0.9073  1.20  
N23 0.0193  0.58  0.0068  0.13  0.0206  0.25  0.2564  1.87*  0.0266  0.08  0.4547  0.50  
N24 0.0050  0.20  -0.0047  -0.12  -0.0120  -0.19  0.0505  0.49  0.1733  0.72  0.4522  0.66  
N25 -0.0339  -0.90  -0.0495  -0.85  -0.0348  -0.37  0.1638  1.06  -0.2330  -0.65  -1.0080  -0.98  
N26 0.0144  0.37  0.0020  0.03  0.0197  0.20  0.2703  1.70*  0.1774  0.48  0.5234  0.50  
N27 0.0347  1.11  0.0197  0.41  0.0180  0.23  0.0761  0.59  0.2407  0.80  1.1149  1.30  
N28 0.1390  2.88***  0.2238  2.99***  0.3683  3.03***  -0.0750  -0.38  0.0426  0.09  0.4799  0.36  
N29 -0.0171  -0.65  -0.0153  -0.37  -0.0424  -0.64  0.0343  0.31  0.0350  0.14  0.6843  0.94  
N30 0.0293  0.49  0.0290  0.32  0.0576  0.39  0.1605  0.66  0.4636  0.81  1.2442  0.77  
N31 0.0330  1.01  0.0473  0.94  0.1491  1.82*  -0.0344  -0.26  0.4387  1.40  2.0520  2.31**  
N32 0.0457  1.29  0.0559  1.02  0.0986  1.11  0.3303  2.27**  1.3568  3.52***  1.4122  1.46  
N33 -0.5926  -2.53**  -0.7374  -2.03**  -1.7780  -3.01***  -1.9486  -2.02**  -11.6036  -5.14*** -35.7763  -5.58***  
N34 -0.0178  -0.59  -0.0411  -0.88  -0.0334  -0.44  0.0562  0.45  -0.0597  -0.20  -0.0581  -0.07  
N35 0.0683  1.57  0.0767  1.13  0.0973  0.89  0.0031  0.02  0.1507  0.36  0.2032  0.17  
N36 0.0099  0.24  0.0436  0.68  0.1532  1.48  -0.1179  -0.69  -0.1625  -0.41  1.2966  1.15  
N40 0.0080  0.32  0.0012  0.03  0.0244  0.39  0.0963  0.93  0.1516  0.63  0.8210  1.20  
N41 0.0066  0.17  0.0251  0.42  0.0367  0.38  0.0160  0.10  0.2123  0.57  0.8259  0.79  
N45 0.0056  0.23  0.0018  0.05  0.0025  0.04  0.0297  0.29  0.1399  0.59  1.0583  1.56  
N50 0.0719  2.22**  0.0528  1.05  0.0099  0.12  0.1292  0.97  0.1913  0.61  0.2900  0.30  
(continued on next page) 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean;   *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  For industry classifications, please refer to Table 4.1 or Appendix 1. 
                                                        
14 Dummy for N11 is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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Table 5.4  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for industry effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
N51 -0.0108  -0.42  -0.0255  -0.64  -0.0336  -0.52  0.1477  1.38  0.2018  0.81  0.7445  1.05  
N52 -0.0040  -0.15  -0.0224  -0.56  -0.0076  -0.12  0.0543  0.51  -0.0372  -0.15  -0.1171  -0.17  
N55 0.0351  1.22  0.0262  0.59  0.0618  0.86  0.1185  1.00  0.3165  1.15  1.4833  1.89*  
N60 0.0169  0.53  0.0458  0.93  0.0625  0.78  0.0207  0.16  0.4513  1.48  1.4347  1.65*  
N61 0.2847  6.00***  0.3071  4.17***  0.5482  4.59***  0.0778  0.50  -0.0191  -0.05  -0.1450  -0.14  
N62 0.0207  0.69  0.0306  0.66  0.0270  0.36  0.1101  0.89  0.4249  1.47  1.7850  2.17**  
N63 0.0020  0.07  -0.0128  -0.28  -0.0271  -0.37  0.3668  3.02  0.1946  0.68  0.5115  0.63  
N64 -0.0141  -0.52  -0.0437  -1.04  -0.0611  -0.90  0.0326  0.29  0.0445  0.17  0.4402  0.59  
N65 -0.0290  -0.75  -0.0325  -0.54  0.1084  1.11  -0.0807  -0.50  -0.5001  -1.34  -2.5009  -2.35***  
N67 -0.0230  -0.47  -0.0356  -0.47  -0.1660  -1.36  0.3682  1.84*  0.4301  0.92  12.0600  9.05***  
N70 -0.1099  -2.35**  -0.3705  -5.09  -0.0388  -0.45  0.1186  0.85  0.2196  0.67  1.6837  1.81*  
N71 -0.0652  -1.72*  -0.1107  -1.88*  -0.1481  -1.55  -0.2703  -1.73*  0.1804  0.49  0.2890  0.28  
N72 0.0291  0.98  0.0276  0.60  0.0404  0.54  0.1548  1.27  1.0683  3.73***  1.6966  2.09**  
N73 0.0234  0.53  0.0383  0.56  0.0566  0.51  0.0126  0.07  0.3730  0.87  0.8764  0.72  
N74 0.0138  0.59  0.0080  0.22  0.0252  0.43  0.0755  0.78  0.2032  0.90  0.8160  1.28  
N75 -0.0413  -0.89  -0.0825  -1.14  -0.1397  -1.19  0.0455  0.24  -0.3667  -0.82  0.6636  0.52  
N90 0.0577  0.87  0.0436  0.42  0.1066  0.64  0.1284  0.47  0.7327  1.15  -0.9804  -0.54  
N92 -0.0127  -0.39  -0.0152  -0.30  0.0084  0.10  0.0686  0.51  0.0510  0.16  0.9456  1.05  
N93 0.0506  1.11  0.0533  0.76  0.0726  0.64  0.3457  1.85*  0.2530  0.58  0.4232  0.34  
unknown 0.0172  0.67  0.0031  0.08  0.0109  0.17  0.1173  1.11  0.0614  0.25  0.6843  0.98  
N13*H 0.0229  0.11  0.2036  0.65  2.0300  3.98***  0.1986  0.24  -8.0681  -4.13*** -11.1692  -2.01**  
N14*H -5.8786  -0.66  -1.3383  -0.10  -57.8551  -2.59***  -45.1875  -1.24  14.3598  0.17  -223.5478 -0.92  
N15*H 0.0421  0.47  0.1340  0.96  0.2708  1.19  -0.6052  -1.63  0.0720  0.08  0.5964  0.24  
N18*H -3.4202  -0.99  -8.2555  -1.54  0.2486  0.75  2.0328  0.14  15.8189  0.48  5.5286  1.54  
N21*H 0.0241  0.24  0.1680  1.07  0.1389  0.54  -0.3890  -0.89  -0.6456  -0.66  -2.7684  -1.00  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean;   *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  For industry classifications, please refer to Table 4.1 or Appendix 1. 
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Table 5.4  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for industry effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
N22*H 0.1050  1.13  0.1726  1.20  0.2228  0.95  -0.1150  -0.30  0.3701  0.41  -0.3077  -0.12  
N23*H 0.0129  0.13  0.0785  0.50  0.1331  0.53  -0.7208  -1.74*  0.1548  0.16  -0.4249  -0.15  
N24*H 0.0187  0.22  0.0708  0.53  0.1547  0.71  -0.3237  -0.91  -0.4189  -0.50  -1.0138  -0.43  
N25*H 0.1160  1.18  0.1825  1.20  0.1991  0.80  -0.3465  -0.86  1.3326  1.41  2.6995  1.00  
N26*H -0.0146  -0.09  0.0898  0.35  0.1305  0.32  -1.4847  -2.20**  -0.7418  -0.47  -1.2299  -0.27  
N27*H -0.0189  -0.18  0.0636  0.40  0.1173  0.45  -0.3359  -0.79  0.0414  0.04  -0.5892  -0.21  
N28*H -0.5279  -2.18**  -0.9077  -2.41**  -1.4936  -2.45**  0.3005  0.30  1.0373  0.44  -1.3757  -0.21  
N29*H 0.1989  2.21**  0.2551  1.82*  0.5250  2.32**  -0.0853  -0.23  0.5870  0.68  -0.1781  -0.07  
N30*H -0.3816  -0.74  -0.5154  -0.65  -0.8203  -0.64  -1.1253  -0.53  -5.3823  -1.09  -12.8164  -0.91  
N31*H -0.0268  -0.24  -0.0230  -0.13  -0.1632  -0.57  -0.4406  -0.94  -1.3840  -1.26  -5.4187  -1.74*  
N32*H -0.1095  -0.72  -0.0908  -0.38  -0.1340  -0.35  -1.5519  -2.41**  -3.9855  -2.47**  -2.3113  -0.55  
N33*H 66.2848  2.93***  90.5302  2.58***  211.1406  3.71***  219.0276  2.35**  1274.3460 5.85***  4048.0260 6.54***  
N34*H 0.5945  5.17***  0.8512  4.77  0.8686  3.00  0.1222  0.26  2.4810  2.24  3.8020  1.21  
N35*H -0.2030  -1.08  -0.2553  -0.87  -0.2128  -0.45  -0.3013  -0.39  0.5140  0.28  0.6561  0.13  
N36*H 0.0447  0.26  0.0860  0.32  -0.0048  -0.01  0.1690  0.24  0.4649  0.28  -2.1101  -0.45  
N40*H 0.0213  0.24  0.1026  0.75  0.1375  0.62  -0.3758  -1.03  0.1710  0.20  -1.1453  -0.47  
N41*H -0.0023  -0.02  0.0503  0.27  0.0690  0.23  -0.4015  -0.83  -0.5673  -0.50  -1.3585  -0.42  
N45*H 0.0200  0.23  0.0786  0.58  0.1634  0.74  -0.3300  -0.92  -0.3745  -0.45  -0.7646  -0.32  
N50*H -0.0778  -0.59  -0.0032  -0.02  0.2913  0.88  -0.5587  -1.03  0.0602  0.05  -0.1942  -0.05  
N51*H 0.0842  0.93  0.1892  1.35  0.3595  1.58  -0.6051  -1.62  -0.8554  -0.98  -1.4897  -0.60  
N52*H 0.0344  0.40  0.1201  0.90  0.1653  0.76  -0.3483  -0.98  0.0876  0.11  0.9235  0.39  
N55*H 0.0250  0.26  0.0957  0.64  0.1140  0.47  -0.1729  -0.43  -0.2113  -0.23  -1.7732  -0.67  
N60*H -0.0450  -0.32  -0.1649  -0.75  -0.1950  -0.54  -0.0794  -0.14  -1.3239  -0.97  -4.2013  -1.08  
N61*H -24.4871  -8.39*** -37.6515  -8.31*** -57.8368  -7.88***  0.1068  0.15  2.1058  1.28  4.2183  0.90  
N62*H -0.0752  -0.54  0.0008  0.00  -0.0115  -0.03  -0.7449  -1.30  -0.7662  -0.57  -1.1530  -0.30  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean;   *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  For industry classifications, please refer to Table 4.1 or Appendix 1. 
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Table 5.4  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regression results of firm performance controlling for industry effects (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
N63*H 0.0377  0.29  0.1263  0.63  0.2939  0.91  -1.4671  -2.78  -0.8852  -0.72  -1.3030  -0.37  
N64*H 0.0908  0.95  0.2152  1.44  0.3819  1.58  -0.2418  -0.61  -0.0627  -0.07  -0.2572  -0.10  
N65*H 0.2560  1.64  0.2781  1.15  -0.0913  -0.23  0.1047  0.16  3.1838  2.12**  12.4566  2.91***  
N67*H 0.0701  0.34  0.1212  0.37  0.6467  1.23  -1.4689  -1.71  -0.8965  -0.45  -38.6775  -6.77***  
N70*H 3.1500  3.79***  9.8725  7.65***  1.4728  2.85***  -1.0177  -1.20  4.5492  2.30**  6.6917  1.19  
N71*H 0.1110  0.82  0.2008  0.95  0.2379  0.70  0.1852  0.33  -1.2646  -0.97  -2.2970  -0.62  
N72*H 0.0403  0.36  0.1024  0.59  0.1616  0.58  -0.5622  -1.23  -1.2630  -1.18  -1.8851  -0.62  
N74*H 0.0173  0.21  0.0852  0.67  0.1361  0.66  -0.3641  -1.08  -0.3562  -0.45  -0.7075  -0.32  
N90*H -0.6653  -0.27  0.1948  0.05  1.8810  0.30  -9.2635  -0.90  -14.2721  -0.59  172.5005  2.52**  
N92*H 0.0527  0.59  0.1320  0.95  0.1282  0.57  -0.3087  -0.84  -0.0898  -0.10  -1.5293  -0.62  
unknown*H -0.0017  -0.02  0.0653  0.48  0.1077  0.49  -0.2314  -0.64  0.0988  0.12  -0.1815  -0.08  
SizeTA-d 0.0015  0.45  -0.0006  -0.11  0.0102  1.22  0.0643  4.55***  -0.0301  -0.93  -0.1410  -1.52  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0057  -1.56  -0.0076  -1.35  -0.0026  -0.29  -0.0367  -2.18**  -0.0878  -2.51**  0.0657  0.65  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.20*** -0.0017  -7.45*** -0.0012  -3.16***  -3.4E-05 -0.05  -0.0078  -5.34*** 0.0001  0.03  
(Lev-d)2 -2.01E-06 -0.51  8.01E-06 1.31  -4.4E-05 -4.43***  5.49E-06 0.34  0.0003  7.19***  0.0011  10.41***  
IAInt -0.0119  -0.99  -0.0267  -1.43  -0.0525  -1.73*  0.2422  4.82***  0.7250  6.23***  1.7133  5.18***  
Beta -0.0059  -2.94*** -0.0071  -2.27**  -0.0108  -2.14  -0.0084  -0.99  -0.0117  -0.58  0.0243  0.44  
Constant 0.0593  2.57**  0.1062  2.96***  0.1429  2.46**  0.1612  1.69*  0.4034  1.81*  0.6516  1.03  
F 3.59***  4.31***  3.69***  1.69***  3.85***  5.38***  
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  631  637  637  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean;   *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%.  For industry classifications, please refer to Table 4.1 or Appendix 1. 
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using the OLS regressions to test the linear impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance  Various tests are performed to test the misspecifications of OLS 
regressions for cross-sectional data.  Four assumptions are violated.  They are 
multi-collinearity of variables with their squared terms, non-normality of residuals, 
heteroskedasticity of residuals, and a large number of influential outliers. 
To control the multi-collinearity problem, size and leverage variables are replaced by 
the values of their deviation from the mean.  To control the problems of 
heteroskedacity and non-normality in residuals, the OLS regressions are carried out 
with robust standard errors.  Additionally, robust regressions using iteratively 
re-weighted least squares are carried out to control the influential outliers, as well as 
addressing the problems of heteroskedasticity and non-normality in residuals. 
A significant negative impact of ownership concentration on accounting rates of 
return and market return is revealed in the iteratively re-weighted least squares 
regressions, supporting the agency cost and increased cost of capital associated with 
higher ownership concentration.  The significant negative results of power of 
multiple large shareholders also confirm the positive monitoring effect of 
contestability of the controlling coalition.  The insignificant results of the 
dichotomous ownership measurement OC95 suggests that continuous ownership 
concentration measurements are more effective proxies in describing the 
ownership-performance relationship.  Firm performance measured as profit margin 
seems to be irrelevant to ownership concentration.  
Non-linear results are found from size and leverage variables.  Size affects firm 
performance especially profit margin positively below a certain level, while starts to 
be detrimental for firm performance after it reaches the certain level.  On the 
contrary, better-performing companies are associated with lower leverage when the 
leverage level is below a certain level, while when above this level, borrowing seems 
to benefit firm performance through the monitoring effect from debt holders.  
Intangible assets are beneficial for firm’s profit margin and market return, but 
detrimental for accounting rates of return.  Systematic risk Beta seems to have a 
significant negative impact on accounting rates of return 
Additional tests are carried out controlling for country and industry effects.  In 
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Greece, the corporate governance effect of ownership concentration is relatively 
strong, while in France and Germany, this effect is relatively weak.  In the industries 
of manufacture of fabricated metal products, manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment, and water transport, the impact of ownership 
concentration is relatively weak.  A relatively strong impact is found in the industries 
of the manufacture of machinery and equipment, manufacture of medical, precision 
and optical instrument and real estate activities.  By taking these country and 
industry effects into consideration, a more efficient approach to applying the 
ownership mechanism can be achieved. 
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Chapter Six  Testing the Impact of Ownership Concentration on 
Firm Performance: Non-linear regressions 
Chapters Four and Five investigate the impact of ownership concentration on 
performance by modelling a linear impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance.  Various measures of ownership and performance are tested, and OLS 
restrictions are controlled by using various regression methods.  Tests are carried out 
with and without controlling for the effects of country and industry.  The linear 
regressions reveal a significant negative impact of continuous ownership 
concentration measures on the firm’s accounting rates of return and market return.  
Additionally, this ownership-performance relationship is found to be conditioned by 
country and industry. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the majority of empirical literature investigates a linear 
relationship.  Therefore testing a simple linear model thoroughly before further 
investigation on more complex models can provide comparable evidence with 
previous literature.  By comparing the results of a simple linear model with the 
results of more complex models, it is possible to reveal the impact of using different 
econometric methodology in this research and explain the contradicting results of 
previous literature.  Moreover, country and industry dummy effects can be identified 
more easily in a simple linear model than in a non-linear model or models with multi 
dummy categories.  
One of the limitations of using linear regressions is that it is not able to identify any 
potential non-linear impact.  It is argued that the impact of ownership concentration 
on performance could be non-linear.  Performance could be positively affected by 
the degree of ownership concentration due to the monitoring effect and interest 
alignment effect.  It could also be negatively affected by the agency costs and cost of 
capital due to low market liquidity.  The controlling shareholder/coalition tends to 
entrench themselves beyond a certain degree of ownership concentration, which 
results in a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. 
Therefore the linear regressions in the previous chapters may be insufficient to 
capture any non-linear impact.  To control for the non-linear impact of ownership 
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concentration on performance, three methods have been used in the empirical 
literature: quadratic regressions, quadratic and cubic regressions and piecewise linear 
regressions.  Quadratic regressions include the quadratic term of an ownership 
concentration variable to the model.  Therefore they are able to find one turning 
point.  Quadratic and cubic regressions include both quadratic and cubic terms of an 
ownership concentration variable.  Therefore they are able to find a maximum of two 
turning points.  Piecewise linear regressions should be able to capture more than two 
turning points.  However the problem with piecewise linear regressions is the 
arbitrariness of the choice of turning points.  
This chapter discusses quadratic and cubic regression method and piecewise linear 
regression method to investigate the non-linear impact of ownership concentration on 
performance.  Section one discusses results of quadratic and cubic regressions.  
Section Two investigates more turning points using piecewise linear regressions.  
The final section concludes. 
1  Quadratic and cubic regressions 
Some previous studies used quadratic and cubic models to control for the non-linear 
impact of ownership on performance.  A quadratic model is constructed by adding a 
squared term of ownership variable to the original model.  As discussed in Chapter 
Five, adding a squared term of a variable to the model will cause multi-collinearity 
problem.  This problem can be mitigated by replacing the affected variables by their 
deviations from mean.   
A cubic model is constructed by adding a squared term, as well as a cubic term of 
ownership variable to the original model.  Again, the quadratic and cubic term 
variables will cause multi-collinearity problems.  Due to the inclusion of a cubic 
term, it is expected that replacing the affected variables by their deviations from mean 
can not solve the multi-collinearity problem.  Table 6.1 compares the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) values of the quadratic and cubic terms of Herfindahl index (H), 
and the quadratic and cubic terms of the deviation from mean values (H-d).  It shows 
that after taking the deviation from mean values, the squared and cubic terms still 
have very high VIF values, indicating that the multi-collinearity problem is not 
solved. 
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Table 6.1  VIF values of the cubic regressions of ROA on Herfindahl index H 
Dependant variable ROA VIF values Dependant variable ROA VIF values 
H 33.75 H_d 2.33 
(H)2 209.06 (H_d)2 19.6 
(H)3 94.03 (H_d)3 20.98 
SizeTA-d 1.33 SizeTA-d 1.33 
(SizeTA-d)2 1.27 (SizeTA-d)2 1.27 
Lev-d 1.44 Lev-d 1.44 
(Lev-d)2 1.33 (Lev-d)2 1.33 
IAInt 1.07 IAInt 1.07 
Beta 1.04 Beta 1.04 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets; H, the Herfindahl index; _d, the deviation from mean value; SizeTA, 
LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, 
market risk. 
Therefore, the cubic regressions method is not used in this study.  I apply the 
quadratic regression method to find potential single turning points of the impact of 
ownership on performance.  Table 6.2 presents the robust regression results of firm 
performance on ownership concentration and the squared terms of ownership 
concentration.  Since the quadratic regression method is not applicable for 
dichotomous variables, the ownership concentration variable OC95 is not tested in 
this process.   
As discussed in Chapter Five, replacing variables with their deviations from the mean 
mitigates the multi-collinearity problem, but changes the coefficients.  However, 
simple calculations can be performed to get the estimates of original terms (β) from 
the estimates of deviation terms (γ): 
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where x is the mean.  x >0 for all ownership variables.  It can be proved that if 1γ >0 
and 2γ <0, 1β >0 and 2β <0; and if 1γ <0 and 2γ >0, 1β <0 and 2β >0.  Therefore the 
signs of the estimates of deviation terms should be the same as the estimates of 
original terms. 
The results show that for each ownership concentration measure, a significant 
negative coefficient for the original term and a significant positive coefficient for the 
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Table 6.2  Quadratic robust regressions of firm performance 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
H-d -0.0311  -2.98***  -0.0481  -2.98*** -0.0222  -0.81  -0.0687  -1.59  -0.3789  -3.74*** -0.6355  -2.21**  
(H-d)2 0.0374  1.65*  0.0758  2.17**  0.0221  0.37  0.0696  0.74  0.6928  3.16***  1.6416  2.64***  
SizeTA-d 0.0025  0.85  0.0017  0.37  0.0117  1.49  0.0610  4.83***  -0.0108  -0.37  -0.0813  -0.97  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.71*  -0.0084  -1.67*  -0.0016  -0.19  -0.0409  -2.70*** -0.0747  -2.37**  0.0723  0.79  
Lev-d -0.0005  -4.00***  -0.0018  -8.44*** -0.0012  -3.41*** -0.0002  -0.33  -0.0074  -5.57*** -0.0007  -0.18  
(Lev-d)2 -2.29E-06 -0.63  8.59E-06 1.51  -4.3E-05 -4.51*** 0.0001  2.16**  0.0003  7.46***  -0.0002  -1.87*  
IAInt -0.0154  -1.41  -0.0360  -2.14**  -0.0440  -1.54  0.2232  4.94***  0.7149  6.77***  1.7268  5.76***  
Beta -0.0060  -3.27***  -0.0058  -2.07**  -0.0096  -2.02**  -0.0088  -1.14  -0.0221  -1.21  0.0408  0.82  
Constant 0.0623  18.89***  0.0986  19.32*** 0.1503  17.41*** 0.2200  15.30*** 0.5142  16.04*** 1.5058  16.60***  
F 6.50***  14.24***  9.60***  7.94***  14.19***  6.05***  
R-sq 0.08  0.15  0.11  0.09  0.16  0.07  
Adj R-sq 0.06  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.15  0.06  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1-d -0.0002  -2.84***  -0.0003  -2.83*** -0.0001  -0.49  -0.0005  -1.55  -0.0027  -3.66*** -0.0050  -2.35**  
(C1-d)2 2.36E-06 1.00  6.47E-06 1.78*  7.02E-07 0.11  4.52E-06 0.46  0.0001  2.75*** 0.0002  2.98***  
SizeTA-d 0.0024  0.80  0.0014  0.30  0.0114  1.45  0.0606  4.80*** -0.0128  -0.44  -0.0854  -1.02  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.70*  -0.0084  -1.67*  -0.0016  -0.19  -0.0407  -2.68*** -0.0747  -2.37** 0.0739  0.81  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.04***  -0.0018  -8.45*** -0.0012  -3.36*** -0.0002  -0.30  -0.0075  -5.65*** -0.0008  -0.20  
(Lev-d)2 -2.15E-06 -0.58  8.58E-06 1.51  -4.35E-05 -4.52*** 0.0001  2.15**  0.0003  7.55*** -0.0002  -2.03**  
IAInt -0.0156  -1.43  -0.0354  -2.10** -0.0434  -1.52  0.2243  4.96*** 0.7204  6.84*** 1.7374  5.79***  
Beta -0.0062  -3.37***  -0.0060  -2.14** -0.0095  -2.00** -0.0088  -1.15  -0.0247  -1.36  0.0360  0.72  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, 
**, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 6.2  Quadratic robust regressions of firm performance on ownership concentration (continued) 
 
 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Constant 0.0631  18.44***  0.0987  18.69*** 0.1508  16.90*** 0.2205  14.92*** 0.5136  15.54*** 1.4831  15.83***  
F 6.50***  14.25***  9.51***  7.93***  15.44***  6.44***  
R-sq 0.07  0.15  0.11  0.09  0.16  0.08  
Adj R-sq 0.06  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.15  0.06  
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H_DIFF-d -0.0280  -1.77*  -0.0315  -1.29  0.0119  0.29  -0.0350  -0.54  -0.3545  -2.29** -0.3269  -0.75  
(H_DIFF-d)2 0.0273  1.07  0.0382  0.97  -0.0261  -0.39  0.0219  0.21  0.5263  2.11**  0.8753  1.24  
SizeTA-d 0.0023  0.76  0.0012  0.26  0.0109  1.39  0.0598  4.73*** -0.0140  -0.47  -0.0897  -1.05  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0058  -1.75*  -0.0086  -1.70*  -0.0016  -0.19  -0.0413  -2.72*** -0.0788  -2.45** 0.0637  0.69  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.92***  -0.0017  -8.22*** -0.0012  -3.33*** -0.0001  -0.25  -0.0074  -5.47*** -0.0008  -0.21  
(Lev-d)2 -2.32E-06 -0.63  8.25E-06 1.44  -4.32E-05 -4.49*** 0.0001  2.21**  0.0003  7.36*** -0.0002  -1.67*  
IAInt -0.0146  -1.33  -0.0337  -1.98** -0.0421  -1.47  0.2246  4.97*** 0.7248  6.75*** 1.7561  5.77***  
Beta -0.0061  -3.30***  -0.0059  -2.09** -0.0095  -1.99** -0.0086  -1.12  -0.0210  -1.13  0.0432  0.85  
Constant 0.0632  19.33***  0.1007  19.89*** 0.1519  17.86*** 0.2224  15.62*** 0.5311  16.57*** 1.5543  17.18***  
F 5.88***  13.13***  9.43***  7.62***  13.90***  5.17***  
R-sq 0.07  0.14  0.11  0.09  0.15  0.06  
Adj R-sq 0.06  0.13  0.10  0.08  0.14  0.05  
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV-d -0.0092  -2.50***  -0.0131  -2.30*** -0.0028  -0.29  -0.0219  -1.45  -0.0955  -2.64*** -0.1124  -1.08  
(SV-d)2 0.0054  2.00**  0.0079  1.86*  0.0035  0.49  0.0130  1.17  0.0540  2.02**  0.0471  0.59  
SizeTA-d 0.0025  0.82  0.0019  0.40  0.0113  1.43  0.0608  4.81*** -0.0118  -0.40  -0.0810  -0.94  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0057  -1.73*  -0.0086  -1.71*  -0.0015  -0.18  -0.0406  -2.68*** -0.0779  -2.43** 0.0616  0.66  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.02***  -0.0018  -8.49*** -0.0012  -3.35*** -0.0002  -0.29  -0.0078  -5.78*** -0.0018  -0.46  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, 
**, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 135 
Table 6.2  Quadratic robust regressions of firm performance on ownership concentration (continued) 
 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
(Lev-d)2 -2.37E-06 -0.64  8.61E-06 1.51  -4.35E-05 -4.52*** 0.0001  2.18**  0.0003  7.54*** -0.0002  -1.61  
IAInt -0.0138  -1.26  -0.0336  -1.99** -0.0429  -1.51  0.2251  4.98*** 0.7333  6.84*** 1.7574  5.72***  
Beta -0.0062  -3.36***  -0.0061  -2.17** -0.0095  -1.99** -0.0088  -1.15  -0.0249  -1.34  0.0343  0.67  
Constant 0.0622  19.06***  0.0995  19.71*** 0.1498  17.59*** 0.2183  15.36*** 0.5347  16.66*** 1.5868  17.35***  
F 6.23***  13.91***  9.51***  7.87***  14.50***  4.99***  
R-sq 0.07  0.15  0.11  0.09  0.16  0.06  
Adj R-sq 0.06  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.15  0.05  
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  630  637  637  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, 
**, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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quadratic term are found on one or more firm performance measures.  Again, firm 
performance measured as return on equity (ROE) and gross profit margin (PMG) 
seems to be irrelevant to any ownership concentration measure.   
This result provides strong evidence on a non-linear impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance.  However, the shape of the impact seems to be 
an inverted-bell curve, instead of a bell shaped curve suggested by Thomsen and 
Pederson (2000).  It seems that ownership concentration increases agency costs and 
cost of capital, therefore decreases performance at a low level of ownership 
concentration.  The sign of the impact changes at higher level of ownership 
concentration due to the positive monitoring and incentive impact of ownership 
concentration.  This shape of impact implies that to maximize firm performance, 
ownership should be either as concentrated as possible, or as dispersed as possible, 
depending on which gives better result.  However, due to the limitation that a 
quadratic regression can only capture one turning point, this result may be inadequate 
in describing the non-linear impact. 
Non-linear results are also found from size and leverage variables.  Size affects firm 
performance especially profit margin positively below a certain level, while starts to 
be detrimental for firm performance after it reaches the certain level.  On the 
contrary, better-performing companies are associated with lower leverage when the 
leverage level is below a certain level, while above this level, borrowing seems to 
benefit firm performance through the monitoring effect from debt holders.  
Intangible assets are beneficial for firm’s profit margin and market return, but 
detrimental for accounting rates of return.  Systematic risk Beta seems to have a 
significant negative impact on accounting rates of return. 
 
 137
2  Piecewise linear regressions 
Piecewise linear regressions divide the variable into ranges according to pre-assumed 
turning points.  Previous literature applies different ways to define the turning points.  
In this study, I use the percentiles of the data as turning points.  Table 6.3 summaries 
the percentiles of ownership concentration measures H, C1, H_DIFF and SV. 
Table 6.3  Percentiles of ownership concentration variables 
Percentiles H C1 H_DIFF SV 
Minimum 0.26E-04 0.0031 0 0.003 
10 0.01 0.06 4.43E-04 0.06 
20 0.02 0.10 2.01E-03 0.11 
30 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.15 
40 0.08 0.22 0.01 0.23 
50 0.14 0.29 0.03 0.39 
60 0.22 0.40 0.07 0.76 
70 0.27 0.47 0.12 1 
80 0.35 0.53 0.20 1 
90 0.51 0.69 0.31 1 
100 1 1 1 1 
 
Note: H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences 
between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value. 
Table 6.4 presents the iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm 
performance on piecewise ownership concentration variables.  For ownership 
concentration measured as the Herfindahl index H, the piecewise variables H-4, H-5, 
H-6, H-7, H-8 and H-9 are significant on accounting rates of return (ROA, ROC and 
ROE).  No significant result is found on profit margin measure PMG.  In 
regressions of Tobin’s Q, only H-4, H-5 and H-6 are significant; and in regressions of 
market to book ratio MTB, H-4 and H-5 are significant.  These results suggest that 
for performance measured as accounting rates of return, the Herfindahl index in the 
range of 0.04 (30 percentile) and 0.51 (90 percentile) can be an effective governance 
mechanism; while for performance measures incorporating market return, the 
effective ranges are narrower: (0.04, 0.22) for Tobin’s Q and (0.04, 0.14) for market to 
book ratio MTB.  The fact that several turning points are found suggests that the 
costs and benefits of ownership concentration fluctuate with the increase in ownership 
concentration, causing the dominant impact, either positive or negative, fluctuates, too. 
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Table 6.4  Piecewise robust regressions of firm performance 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
H-1 0.6279  0.38  3.4443  1.38  4.2666  1.01  -6.1969  -0.91  -2.7635  -0.17  -15.5839  -0.35  
H-2 -0.4102  -0.49  -1.9886  -1.55  -2.4350  -1.12  2.2594  0.64  -0.6074  -0.07  -2.1415  -0.09  
H-3 -0.8306  -1.35  -1.0656  -1.14  -0.8032  -0.51  -0.1603  -0.06  -7.4611  -1.24  -26.1487  -1.54  
H-4 0.6561  2.34**  1.0168  2.38**  1.5371  2.13**  -0.3013  -0.26  5.4450  2.00**  15.0699  1.95*  
H-5 -0.5594  -3.22***  -0.9622  -3.63*** -1.3743  -3.06*** -0.2517  -0.35  -5.9954  -3.55*** -12.0531  -2.51**  
H-6 0.2961  2.12**  0.5111  2.40**  0.8973  2.48**  0.0048  0.01  2.7781  2.04**  5.4289  1.41  
H-7 -0.4477  -2.27**  -0.6345  -2.11**  -1.2874  -2.53**  0.0689  0.08  -1.9478  -1.02  -4.6825  -0.86  
H-8 0.3312  2.78***  0.5266  2.90***  0.8416  2.74***  0.0264  0.05  0.7052  0.61  1.6900  0.51  
H-9 -0.0978  -1.68*  -0.1501  -1.69*  -0.1828  -1.22  -0.1692  -0.69  -0.1692  -0.30  1.0822  0.68  
H-10 0.0001  0.00  0.0129  0.33  -0.0104  -0.16  0.0537  0.49  0.1880  0.76  0.3372  0.48  
SizeTA-d 0.0007  0.24  -0.0022  -0.47  0.0073  0.92  0.0586  4.50***  -0.0156  -0.52  -0.1026  -1.20  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0044  -1.36  -0.0059  -1.20  0.0010  0.12  -0.0403  -2.62*** -0.0759  -2.39**  0.0840  0.92  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.90***  -0.0018  -8.59*** -0.0012  -3.41*** 0.0002  0.30  -0.0074  -5.55*** -0.0002  -0.06  
(Lev-d)2 -1.43E-06 -0.39  1.07E-05 1.89**  -4.22E-05 -4.40*** 3.32E-06 0.21  0.0003  7.73***  -0.0002  -2.29**  
IAInt -0.0153  -1.40  -0.0349  -2.10**  -0.0415  -1.47  0.2240  4.88***  0.7219  6.79***  1.7157  5.69***  
Beta -0.0065  -3.53***  -0.0068  -2.45**  -0.0107  -2.26**  -0.0087  -1.12  -0.0243  -1.32  0.0368  0.73  
Constant 0.0708  6.94***  0.1032  6.64***  0.1405  5.33***  0.2758  6.48***  0.6675  6.73***  1.9476  6.93***  
F 4.70***  9.48***  6.36***  3.68***  8.43***  3.94***  
R-sq 0.11  0.20  0.14  0.09  0.18  0.09  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.18  0.12  0.06  0.16  0.07  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean; -1, 
-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10, piecewise variables based on percentiles.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 6.4  Piecewise robust regressions of firm performance (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1-1 -0.5731  -1.73*  -0.1070  -0.21  -0.0818  -0.09  -2.9740  -2.14**  -7.7316  -2.40**  -14.0748  -1.53  
C1-2 0.5929  2.67***  0.6384  1.85*  0.7193  1.22  1.3354  1.43  4.5616  2.11**  6.3741  1.03  
C1-3 -0.8607  -3.68***  -1.3662  -3.77*** -1.1835  -1.91*  0.0010  0.00  -5.8252  -2.54*** -15.3377  -2.35**  
C1-4 0.3405  2.56***  0.4863  2.35**  0.5160  1.46  -0.2606  -0.47  2.2620  1.73*  6.8258  1.85*  
C1-5 -0.2975  -2.03**  -0.3782  -1.66  -0.6137  -1.57  -0.1628  -0.26  -3.1795  -2.23**  -6.5999  -1.61  
C1-6 0.1180  1.20  0.1066  0.70  0.4444  1.70*  -0.0220  -0.05  0.6289  0.66  0.9319  0.34  
C1-7 -0.1465  -0.92  -0.1433  -0.58  -0.5888  -1.40  0.0696  0.11  0.1329  0.09  0.3867  0.09  
C1-8 0.0949  0.52  0.2566  0.91  0.5072  1.05  -0.2201  -0.29  0.2475  0.14  2.6847  0.53  
C1-9 -0.0361  -0.55  -0.0718  -0.71  -0.0925  -0.53  0.0030  0.01  -0.1674  -0.26  -0.3093  -0.17  
C1-10 0.0021  0.05  0.0237  0.38  -0.0085  -0.08  0.0348  0.20  0.2643  0.68  1.0370  0.93  
SizeTA-d 0.0017  0.55  0.0009  0.20  0.0117  1.45  0.0582  4.50***  -0.0109  -0.37  -0.1045  -1.22  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0042  -1.30  -0.0072  -1.43  -0.0006  -0.07  -0.0389  -2.53**  -0.0708  -2.24**  0.0973  1.06  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.38***  -0.0017  -8.12*** -0.0011  -3.15*** 0.0003  0.49  -0.0071  -5.35*** 0.0002  0.06  
(Lev-d)2 -3.45E-06 -0.94  7.31E-06 1.28  -4.37E-05 -4.48*** 8.04E-07 0.05  0.0003  7.33***  -0.0002  -1.84*  
IAInt -0.0161  -1.47  -0.0377  -2.23**  -0.0470  -1.62  0.2227  4.84***  0.7101  6.70***  1.6905  5.57***  
Beta -0.0065  -3.57***  -0.0063  -2.23**  -0.0112  -2.32**  -0.0088  -1.13  -0.0253  -1.38  0.0342  0.68  
Constant 0.0963  5.79***  0.1159  4.49***  0.1548  3.50***  0.3812  5.48***  1.0050  6.23***  2.4918  5.40***  
F 4.25***  8.09***  5.13***  3.97***  8.71***  3.52***  
R-sq 0.10  0.17  0.12  0.09  0.18  0.08  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.15  0.09  0.07  0.16  0.06  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean; -1, 
-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10, piecewise variables based on percentiles.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 6.4  Piecewise robust regressions of firm performance (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H_DIFF-1 8.5864  0.33  -17.9245 -0.45  -36.5323  -0.54  139.6263 -1.34  231.7370  0.93  -1136.8050 -1.63  
H_DIFF-2 -7.9862  -1.08  1.7799  0.16  1.2018  0.06  40.5443  1.36  -95.7989  -1.34  204.6192  1.03  
H_DIFF-3 0.1845  0.06  -3.0029  -0.61  -0.3768  -0.05  3.3877  0.26  10.6601  0.34  -10.3151  -0.12  
H_DIFF-4 0.5354  0.33  0.5103  0.20  1.6025  0.37  -3.0779  -0.46  -3.1102  -0.19  -91.4079  -2.07** 
H_DIFF-5 0.2220  0.40  -0.0127  -0.01  -0.1025  -0.07  -0.6516  -0.29  1.7556  0.33  40.1358  2.71*** 
H_DIFF-6 -0.3130  -1.12  -0.2788  -0.64  -0.2025  -0.28  0.5434  0.48  -4.3534  -1.61  -17.7971  -2.35** 
H_DIFF-7 0.0652  0.33  0.1519  0.49  0.1267  0.24  -1.6476  -2.06** 1.6185  0.84  5.3234  0.99  
H_DIFF-8 -0.0258  -0.19  -0.0725  -0.34  -0.0893  -0.25  1.2075  2.18** 0.5118  0.38  0.6571  0.18  
H_DIFF-9 -0.0070  -0.08  0.0305  0.22  0.0927  0.40  -0.2496  -0.70  -0.7552  -0.88  -1.6786  -0.71  
H_DIFF-10 -0.0036  -0.19  -0.0004  -0.01  -0.0200  -0.41  -0.0026  -0.03  0.1646  0.91  0.8535  1.71  
SizeTA-d 0.0021  0.69  0.0011  0.22  0.0108  1.35  0.0595  4.69*** -0.0145  -0.48  -0.1126  -1.34  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0057  -1.71* -0.0085  -1.64  -0.0014  -0.16  -0.0402  -2.65*** -0.0777  -2.40** 0.0843  0.92  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.93*** -0.0018  -8.27*** -0.0012  -3.26*** 0.0003  0.51  -0.0074  -5.47*** 0.0004  0.09  
(Lev-d)2 -1.9E-06 -0.51  8.34E-06 1.43  -4.28E-05 -4.36*** -3.6E-07 -0.02  0.0003  7.39*** -0.0003  -2.84*** 
IAInt -0.0133  -1.19  -0.0342  -1.96** -0.0422  -1.44  0.2112  4.63*** 0.7370  6.75*** 1.6339  5.41*** 
Beta -0.0061  -3.31*** -0.0061  -2.12** -0.0095  -1.96** -0.0081  -1.06  -0.0230  -1.23  0.0390  0.78  
Constant 0.0706  9.37*** 0.1155  9.87*** 0.1614  8.18*** 0.2500  8.17*** 0.5883  8.03*** 1.9690  9.71*** 
F 3.18  6.81***  4.63***  4.19***  7.45***  3.77***  
R-sq 0.08  0.15  0.11  0.10  0.16  0.09  
Adj R-sq 0.05  0.13  0.08  0.07  0.14  0.07  
(continued on next page) 
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean; -1, 
-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9 and -10: piecewise variables based on percentiles.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 6.4 Piecewise robust regressions of firm performance (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV-1 -0.6920  -2.11  -0.3555  -0.70  -0.3780  -0.44  -1.7478  -1.29  -8.3316  -2.59*** -17.7007  -1.95* 
SV-2 0.3606  1.72* 0.3150  0.97  0.3975  0.72  0.1655  0.19  2.2112  1.08  3.1553  0.54  
SV-3 -0.1844  -0.82  -0.3221  -0.92  -0.0614  -0.10  1.5434  1.65* -0.0011  0.00  -3.6408  -0.58  
SV-4 -0.1737  -1.34  -0.2451  -1.21  -0.3723  -1.09  -0.8939  -1.67* -2.4609  -1.93* -4.8375  -1.34  
SV-5 0.0672  1.05  0.0836  0.84  0.1570  0.93  -0.0136  -0.05  0.8744  1.40  3.1651  1.79* 
SV-6 0.0171  0.52  0.0167  0.33  -0.0033  -0.04  0.0823  0.60  -0.2599  -0.80  -0.9445  -1.02  
SV-7 -0.0565  -1.56  -0.0472  -0.84  -0.0244  -0.25  -0.1312  -0.87  0.0557  0.16  0.8426  0.82  
SV-10 0.0056  1.07  0.0066  0.81  0.0063  0.46  0.0116  0.53  0.0419  0.81  -0.0416  -0.29  
SizeTA-d 0.0016  0.54  0.0005  0.10  0.0110  1.37  0.0590  4.62*** -0.0183  -0.61  -0.1234  -1.44  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.71* -0.0084  -1.64  -0.0016  -0.19  -0.0409  -2.68*** -0.0725  -2.25** 0.0914  0.98  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.78*** -0.0018  -8.28*** -0.0012  -3.26*** 0.0002  0.41  -0.0078  -5.74*** -0.0009  -0.24  
(Lev-d)2 -2.19E-06 -0.59  8.65E-06 1.51  -4.26E-05 -4.38*** 1.05E-06 0.07  0.0003  7.59*** -0.0002  -1.74* 
IAInt -0.0121  -1.11  -0.0322  -1.89* -0.0391  -1.35  0.2214  4.86*** 0.7420  6.90*** 1.7831  5.87*** 
Beta -0.0066  -3.59*** -0.0064  -2.25** -0.0105  -2.17** -0.0094  -1.22  -0.0289  -1.55  0.0382  0.75  
Constant 0.1034  6.11** 0.1286  4.88*** 0.1681  3.75*** 0.3241  4.61*** 1.0565  6.35*** 2.6971  5.74*** 
F 4.46***  8.37***  5.45***  4.62***  9.44***  3.91***  
R-sq 0.09  0.16  0.11  0.09  0.18  0.08  
Adj R-sq 0.07  0.14  0.09  0.07  0.16  0.06  
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  630  637  637  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean; -1, 
-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10, piecewise variables based on percentiles.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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For the largest shareholding C1, piecewise variables C1-1, C1-2, C1-3, C1-4 and C1-5 
are significant on performance measured as ROA and TQ, suggesting that the largest 
shareholding can be an effective governance mechanism up to 29%.  Any increase in 
the largest shareholding over 29% has no impact on ROA or TQ.  Some of these 
piecewise variables are also significant for performance measured as ROC and PMG. 
For the power of multiple large shareholders variables H_DIFF and SV, the results are 
less consistent than those of other measures.  H_DIFF-4, H_DIFF-5 and H_DIFF-6 
are significant on market to book ratio MTB, while H_DIFF-7 and H_DIFF-8 are 
significant on gross profit margin PMG.  The other performance measures are not 
affected by any H_DIFF piecewise variable.  For the Shapley value piecewise 
variables, SV-1 is found significant on Tobin’s Q.  SV-3 and SV-4 are found 
significant on profit margin PMG, but only at a low significant level of 10%.  Several 
other significant results are also found on other performance measures, but only 
significant at 10% level.  Previous linear regressions and quadratic regressions found 
no significant impact of ownership concentration on the profit margin measure PMG.  
Therefore, it seems that the piecewise regressions are able to reveal that profit margin 
can be affected by the contestability of the controlling coalition.   
Based on the above results, Figure 6.1 graphs the non-linear impact of ownership 
concentration measures on Tobin’s Q given that other control variables are constant.  
No non-linear impact of H_DIFF is found on Tobin’s Q.  Therefore it is not graphed 
in the figure.  When measured as the Herfindahl index H, ownership concentration 
has no impact on Tobin’s Q when it is below 0.04 or over 0.22.  Tobin’s Q starts to 
increase with more concentrated ownership when the Herfindah index is between 0.04 
and 0.08.  After that, the impact becomes negative until the Herfindahl index reaches 
around 0.14.  A positive impact is resumed when the Herfindahl index is between 
0.14 and 0.22.  The fact that these turning points are located well in the middle 
percentiles of the data (between 30% and 60%) (please refer to table 6.3) adds to the 
validity of the results.  
These results indicate that ownership concentration can only be an effective 
mechanism within a certain range.  Within that range, at low ownership 
concentration level of the controlling shareholders, the positive impact of monitoring 
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and control dominates.  Over a certain level of ownership concentration, the 
controlling shareholders have greater power and therefore are more motivated to 
entrench themselves from outsider investors.  This results in increased agency costs 
Figure 6.1  Non-linear impact of ownership concentration measures on Tobin’s Q 
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which eventually dominate the overall impact of controlling shareholders.  It is 
interesting to see that over a higher level of ownership concentration, the impact 
becomes positive again, possibly due to more aligned interests between large 
shareholders and outside investors.  From the graph, it is expected that the optimum 
level of firm performance can be achieved at a Herfindahl index value of 0.08. 
The impact of the largest shareholding C1 on Tobin’s Q is more fluctuating than that 
of the Herfindahl index.  It turns out that when ownership starts to concentrate in a 
single shareholder, firm performance decreases with the single shareholder’s 
ownership.  It is only after the threshold of 6% the largest shareholding starts to 
benefit firm performance.  The positive impact lasts until the largest shareholding 
reaches 10%.  The negative and positive impacts of the largest shareholding 
dominate in turn until the largest shareholding reaches around 29%, after which any 
increase in the largest shareholding has no impact on Tobin’s Q. 
The Shapley value SV is an inverse indication of the contestability of the controlling 
coalition formed by multiple large shareholders.  Figure 6.1 shows a negative impact 
of SV on Tobin’s Q when SV is below 0.06 or within the range of (0.15, 0.23).  
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Within other ranges, no significant impact can be found.  These results confirm that 
the contestability of the controlling coalition has a positive impact of firm 
performance when it is above a certain level. 
Judging from the results of C1 and SV, it seems that the highest Tobin’s Q is achieved 
when the largest shareholding or the Shapley value is as low as possible, indicating 
that the most dispersed ownership produce the best firm performance.  In the 
circumstance that a certain level of ownership concentration is required, firm 
performance can achieve the second best point when the largest shareholding is 
around 10%.  However, there is no second best level for the Shapley value.  Further 
research can be carried out regarding the power allocation of multiple large 
shareholders within the controlling coalition.   
3  Conclusion 
The impact from ownership concentration on performance can be non-linear, due to 
the combination of positive monitoring and interest alignment effects and negative 
agency cost and cost of capital effects.  The quadratic and piecewise regressions are 
carried out to control this non-linear impact.   
The results of quadratic regressions provide strong evidence on a significant 
non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance.  The shape of 
the impact seems to be an inverted-bell curve, instead of a bell shaped curve 
suggested by Thomsen and Pederson (2000).  The quadratic regressions are also 
restricted by only being able to capture single turning point.   
Piecewise linear regressions are carried out with ownership variables divided by ten 
ranges using the percentiles of the data as turning points.  The results strongly 
support a non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance with 
multiple turning points.  Specifically when firm performance is measured as Tobin’s 
Q, best performance can be achieved when the Herfindahl index is round 0.08.  The 
impact of the Herfindahl index H on Tobin’s Q is positive within the range of 0.04 and 
0.08, negative between 0.08 and 0.14, and positive again between 0.14 and 0.22.  No 
significant impact is found within the other ranges.  The results of the largest 
shareholding C1 and the Shaley value SV suggest that when a certain level of 
ownership concentration is required, a largest shareholding of 10% can deliver a 
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relatively strong performance.   
The studies in this chapter support a strong non-linear impact of ownership on 
performance.  This could be the result of a combination of positive and negative 
impact of ownership on performance.  However, it can not reject the possibility of 
endogeneity of ownership and performance until further investigation is carried out. 
The results in the chapter also suggest that the contradicting conclusions of existing 
empirical literature on the relationship between ownership and performance could be 
caused by ignoring the non-linearity of the relationship.   
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Chapter Seven  Testing the Impact of Owner Identity on Firm 
Performance 
Chapter Five investigates the linear impact of various ownership concentration 
measures on various firm performance measures.  A significant negative impact is 
confirmed when the OLS regression restrictions are controlled by running iteratively 
re-weighted least squares regressions.  Significant interaction effects of country or 
industry are also found in the sample.  Chapter Six carries out the quadratic and 
piecewise regressions to capture the potential non-linear impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance.  The results are significant for all of the 
ownership concentration measures, supporting the non-linear hypothesis of the 
relationship.  Moreover, multiple turning points of the non-linear impact are found 
from the piecewise regressions. 
While Chapters Five and Six focus on the impact of degree of control on firm 
performance, this chapter explores the impact of location of control, or identity of 
owner, on firm performance.  A number of studies, such as Cubbin and Leech (1982), 
suggest that simply examining ownership in terms of degree of control may be not 
enough to give a comprehensive insight into the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance.  Identification of the shareholders, or the location of 
control, is crucial to the empirical tests.  Maher and Andersson (2000) suggest that 
transferring the “separation of ownership and control” view of monitoring in US and 
UK corporations to Continental Europe can be misleading because the economic 
decision agents are very different.  This is confirmed by the descriptive statistics 
provided in Chapter Three.  The identities of controlling owners (directly or 
ultimately) are found to be substantially different among European countries.  
Therefore ownership concentration and the identity of owners should be viewed as 
variables that exert a simultaneous, but different influence on firm performance.  
Since pyramid ownership structures are common among modern European companies, 
direct controllers are significantly different from ultimate controllers.  This is 
confirmed by the statistics provided in Chapter Three, which suggest that industrial 
companies hold a majority direct control of European non-subsidiary companies, 
while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners.  In the U.K. and Italy, 
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institutional investors have significantly less power in controlling their companies 
ultimately than directly.  Therefore the impact of identities of direct controllers on 
modelling the relationship between ownership structure and performance might be 
different from that of ultimate controllers. 
Using the same sample as in Chapters Five and Six, this chapter investigates how 
ownership concentration and owner identity interact to affect firm performance.  The 
impacts of direct location of control and ultimate location of control are investigated 
separately.  Section One discusses the model and hypotheses.  Section Two presents 
and analyses regression results.  The final section concludes. 
1  Model and hypotheses 
Owner identity dummies and interaction variables of degree and location of control 
are included in the original model.  Again, OC95 is a dichotomous variable, 
therefore not suitable for tests involving dummy and interaction variables.  The 
model is as follows: 
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where performance variables are return on assets (ROA), return on capital (ROC), 
return on equity (ROE), gross profit margin (PMG), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB); ownership variables are Herfindahl index (H), the 
largest shareholding (C1), and variables for the power of multiple large shareholders 
(H_DIFF and SV).  SizeTA is the total assets value, Lev is calculated as long term 
debt to common equity ratio, IAInt is the intangible assets ratio, and Beta is the risk 
element.  12 types of owner identities are identified in the database, as discussed in 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four.  This study focuses on the impacts of institutional 
investors (insurance companies “A”, banks “B”, mutual & pension funds / nominees / 
trusts / trustees “E” and financial companies “F”), non-financial corporate ownership 
(industrial ownership “C”), management ownership (employees / managers / directors 
“M”), founder owners (Named individuals or families “I” and unnamed individuals or 
families “D”) and government ownership (“S”).  
Institutional investors exert external control on firms’ management.  Big institutional 
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owners should be more motivated and efficient to monitor firms’ management than 
small investors.  However, when they hold relatively few shares in firms, they are 
less motivated to monitor a firm’s management since they are able to sell when a firm 
underperforms during a short term.  The impact of institutional ownership also 
differs between pressure-sensitive institutions, who derive benefits from businesses 
linked to firms, and therefore would be more subject to management influence, and 
pressure-insensitive institutions who are less subject to management influence and 
more independent to monitor management’s performance.   
Non-financial corporate ownership improves firm performance through resources 
sharing effect, high asset specificity and high transaction frequency, while it could 
also be harmful due to extraction of wealth at the expense of minority investors. 
Concerning the impact of internal control, the incentive alignment hypothesis predicts 
a convergence of interests between managers and shareholders associated 
management ownership, and therefore a positive impact of management ownership on 
firm performance.  The entrenchment hypothesis asserts that managers holding more 
shares of the firm are more capable to entrench themselves by making 
“manager-specific” investment decisions, which are non-value-maximizing.  In this 
case, management ownership imposes a negative effect on firm performance.  The 
positive alignment effect or the negative entrenchment effect may dominate at a 
certain level of management ownership, which implies a non-linear relationship 
between management ownership and firm performance. 
Founder owners seem able to solve the agency problem.  But they also have a 
negative entrenchment impact on firm performance.  Government ownership is 
generally considered to be harmful to firm performance due to its political goals 
conflicting with firms’ value maximizing goals.  However, a positive impact is also 
possible for minority investors due to low cost of capital.   
2  Regressions and results 
2.1  Effects of direct location of control 
Table 7.1 presents the iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm 
performance on ownership concentration, controlling for direct controlling 
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Table 7.1  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for direct controller identity15 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
H -0.0336  -0.57  -0.0748  -0.81  -0.0268  -0.17  0.0158  0.07  -0.1656  -0.28  -0.6118  -0.37  
A -0.0120  -0.64  -0.0218  -0.73  -0.0336  -0.67  0.0122  0.15  -0.2015  -1.06  -0.4641  -0.88  
B -0.0130  -0.82  -0.0241  -0.97  -0.0246  -0.58  0.0562  0.85  -0.0983  -0.62  -0.2956  -0.66  
C 0.0010  0.07  -0.0202  -0.91  -0.0317  -0.85  0.0569  0.98  -0.0560  -0.40  -0.2618  -0.67  
D 3.0804  1.49  5.0859  1.57  9.8634  1.80  8.0443  0.94  36.6732  1.77*  161.8986 2.80***  
E -0.0144  -1.00  -0.0383  -1.69*  -0.0478  -1.24  0.0639  1.07  -0.1556  -1.08  -0.3258  -0.81  
F -0.0008  -0.05  -0.0265  -1.01  -0.0284  -0.64  0.0707  1.01  0.0140  0.08  -0.3261  -0.70  
I 0.0155  0.99  0.0042  0.17  0.0030  0.07  0.1219  1.87*  0.0195  0.12  -0.1346  -0.31  
L -0.0239  -1.33  -0.0481  -1.70*  -0.0722  -1.51  0.0531  0.72  -0.0676  -0.38  -0.3307  -0.66  
M -0.0025  -0.05  -0.0365  -0.43  -0.1048  -0.73  0.8996  4.01*** -0.3612  -0.66  -1.4486  -0.95  
S -0.0231  -1.34  -0.0475  -1.76*  -0.0573  -1.25  0.0946  1.32  -0.0859  -0.50  -0.3179  -0.66  
Z -0.0222  -1.48  -0.0452  -1.93*  -0.0651  -1.64  0.1128  1.83*  -0.1299  -0.87  -0.1660  -0.40  
A*H -0.0200  -0.23  -0.0436  -0.32  -0.1722  -0.74  -0.0117  -0.03  0.0607  0.07  0.8532  0.35  
B*H 0.0409  0.62  0.0612  0.59  0.0286  0.16  -0.0230  -0.08  0.3061  0.46  1.8684  1.01  
C*H 0.0120  0.20  0.0618  0.65  0.0270  0.17  -0.0286  -0.12  0.0441  0.07  0.6035  0.36  
D*H -11.5132  -1.49  -19.0077  -1.57  -36.8142  -1.80*  -29.0532  -0.91  -136.2275 -1.76*  -598.9639 -2.78***  
E*H 0.0361  0.59  0.0859  0.89  0.0416  0.26  -0.0356  -0.14  0.1332  0.22  0.2437  0.14  
F*H 0.0011  0.02  0.0387  0.36  -0.0196  -0.11  -0.1640  -0.55  -0.2073  -0.30  0.2178  0.11  
I*H -0.0394  -0.60  -0.0317  -0.31  -0.0874  -0.50  -0.0521  -0.19  -0.1267  -0.19  0.5142  0.28  
L*H 0.0617  0.79  0.0741  0.60  0.0327  0.16  -0.1421  -0.44  -0.6500  -0.83  -1.0083  -0.46  
M*H 0.1016  0.05  0.6439  0.19  2.4455  0.42  -23.5618  -2.60*** 12.2644  0.56  36.1430  0.59  
S*H 0.0181  0.29  0.0514  0.52  -0.0022  -0.01  -0.1127  -0.43  -0.1907  -0.30  -0.2261  -0.13  
Z*H 0.0337  0.54  0.0751  0.77  0.0655  0.40  -0.1509  -0.59  0.1236  0.20  1.3687  0.79  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                        
15 Identity J is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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Table 7.1  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for direct controller’s identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
SizeTA-d 0.0015  0.50  0.0004  0.08  0.0115  1.42  0.0579  4.49*** -0.0148  -0.48  -0.0870  -1.00  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0053  -1.59  -0.0080  -1.53  -0.0015  -0.17  -0.0405  -2.62*** -0.0803  -2.41** 0.0575  0.61  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.81***  -0.0018  -8.08*** -0.0012  -3.15*** 0.0003  0.45  -0.0077  -5.46*** -0.0008  -0.20  
(Lev-d)2 -1.29E-06 -0.35  9.89E-06 1.70*  -4.22E-05 -4.29*** 4.05E-07 0.03  0.0003  7.41*** -0.0002  -1.52  
IAInt -0.0154  -1.40  -0.0354  -2.04** -0.0527  -1.80*  0.2202  4.79*** 0.7033  6.35*** 1.5996  5.17***  
Beta -0.0057  -3.12***  -0.0054  -1.88  -0.0092  -1.88*  -0.0090  -1.17  -0.0246  -1.29  0.0463  0.90  
Constant 0.0738  5.33***  0.1324  6.09*** 0.1912  5.20*** 0.1719  3.01*** 0.6735  4.86*** 1.8882  4.88***  
F 2.93***  4.66***  3.31***  3.22***  3.50***  2.42***  
R-sq 0.12  0.18  0.14  0.13  0.18  0.10  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.14  0.09  0.09  0.14  0.06  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 -0.0340  -0.64  -0.0771  -0.93  -0.0133  -0.09  -0.0041  -0.02  0.1460  0.28  -0.3318  -0.22  
A -0.0133  -0.55  -0.0233  -0.62  -0.0198  -0.31  -0.0057  -0.06  -0.1293  -0.54  -0.3257  -0.48  
B -0.0214  -1.04  -0.0361  -1.11  -0.0353  -0.64  0.0439  0.51  -0.0578  -0.28  -0.5454  -0.94  
C -0.0005  -0.03  -0.0269  -0.94  -0.0321  -0.66  0.0567  0.76  0.0250  0.14  -0.2055  -0.40  
D 3.9897  1.49  6.5818  1.56  12.7758  1.79  10.3466  0.94  47.6225  1.80*  209.6395 2.80***  
E -0.0181  -0.96  -0.0497  -1.69*  -0.0544  -1.09  0.0701  0.91  -0.0877  -0.47  -0.2592  -0.49  
F 0.0028  0.13  -0.0254  -0.76  -0.0148  -0.26  0.0816  0.91  0.1506  0.72  -0.2178  -0.37  
I 0.0146  0.73  -0.0009  -0.03  0.0031  0.06  0.1076  1.30  0.0678  0.34  -0.1213  -0.22  
L -0.0259  -1.18  -0.0555  -1.60  -0.0651  -1.11  0.0994  1.10  0.0805  0.37  -0.1524  -0.25  
M -0.0092  -0.09  -0.0601  -0.40  -0.1572  -0.61  1.3926  3.50*** -0.5643  -0.59  -2.2190  -0.82  
S -0.0245  -1.11  -0.0569  -1.65*  -0.0557  -0.96  0.1122  1.22  0.0451  0.21  -0.2044  -0.33  
Z -0.0277  -1.44  -0.0565  -1.86*  -0.0669  -1.30  0.1157  1.46  -0.0691  -0.36  -0.2123  -0.39  
A*C1 -0.0049  -0.07  -0.0142  -0.13  -0.1380  -0.72  0.0570  0.19  -0.2668  -0.37  -0.0597  -0.03  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7.1  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for direct controller’s identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
B*C1 0.0505  0.84  0.0735  0.78  0.0458  0.29  0.0272  0.11  -0.0266  -0.05  1.8743  1.12  
C*C1 0.0130  0.24  0.0596  0.70  0.0147  0.10  -0.0128  -0.06  -0.3091  -0.58  0.1838  0.12  
D*C1 -7.8131  -1.49  -12.8841  -1.56  -25.0200  -1.79*  -19.7438  -0.91  -93.0368  -1.80*  -407.7186 -2.78***  
E*C1 0.0337  0.61  0.0872  1.01  0.0401  0.27  -0.0351  -0.15  -0.2032  -0.37  -0.0715  -0.05  
F*C1 -0.0105  -0.17  0.0203  0.21  -0.0577  -0.35  -0.1340  -0.51  -0.6447  -1.06  -0.2706  -0.16  
I*C1 -0.0218  -0.38  -0.0049  -0.05  -0.0563  -0.36  0.0157  0.07  -0.3079  -0.54  0.2365  0.15  
L*C1 0.0403  0.61  0.0636  0.62  -0.0084  -0.05  -0.2572  -0.95  -1.0132  -1.56  -1.3834  -0.75  
M*C1 0.0744  0.07  0.3608  0.22  1.1757  0.42  -11.2694  -2.59*** 5.6846  0.55  17.5441  0.59  
S*C1 0.0158  0.27  0.0581  0.63  -0.0108  -0.07  -0.1163  -0.48  -0.5758  -1.00  -0.5230  -0.32  
Z*C1 0.0375  0.67  0.0802  0.91  0.0440  0.30  -0.0992  -0.43  -0.1990  -0.36  0.9563  0.61  
SizeTA-d 0.0016  0.52  0.0005  0.10  0.0109  1.35  0.0585  4.54*** -0.0137  -0.45  -0.0849  -0.98  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0054  -1.64  -0.0080  -1.54  -0.0012  -0.13  -0.0418  -2.71*** -0.0769  -2.34** 0.0609  0.64  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.75***  -0.0017  -7.96*** -0.0011  -2.99*** 0.0002  0.40  -0.0076  -5.50*** -0.0010  -0.26  
(Lev-d)2 -1.25E-06 -0.34  9.66E-06 1.66  -4.25E-05 -4.32*** 7.58E-07 0.05  0.0003  7.54*** -0.0001  -1.39  
IAInt -0.0172  -1.56  -0.0372  -2.15** -0.0554  -1.89*  0.2171  4.74*** 0.6928  6.36*** 1.5649  5.07***  
Beta -0.0058  -3.15***  -0.0056  -1.94*  -0.0094  -1.92*  -0.0092  -1.19  -0.0275  -1.46  0.0460  0.89  
Constant 0.0785  4.39***  0.1430  5.10*** 0.1915  4.03*** 0.1764  2.40**  0.6199  3.51*** 1.8925  3.79***  
F 2.98***  4.66***  3.26***  3.29***  4.76***  2.51***  
R-sq 0.12  0.18  0.13  0.14  0.19  0.11  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.14  0.09  0.10  0.15  0.06  
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H-DIFF -0.0395  -0.46  -0.0824  -0.61  0.0327  0.14  0.0813  0.23  0.2818  0.33  -0.4350  -0.18  
A -0.0131  -0.77  -0.0214  -0.80  -0.0291  -0.65  0.0033  0.05  -0.1899  -1.11  -0.3528  -0.74  
B -0.0104  -0.73  -0.0219  -0.98  -0.0156  -0.42  0.0533  0.91  -0.0669  -0.47  -0.0882  -0.22  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7.1  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for direct controller’s identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
C -0.0012  -0.10  -0.0215  -1.07  -0.0311  -0.93  0.0577  1.10  -0.0483  -0.38  -0.2546  -0.71  
D 0.1736  1.18  0.3203  1.39  0.6076  1.57  1.5590  2.58*** 3.2549  2.22**  12.9050  3.14***  
E -0.0124  -0.95  -0.0329  -1.60  -0.0405  -1.17  0.0602  1.12  -0.1265  -0.96  -0.2975  -0.81  
F -0.0038  -0.25  -0.0277  -1.18  -0.0275  -0.70  0.0683  1.09  0.0025  0.02  -0.3265  -0.78  
I 0.0155  1.08  0.0038  0.17  0.0023  0.06  0.1313  2.22**  0.0608  0.42  -0.0525  -0.13  
L -0.0257  -1.61  -0.0518  -2.07** -0.0739  -1.76*  0.0146  0.22  -0.1030  -0.64  -0.4814  -1.08  
M -0.0002  0.00  -0.0328  -0.36  -0.1047  -0.69  0.9483  4.01*** -0.3468  -0.60  -1.4567  -0.91  
S -0.0225  -1.45  -0.0445  -1.83*  -0.0535  -1.31  0.0890  1.37  -0.0944  -0.61  -0.3809  -0.88  
Z -0.0190  -1.40  -0.0397  -1.87*  -0.0545  -1.53  0.1047  1.88*  -0.0949  -0.70  -0.0735  -0.19  
A*H-DIFF -0.0219  -0.17  -0.0810  -0.41  -0.3876  -1.16  0.1042  0.20  -0.1145  -0.08  0.1062  0.03  
B*H-DIFF 0.0489  0.53  0.0757  0.52  -0.0545  -0.22  -0.0205  -0.05  0.0520  0.06  1.4825  0.57  
C*H-DIFF 0.0371  0.43  0.1105  0.81  0.0109  0.05  -0.0735  -0.21  -0.2543  -0.29  0.8617  0.35  
D*H-DIFF -0.8607  -1.30  -1.5984  -1.54  -2.9917  -1.72*  -6.6611  -2.45** -15.6490  -2.37** -56.3356  -3.04***  
E*H-DIFF 0.0440  0.50  0.0953  0.69  -0.0156  -0.07  -0.0525  -0.15  -0.2740  -0.31  0.0722  0.03  
F*H-DIFF 0.0227  0.24  0.0683  0.45  -0.0707  -0.28  -0.3347  -0.74  -0.4796  -0.50  0.2834  0.11  
I*H-DIFF -0.0576  -0.63  -0.0460  -0.32  -0.1623  -0.67  -0.1803  -0.46  -0.7617  -0.83  0.0895  0.03  
L*H-DIFF 0.1396  1.35  0.1758  1.08  0.0637  0.23  0.5076  1.19  -0.9458  -0.91  0.0285  0.01  
M*H-DIFF 0.7914  0.02  11.9928  0.15  55.9068  0.42  -543.1830 -2.61*** 273.6987  0.54  822.1529 0.58  
S*H-DIFF 0.0253  0.29  0.0589  0.42  -0.0594  -0.25  -0.1645  -0.45  -0.5558  -0.63  -0.1680  -0.07  
Z*H-DIFF 0.0317  0.36  0.0762  0.55  0.0025  0.01  -0.2072  -0.57  -0.3481  -0.39  1.4296  0.58  
SizeTA-d 0.0008  0.26  -0.0007  -0.15  0.0111  1.37  0.0564  4.36*** -0.0200  -0.65  -0.0875  -1.00  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0051  -1.54  -0.0073  -1.40  -0.0011  -0.12  -0.0390  -2.52** -0.0806  -2.41** 0.0539  0.57  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.61***  -0.0017  -7.81*** -0.0011  -2.97*** 0.0003  0.48  -0.0073  -5.20*** -0.0011  -0.27  
(Lev-d)2 -1.55E-06 -0.42  9.26E-06 1.59  -4.25E-05 -4.34*** -9.10E-07 -0.06  0.0003  7.25*** -0.0001  -1.20  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7.1  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for direct controller’s identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
IAInt -0.0143  -1.29  -0.0344  -1.97** -0.0514  -1.76*  0.2290  4.96*** 0.7138  6.41*** 1.6883  5.41***  
Beta -0.0057  -3.07***  -0.0051  -1.76*  -0.0082  -1.69*  -0.0095  -1.21  -0.0212  -1.11  0.0535  1.03  
Constant 0.0715  5.63**  0.1271  6.38*** 0.1839  5.50  0.1656  3.16*** 0.6328  4.98*** 1.8112  5.09***  
F 2.92***  4.72***  3.31***  3.43***  4.42***  2.36***  
R-sq 0.12  0.18  0.14  0.14  0.17  0.10  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.14  0.09  0.10  0.13  0.06  
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV -0.0253  -0.69  -0.0526  -0.91  0.0085  0.09  -0.0059  -0.04  0.3823  1.03  0.0273  0.03  
A -0.0210  -0.98  -0.0373  -1.10  -0.0405  -0.71  0.0163  0.18  -0.0510  -0.23  -0.2060  -0.35  
B -0.0273  -1.40  -0.0424  -1.38  -0.0375  -0.73  0.0110  0.14  -0.0505  -0.26  -0.4683  -0.86  
C -0.0044  -0.25  -0.0268  -0.97  -0.0270  -0.58  0.0605  0.85  0.1081  0.61  -0.0696  -0.14  
D -0.0096  -0.27  -0.0195  -0.36  -0.0737  -0.80  0.1485  1.05  (dropped)16  -1.2095  -1.25  
E -0.0193  -1.07  -0.0466  -1.65*  -0.0480  -1.01  0.0634  0.87  -0.0304  -0.17  -0.2629  -0.53  
F 0.0028  0.14  -0.0213  -0.67  -0.0049  -0.09  0.0876  1.06  0.2482  1.21  -0.1298  -0.23  
I 0.0042  0.22  -0.0161  -0.54  0.0006  0.01  0.0842  1.10  0.1094  0.58  -0.1080  -0.21  
L -0.0197  -0.94  -0.0458  -1.40  -0.0432  -0.78  0.0369  0.43  0.0617  0.29  -0.2086  -0.36  
M -0.0101  -0.11  -0.0578  -0.40  -0.1459  -0.60  1.3280  3.54*** -0.4267  -0.46  -1.9708  -0.77  
S -0.0300  -1.46  -0.0753  -2.32** -0.0770  -1.42  0.1078  1.26  0.0634  0.30  -0.4388  -0.77  
Z -0.0301  -1.62  -0.0584  -2.00** -0.0547  -1.12  0.0794  1.05  0.0110  0.06  -0.0110  -0.02  
A* SV 0.0188  0.47  0.0337  0.53  -0.0353  -0.33  -0.0093  -0.06  -0.4167  -1.02  -0.2801  -0.25  
B* SV 0.0449  1.16  0.0629  1.03  0.0261  0.25  0.0775  0.49  -0.0467  -0.12  0.9695  0.90  
C* SV 0.0200  0.54  0.0460  0.79  -0.0051  -0.05  -0.0119  -0.08  -0.4460  -1.20  -0.1793  -0.18  
E* SV 0.0268  0.72  0.0556  0.95  0.0061  0.06  -0.0082  -0.05  -0.3618  -0.96  -0.1107  -0.11  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                        
16 Stata drops this variable due to its dependency with some other independent variables. 
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Table 7.1  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for direct controller’s identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
F* SV -0.0038  -0.09  0.0102  0.16  -0.0618  -0.57  -0.1015  -0.61  -0.7199  -1.75*  -0.4282  -0.38  
I* SV 0.0150  0.40  0.0394  0.67  -0.0262  -0.27  0.0414  0.27  -0.3771  -1.00  0.0466  0.04  
L* SV 0.0156  0.39  0.0304  0.48  -0.0461  -0.44  -0.0005  0.00  -0.5834  -1.44  -0.5213  -0.47  
M* SV 0.0691  0.07  0.3164  0.21  1.0394  0.41  -10.1600  -2.60*** 4.6752  0.48  14.7590  0.55  
S* SV 0.0216  0.56  0.0672  1.10  0.0135  0.13  -0.0630  -0.40  -0.5300  -1.35  -0.0657  -0.06  
Z* SV 0.0307  0.81  0.0597  1.00  0.0010  0.01  0.0033  0.02  -0.3894  -1.02  0.1593  0.15  
SizeTA-d 0.0014  0.47  0.0004  0.08  0.0096  1.19  0.0583  4.54*** -0.0202  -0.65  -0.0970  -1.12  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0061  -1.83*  -0.0089  -1.71*  -0.0018  -0.20  -0.0389  -2.53** -0.0746  -2.22*** 0.0715  0.76  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.54***  -0.0017  -7.81*** -0.0010  -2.69*** 0.0002  0.43  -0.0075  -5.26*** -0.0007  -0.18  
(Lev-d)2 -1.16E-06 -0.31  9.82E-06 1.67*  -4.32E-05 -4.39*** 1.41E-06 0.09  0.0003  7.23*** -0.0002  -1.86*  
IAInt -0.0165  -1.48  -0.0365  -2.09** -0.0553  -1.88*  0.2196  4.79*** 0.7298  6.48*** 1.5479  5.00***  
Beta -0.0059  -3.18***  -0.0058  -1.99** -0.0092  -1.88*  -0.0082  -1.06  -0.0243  -1.25  0.0466  0.90  
Constant 0.0789  4.53***  0.1417  5.19*** 0.1850  4.04*** 0.1753  2.47**  0.5234  2.98*** 1.8102  3.75***  
F 2.95***  4.70***  3.22***  3.30***  4.91***  2.33***  
R-sq 0.12  0.18  0.13  0.13  0.19  0.10  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.14  0.09  0.09  0.15  0.06  
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  640  631  637  636  
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean; A, 
insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more known 
individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, general 
public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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shareholder’s identity.  Some significant main effects are found.  Unnamed 
individuals and families owners (D) have a significant positive impact on performance 
measured as TQ, MTB or PMG.  Known individuals and families owners (I) also 
have significant positive impacts on performance measured as PMG.  This confirms 
the monitoring effect of founder owners to solve the agency problem.  Mutual & 
pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees owners (E) and government owners (S) are 
found to have a significant negative impact on performance measured as return on 
invested capital ROC.  Management ownership (M) significantly improves a firm’s 
gross profit margin PMG, supporting its positive effect on aligning the interests 
between management and owners. 
Unnamed individuals and families owners (D) are found to have negative interaction 
effects with ownership concentration on most firm performance measures, suggesting 
that when the direct controller is the founder, the impact of ownership concentration 
on firm performance is relatively weaker than with other identities of direct controller.  
A negative interaction effect is also found of management direct controllers (M), but 
only when performance is measured as gross profit margin PMG, indicating that when 
managers are also the direct controllers of the firm, the impact of ownership 
concentration on profit margin is weaker than other identities are the direct 
controllers.   
2.2  Effects of ultimate location of control 
Table 7.2 summarises the robust regression results of firm performance on ownership, 
controlling for ultimate owner identity effects.  No significant impact is found of 
founder owners (D and I).  It seems that the positive monitoring effects of founder 
owners only exist when they directly control the company.  Institutional investors 
have different impacts on firm performance:  
Banks (B) and financial companies (F) seem to be detrimental to market to book ratio 
MTB, while insurance companies (A) significantly improve a firm’s profit margin.  
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that pressure-sensitive institutions, like 
banks and financial companies, are more subject to management influence and less 
motivated to monitor a firm’s management; while pressure-insensitive institutions, 
such as insurance companies, are more independent to monitor management’s 
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Table 7.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for ultimate owner identity17 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
H -0.4268  -0.85  -0.1077  -0.77  -0.1208  -0.51  0.6825  1.83*  0.0157  0.02  -1.5271  -0.62  
A 0.0068  0.41  0.0061  0.25  0.0094  0.23  0.1883  2.13**  0.0347  0.23  -0.3673  -0.86  
B 0.0033  0.28  0.0054  0.33  0.0160  0.59  0.0135  0.31  -0.0390  -0.39  -0.5452  -1.90*  
C -0.0084  -1.12  -0.0190  -2.11**  -0.0014  -0.10  0.0246  1.02  -0.1046  -1.88*  -0.3093  -1.94*  
D -0.1393  -2.98***  0.3264  0.30  1.6595  0.91  1.1801  0.41  -0.6476  -1.45  -2.0138  -1.58  
E -0.0078  -0.88  -0.0128  -1.10  -0.0140  -0.72  0.0290  0.93  -0.0150  -0.21  0.0428  0.21  
F -0.0319  -1.58  -0.0492  -1.61  -0.0445  -0.86  -0.0506  -0.62  -0.3605  -1.91*  -1.1878  -2.20**  
I -0.0108  -1.11  -0.0179  -1.37  0.0122  0.56  -0.0068  -0.19  -0.1249  -1.55  -0.3373  -1.46  
J 0.0038  0.22  -0.0170  -0.66  -0.0204  -0.47  0.0248  0.36  -0.0901  -0.57  -0.6459  -1.42  
L -0.0085  -0.36  0.0102  0.29  0.0597  0.99  -0.0906  -0.84  -0.2649  -1.20  -0.0222  -0.04  
M 0.1482  0.96  0.0102  0.14  0.0035  0.03  0.0333  0.17  0.8551  1.84*  0.8815  0.66  
S -0.0214  -1.59  -0.0313  -1.59  -0.0388  -1.17  -0.0218  -0.42  -0.1789  -1.47  -0.7189  -2.07**  
Z -0.0367  -2.83***  -0.0589  -3.13*** -0.0546  -1.72*  -0.0738  -1.48  -0.3435  -2.96*** -0.9908  -2.98***  
A*H 0.3183  0.63  0.0028  0.02  -0.0114  -0.04  -2.2889  -1.53  -0.8568  -0.88  2.1310  0.76  
B*H 0.3918  0.78  0.0313  0.20  -0.0283  -0.11  -0.6354  -1.50  -0.3793  -0.38  1.9294  0.68  
C*H 0.4174  0.83  0.1175  0.83  0.1295  0.54  -0.7713  -2.05**  -0.1049  -0.12  1.4512  0.58  
D*H 0.9095  1.71*  -0.8465  -0.25  -4.8411  -0.84  -3.9803  -0.44  3.0548  1.61  9.8032  1.80*  
E*H 0.4049  0.80  0.0546  0.37  0.0373  0.15  -0.8195  -2.08**  -0.2969  -0.32  -0.1770  -0.07  
F*H 0.5908  1.14  0.3084  1.35  0.4427  1.15  -0.2720  -0.45  2.1240  1.51  8.5805  2.14**  
I*H 0.4124  0.82  0.0892  0.62  0.0697  0.29  -0.7110  -1.87*  -0.0705  -0.08  2.1491  0.85  
J*H 0.4265  0.84  0.1367  0.82  0.2395  0.86  -0.6983  -1.58  0.1200  0.12  2.6936  0.92  
L*H 0.3784  0.74  -0.0212  -0.11  -0.1668  -0.53  -0.5103  -0.99  0.1931  0.17  -0.4530  -0.14  
S*H 0.4332  0.86  0.1040  0.69  0.1329  0.52  -0.6010  -1.50  0.3448  0.37  1.7270  0.65  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                        
17 Ultimate owner identity indicator WH is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity. 
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Table 7.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for ultimate owner identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Z*H 0.4606  0.91  0.1768  1.21  0.2050  0.83  -0.5595  -1.44  0.4036  0.45  2.9726  1.15  
SizeTA-d 0.0044  1.42  0.0034  0.69  0.0180  2.18**  0.0604  4.55***  -0.0144  -0.48  -0.0440  -0.50  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0044  -1.31  -0.0075  -1.43  0.0006  0.07  -0.0395  -2.54**  -0.0614  -1.90*  0.0898  0.96  
Lev-d -0.0006  -3.97***  -0.0018  -8.09*** -0.0011  -3.12*** 0.0001  0.16  -0.0077  -5.72*** 0.0006  0.15  
(Lev-d)2 -2.47E-06 -0.66  8.42E-06 1.45  -4.50E-05 -4.61*** 2.33E-06 0.15  0.0003  7.71***  -0.0003  -2.63***  
IAInt -0.0150  -1.34  -0.0371  -2.12**  -0.0577  -1.96**  0.2317  4.94***  0.7406  6.85***  1.6097  5.21***  
Beta -0.0055  -2.92***  -0.0057  -1.91*  -0.0106  -2.13**  -0.0069  -0.85  -0.0163  -0.86  0.0408  0.78  
Constant 0.0747  10.91***  0.1193  16.02*** 0.1612  12.86*** 0.2267  11.30*** 0.6293  13.67*** 1.9041  14.45***  
F 2.75***  4.44***  3.35***  2.60***  4.99***  2.66***  
R-sq 0.12  0.18  0.14  0.12  0.20  0.12  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.14  0.10  0.07  0.16  0.07  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 0.0490  0.29  0.4638  1.73*  0.5082  1.13  -0.5861  -0.80  -0.0861  -0.05  -1.3132  -0.28  
A 0.0262  1.24  0.0470  1.43  0.0573  1.04  0.1037  0.64  0.1142  0.56  -0.4448  -0.76  
B 0.0144  0.85  0.0433  1.63  0.0569  1.28  -0.0382  -0.54  -0.0012  -0.01  -0.5250  -1.12  
C 0.0001  0.01  0.0082  0.41  0.0277  0.83  -0.0073  -0.14  -0.0903  -0.74  -0.4030  -1.15  
D -0.2482  -2.85***  -0.6724  -4.94*** 1.8361  0.93  -0.4611  -1.28  -1.3611  -1.62  -4.0389  -1.69*  
E 0.0025  0.18  0.0237  1.08  0.0297  0.81  -0.0011  -0.02  -0.0053  -0.04  0.1804  0.46  
F -0.0394  -1.33  -0.0433  -0.94  -0.0804  -1.04  -0.1325  -1.08  -0.2326  -0.82  -1.6463  -2.02**  
I -0.0012  -0.08  0.0125  0.52  0.0477  1.19  -0.0456  -0.71  -0.1231  -0.83  -0.5605  -1.33  
J 0.0119  0.50  0.0082  0.22  0.0018  0.03  -0.0300  -0.30  -0.1091  -0.47  -0.6691  -1.01  
L -0.0004  -0.01  0.0506  0.99  0.1266  1.48  -0.1316  -0.90  -0.4041  -1.29  -0.0668  -0.07  
M 0.0050  0.07  -0.1813  -1.62  -0.2071  -1.10  0.4366  1.44  0.8868  1.28  0.9005  0.45  
S -0.0159  -0.83  -0.0050  -0.17  -0.0181  -0.36  -0.1133  -1.42  -0.1954  -1.06  -0.7496  -1.42  
Z -0.0407  -1.95*  -0.0457  -1.40  -0.0481  -0.88  -0.1731  -2.00**  -0.4828  -2.41**  -1.3939  -2.43**  
A*C1 -0.1603  -0.90  -0.5711  -2.05**  -0.6477  -1.38  0.1734  0.14  -0.7557  -0.44  1.7880  0.36  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for ultimate owner identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
B*C1 -0.0823  -0.47  -0.5350  -1.94*  -0.6130  -1.32  0.6346  0.85  -0.2596  -0.15  1.1798  0.24  
C*C1 -0.0581  -0.34  -0.4511  -1.68*  -0.4937  -1.09  0.4964  0.68  -0.0259  -0.02  1.3558  0.28  
D*C1 0.6507  2.10***  1.4125  2.92***  -4.9879  -0.97  1.9962  1.54  4.4688  1.50  13.2484  1.55  
E*C1 -0.0718  -0.41  -0.5170  -1.90*  -0.5909  -1.30  0.4613  0.62  -0.1167  -0.07  -0.2752  -0.06  
F*C1 0.0771  0.40  -0.2922  -0.98  -0.1463  -0.29  0.8978  1.11  0.4821  0.26  6.0182  1.14  
I*C1 -0.0633  -0.37  -0.4775  -1.77*  -0.5489  -1.21  0.5532  0.75  0.0294  0.02  2.0926  0.44  
J*C1 -0.0513  -0.29  -0.4333  -1.55  -0.4087  -0.87  0.6003  0.79  0.2015  0.12  1.8759  0.38  
L*C1 -0.0835  -0.45  -0.5773  -1.97**  -0.7791  -1.59  0.6988  0.87  0.5394  0.30  -0.0587  -0.01  
S*C1 -0.0413  -0.24  -0.4591  -1.68  -0.4760  -1.04  0.7427  1.00  0.3311  0.20  1.3839  0.29  
Z*C1 -0.0059  -0.03  -0.3871  -1.42  -0.4048  -0.89  0.7672  1.04  0.6153  0.36  2.9203  0.60  
SizeTA-d 0.0046  1.46  0.0035  0.71  0.0187  2.27**  0.0577  4.34***  -0.0136  -0.45  -0.0498  -0.57  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0044  -1.30  -0.0068  -1.30  0.0011  0.12  -0.0389  -2.50*** -0.0638  -1.98**  0.0996  1.06  
Lev-d -0.0006  -3.94***  -0.0018  -8.03*** -0.0011  -3.11*** 0.0002  0.30  -0.0078  -5.78*** 0.0009  0.24  
(Lev-d)2 -2.50E-06 -0.67  8.22E-06 1.42  -4.52E-05 -4.64*** -5.74E-07 -0.04  0.0003  7.76***  -0.0003  -2.91***  
IAInt -0.0163  -1.44  -0.0398  -2.26**  -0.0593  -2.01**  0.2277  4.83***  0.7309  6.73***  1.5703  5.05***  
Beta -0.0056  -2.91***  -0.0056  -1.86*  -0.0108  -2.16**  -0.0068  -0.83  -0.0214  -1.12  0.0403  0.77  
Constant 0.0676  5.89****  0.0897  5.00***  0.1288  4.28***  0.2716  5.61***  0.6416  5.78***  1.9620  6.19***  
F 2.78***  5.61***  3.46***  2.48***  4.89***  2.66***  
R-sq 0.12  0.22  0.15  0.11  0.20  0.12  
Adj R-sq 0.08  0.18  0.10  0.07  016  0.07  
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as H_DIFF 
H-DIFF 2.1252  1.00  6.7635  2.06**  7.1411  1.30  13.4745  1.52  4.6909  0.23  63.8501  1.11  
A 0.0070  0.47  0.0110  0.48  0.0147  0.38  0.1025  1.32  -0.0290  -0.20  -0.2696  -0.66  
B 0.0092  0.98  0.0109  0.75  0.0336  1.38  0.0292  0.76  -0.0333  -0.37  -0.3561  -1.39  
C -0.0038  -0.66  -0.0100  -1.11  0.0080  0.53  0.0244  1.01  -0.1232  -2.22**  -0.2493  -1.57  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for ultimate owner identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
D -1.2102  -2.57**  -3.2247  -4.41*** (dropped)18  -2.6527  -1.37  -6.9566  -1.55  -21.2137  -1.66  
E -0.0030  -0.41  -0.0059  -0.51  -0.0061  -0.32  0.0324  1.06  -0.0256  -0.36  0.0583  0.29  
F -0.0070  -0.46  -0.0229  -0.96  -0.0147  -0.37  -0.0212  -0.34  -0.0925  -0.63  -0.4817  -1.16  
I -0.0060  -0.82  -0.0091  -0.80  0.0187  0.98  -0.0090  -0.30  -0.1366  -1.96*  -0.1515  -0.76  
J 0.0104  0.70  -0.0048  -0.21  -0.0019  -0.05  0.0323  0.53  -0.0914  -0.65  -0.5655  -1.40  
L -0.0206  -1.31  -0.0163  -0.67  0.0008  0.02  -0.0570  -0.82  -0.3160  -2.11**  -0.4874  -1.14  
M -0.1559  -0.86  -0.5874  -2.08**  -0.6284  -1.33  -0.8916  -1.17  0.4704  0.27  -4.9040  -0.99  
S -0.0110  -1.16  -0.0202  -1.37  -0.0271  -1.10  -0.0078  -0.20  -0.1145  -1.26  -0.5744  -2.22**  
Z -0.0255  -2.64***  -0.0379  -2.53**  -0.0296  -1.18  -0.0622  -1.57  -0.3171  -3.45*** -0.8036  -3.06***  
A*H-DIFF -2.2372  -1.06  -6.8788  -2.10**  -7.2786  -1.33  -13.1158  -1.23  -5.5181  -0.27  -62.8773  -1.09  
B*H-DIFF -2.1980  -1.04  -6.8686  -2.09**  -7.5854  -1.38  -13.4456  -1.52  -5.5778  -0.28  -65.0469  -1.13  
C*H-DIFF -2.1281  -1.01  -6.7390  -2.05**  -7.1111  -1.30  -13.5438  -1.53  -4.6959  -0.23  -63.7527  -1.11  
D*H-DIFF 105.4845  2.43**  277.6331  4.12***  (dropped)19  233.2252  1.31  628.5376  1.52  1861.8840 1.58  
E*H-DIFF -2.1379  -1.01  -6.8090  -2.08**  -7.2233  -1.32  -13.6144  -1.54  -5.0070  -0.25  -65.8151  -1.15  
F*H-DIFF -2.0088  -0.95  -6.5370  -1.99*  -6.6544  -1.21  -12.8663  -1.45  -5.1298  -0.25  -56.6666  -0.98  
I*H-DIFF -2.1394  -1.01  -6.7860  -2.07**  -7.1954  -1.31  -13.4510  -1.52  -4.6982  -0.23  -63.3139  -1.10  
J*H-DIFF -2.1256  -1.00  -6.7308  -2.05**  -6.9973  -1.28  -13.4734  -1.52  -4.4148  -0.22  -61.8909  -1.08  
L*H-DIFF -2.0635  -0.97  -6.7641  -2.06**  -7.2470  -1.32  -13.1558  -1.48  -3.2610  -0.16  -64.0040  -1.11  
S*H-DIFF -2.1371  -1.01  -6.7773  -2.07**  -7.1202  -1.30  -13.3387  -1.50  -4.4168  -0.22  -63.7598  -1.11  
Z*H-DIFF -2.0889  -0.99  -6.6942  -2.04**  -7.0571  -1.29  -13.2832  -1.50  -4.0808  -0.20  -61.9322  -1.08  
SizeTA-d 0.0038  1.22  0.0027  0.55  0.0170  2.10**  0.0591  4.48***  -0.0164  -0.55  -0.0501  -0.58  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0041  -1.22  -0.0072  -1.37  -0.0002  -0.03  -0.0369  -2.39**  -0.0610  -1.90*  0.0922  0.99  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.72***  -0.0017  -7.91*** -0.0011  -2.92*** 0.0002  0.27  -0.0075  -5.56*** 0.0012  0.32  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
                                                        
18 Stata drops this variable due to its dependency on some other independent variables.   
19 As above. 
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Table 7.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for ultimate owner identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
(Lev-d)2 -2.63E-06 -0.70  7.98E-06 1.38  -4.53E-05 -4.68*** -4.02E-07 -0.03  0.0003  7.76***  -0.0003  -2.83***  
IAInt -0.0159  -1.41  -0.0414  -2.36**  -0.0635  -2.17**  0.2252  4.80***  0.7333  6.78***  1.5657  5.08***  
Beta -0.0054  -2.84***  -0.0058  -1.95*  -0.0098  -1.98*  -0.0066  -0.82  -0.0191  -1.01  0.0428  0.82  
Constant 0.0680  12.73***  0.1098  13.25*** 0.1495  10.80*** 0.2154  9.77***  0.6261  12.29*** 1.8035  12.39***  
F 2.56***  5.56***  3.72***  2.48***  4.89***  2.77***  
R-sq 0.11  0.22  0.15  0.11  0.20  0.12  
Adj R-sq 0.07  0.18  0.11  0.07  0.16  0.08  
Panel D  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV -0.0113  -0.27  -0.0218  -0.34  -0.0203  -0.19  0.3246  1.89*  0.0044  0.01  -0.7097  -0.62  
A 0.0218  1.19  0.0151  0.53  0.0229  0.47  -0.0027  -0.02  0.1016  0.57  -0.3619  -0.72  
B 0.0103  0.85  0.0102  0.53  0.0096  0.30  0.0217  0.43  -0.0246  -0.21  -0.4199  -1.25  
C -0.0072  -1.07  -0.0227  -2.15**  -0.0060  -0.33  0.0317  1.13  -0.1470  -2.24**  -0.4879  -2.62***  
D 0.2923  2.43**  0.7449  3.97***  0.0212  0.20  0.7466  1.50  1.9740  1.70*  5.4472  1.65*  
E -0.0029  -0.33  -0.0101  -0.75  -0.0117  -0.52  0.0581  1.62  -0.0080  -0.10  0.1145  0.48  
F -0.0110  -0.73  -0.0323  -1.38  -0.0358  -0.90  -0.0105  -0.17  -0.1298  -0.89  -0.4440  -1.07  
I -0.0093  -0.99  -0.0241  -1.63  0.0006  0.03  -0.0432  -1.10  -0.1234  -1.35  -0.5929  -2.11**  
J -0.0050  -0.29  -0.0352  -1.31  -0.0368  -0.81  0.0344  0.48  -0.2449  -1.47  -0.5518  -1.16  
L -0.0281  -1.72*  -0.0336  -1.32  -0.0275  -0.64  -0.0298  -0.42  -0.3233  -2.05**  -0.6674  -1.49  
M 0.0247  0.58  -0.0153  -0.23  -0.0272  -0.24  0.1349  0.77  0.8500  2.08**  0.6611  0.57  
S -0.0215  -1.98**  -0.0351  -2.08**  -0.0387  -1.35  -0.0114  -0.25  -0.0804  -0.77  -0.5795  -1.94**  
Z -0.0248  -1.63  -0.0322  -1.36  -0.0059  -0.15  0.0056  0.09  -0.2319  -1.58  -0.4758  -1.14  
A* SV -0.0797  -1.42  -0.0617  -0.71  -0.0900  -0.61  0.5536  0.77  -0.6718  -1.24  0.9244  0.60  
B* SV -0.0118  -0.25  -0.0198  -0.27  -0.0118  -0.09  -0.2922  -1.47  -0.1760  -0.38  0.3983  0.30  
C* SV 0.0111  0.27  0.0302  0.46  0.0296  0.27  -0.3455  -2.00**  0.0233  0.06  0.8968  0.78  
(continued on next page)  Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book 
ratio of equity; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second 
and third largest shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation 
from mean; A, insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more 
known individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, 
general public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of firm performance controlling for ultimate owner identity (continued) 
 ROA  ROC  ROE  PMG  TQ  MTB  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
D* SV -1.7080  -2.68***  -4.5259  -4.56*** (dropped)20  -4.0624  -1.54  -10.3629  -1.68*  -29.5470  -1.69*  
E* SV 0.0015  0.03  0.0001  0.00  -0.0074  -0.06  -0.3974  -2.22**  -0.0960  -0.23  -0.0036  0.00  
F* SV 0.0216  0.50  0.0397  0.59  0.0675  0.59  -0.2838  -1.58  0.0094  0.02  1.0708  0.90  
I* SV 0.0083  0.20  0.0222  0.34  0.0148  0.13  -0.2717  -1.55  -0.0282  -0.07  1.2610  1.08  
J*SV 0.0303  0.67  0.0598  0.85  0.0826  0.70  -0.3232  -1.73*  0.3055  0.70  0.8626  0.70  
L* SV 0.0224  0.51  0.0299  0.44  0.0275  0.24  -0.3175  -1.74*  0.1311  0.31  0.7343  0.61  
S* SV 0.0169  0.40  0.0245  0.37  0.0249  0.22  -0.2945  -1.68*  -0.0074  -0.02  0.5825  0.50  
Z* SV 0.0158  0.37  0.0221  0.33  0.0084  0.07  -0.3404  -1.90*  0.0273  0.07  0.6951  0.59  
SizeTA-d 0.0049  1.58  0.0037  0.77  0.0173  2.10**  0.0586  4.42***  -0.0089  -0.30  -0.0438  -0.50  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0051  -1.53  -0.0081  -1.55  -0.0011  -0.12  -0.0362  -2.32**  -0.0655  -2.02**  0.1061  1.13  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.16***  -0.0018  -8.22*** -0.0012  -3.27*** 0.0002  0.31  -0.0080  -5.94*** 0.0005  0.12  
(Lev-d)2 -2.22E-06 -0.60  8.61E-06 1.49  -4.42E-05 -4.51*** 3.24E-07 0.02  0.0003  7.75***  -0.0003  -2.55**  
IAInt -0.0167  -1.49  -0.0387  -2.21**  -0.0611  -2.07**  0.2234  4.76***  0.7187  6.62***  1.6032  5.18***  
Beta -0.0053  -2.83***  -0.0054  -1.84*  -0.0090  -1.80*  -0.0071  -0.89  -0.0185  -0.98  0.0428  0.82  
Constant 0.0715  12.89***  0.1197  13.83*** 0.1606  10.97*** 0.2126  9.18***  0.6360  11.85*** 1.9223  12.58***  
F 2.67***  5.38***  3.17***  2.64***  4.74***  2.59***  
R-sq 0.12  0.21  0.13  0.12  0.19  0.11  
Adj R-sq 0.07  0.17  0.09  0.07  0.15  0.07  
Number of 
Observations 
640  640  638  631  637  636  
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; ROC, return on invested capital ratio; ROE, return on equity ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; MTB, market to book ratio of equity; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; H_DIFF, sum of squares of the differences between the largest and second largest shareholdings, and between the second and third largest 
shareholdings; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean; A, 
insurance; B, banks; C, industrial companies; D, unnamed individuals or families; E, mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees; F, financial companies; I, one of more known 
individuals or families; J, foundations/research institutes; L, bulk lists of companies and private owners; M, employees/managers/directors; S, public authorities, states, governments; Z, general 
public (only applies to publicly listed companies).  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
                                                        
20 As above. 
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performance.  The negative impact of banks and financial company owners may also 
due to their short-term profit-seeking goals.  Arguably they tend to make money 
from market price fluctuations within their investment portfolio rather than from 
improving firms’ performance.   
This negative result is inconsistent with the traditional hypothesis of a positive impact 
from financial institutional investors (Brickley et al., 1988; Steiner, 1996; Han and 
Suk, 1998; and Woidtke, 2002).  Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find that financial 
institutional ownership is generally associated with high market-to-book values in 
Europe during the period 1990—1995.  They argue that institutional investors are 
relatively wealthy and have a relatively strong preference for shareholder value and 
portfolio diversification.  It must be noted that the data samples of previous studies 
are much earlier than the base year of 2004 in this study.  Therefore it seems that 
financial institution owners have deviated from their old monitoring role on firm’s 
management and become game players as ultimate controllers. 
The regressions also find a significant negative impact of governments (S) as ultimate 
owners on market-to-book ratio MTB, supporting the non-profit-maximizing goal of 
government owners.  Management controllers (M) are found to significantly improve 
Tobin’s Q, supporting its positive effect on aligning the interests between management 
and owners.  Some significant negative results are found from non-financial 
corporate owners (C), though only in a couple of regressions.  This indicates a 
potential negative impact from non-financial corporate owners and supporting the 
theory that they will extract relatively high private benefit than the other owner 
identities.  
When the firm is ultimately controlled by institutional investors (A, B and E), the 
impact of ownership on firm performance is weaker than with other ultimate owner 
identities.  Some significant interaction effects are also found of founder owner (D) 
and financial companies (F), but their signs are inconsistent on different firm 
performance measures.  
The results for control variables are similar to those in previous chapters.  An 
inverted-bell shaped impact is found of size on gross profit margin PMG, while 
leverage seems to have a bell-shaped impact on firm performance.  The impact of 
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intangible assets is different on different measures of performance.  Intangible assets 
ratio improves firm performance measured as gross profit margin PMG, Tobin’s Q and 
market-to-book ratio MTB, but is detrimental for the accounting calculation of return 
on invested capital ROC.  Systematic risk Beta seems to have a significant negative 
impact on accounting rates of return ROA, ROC and ROE, which strongly supports 
the risk-incentive trade-off theory.   
3  Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the effects of owner identity on firm performance, and how 
the degree and location of control interact to affect firm performance.  The location 
of control is differentiated by direct and ultimate locations of control and investigated 
separately.  The models are set up by including owner identity dummies and their 
interaction variables with ownership concentration variables.   
Firm performance is found to be significantly affected by owner identities, and the 
impacts of some owner identities as the direct controllers of companies are different 
from those as the ultimate controllers.  Founder owners are found to have an efficient 
monitoring impact on management and are able to improve firm performance when 
they control the company directly.  However, when they are the ultimate owners of 
the company, this impact disappears.  Mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / 
trustees owners seem to be detrimental for firm performance when they are the direct 
controllers of the firm.  This impact disappears when they are the ultimate owners.  
No significant impact is found from banks, financial companies and insurance 
companies when they are the direct controllers of the firm.  However, they affect 
firm performance significantly when they are the ultimate owners.  The short-term 
profit-seeking goals of modern banks and financial companies seem to be detrimental 
for the companies they invest in, while insurance companies seem to have more 
efficient monitoring effects over managements.  Direct and ultimate government 
controls are both found to be detrimental for firm performance due to their political 
rather than profit-maximizing goals.  A consistent positive impact is found of direct 
and ultimate management control, confirming its interest alignment effect.  
Non-financial corporate owners extract more private benefit than the other owners if 
they are the ultimate owners. 
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This chapter also confirms the interaction effects of degree and location of control.  
The impact of ownership concentration on performance is conditioned by the 
identities of their controllers.  Direct controller identities have different interaction 
effects from that of ultimate controller identities.  When the company is directly 
controlled by the founder, the impact of ownership concentration on performance is 
weaker, while when ultimately controlled, the sign of the effect is not clear.  
Additionally, direct management control and ultimate financial institution control may 
cause the impact of ownership concentration less efficient. 
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Chapter Eight  Testing the Inverse Causality and Endogeneity of 
Ownership and Firm Performance 
Chapter Five investigates the linear impact of various ownership concentration 
measures on various firm performance measures.  OLS regressions are tested and 
verified.  The robust regressions find a significant negative impact of ownership 
concentration measures on firm performance.  This impact is found to be conditioned 
by country and industry.  Chapter Six carries out quadratic and piecewise regressions 
to capture the potential non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance.  Multiple turning points of the non-linear impact are found.  Chapter 
Seven examines the effects of owner identity on firm performance, and its interaction 
effects with ownership concentration.  Firm performance is found to be significantly 
affected by owner identities, and the impact of an owner identity as the direct 
controller is different from that as the ultimate controller.  Some significant 
interaction effects of owner identities and ownership concentration are also found. 
The empirical tests in this study so far treat ownership as exogenous.  However, 
performance could be a determinant of ownership concentration as well as being 
determined by it.  Performance and ownership could be jointly determined by some 
unobserved variables.  In this case, ownership and performance are endogenous 
variables and reduced-form regressions generate inconsistent estimates.  If there is 
endogeneity, the instrumental variables estimation and simultaneous equations 
systems should be able to provide consistent estimates. 
The first section of this chapter investigates the inverse impact of firm performance on 
ownership concentration, and the impacts of other determinants of ownership 
concentration.  The second section tests the endogeneity of ownership and 
performance by controlling for instrumental variables effect. And testing a 
simultaneous equations system with two-stage least squares.  The final section 
concludes.  
1  Testing the inverse causality of performance on ownership concentration 
1.1  Determinants of ownership concentration 
Firm performance could be a direct determinant of ownership structure, especially in 
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takeovers when the target firm’s ownership structure is decided by the takeover 
owners.  The inverse impact of performance on ownership structure is expected to be 
lagged since it takes time for ownership structure to adjust.  Therefore, I add 
performance variables for 4 years before the year of ownership data. 
Size and leverage are argued to be potential determinants of ownership structure.  
Firm size is expected to affect ownership structure due to higher cost of capital or risk 
associated with larger firms.  The larger is the firm, the larger is the firm’s capital 
resources and the greater is the market value of a given fraction of ownership.  This 
means higher market price of a given fraction of ownership.  A certain amount of 
capital can purchase a less fraction of ownership in large firms than in small firms.  
For risk-neutral investors, this means to purchase smaller fractions of ownership in 
larger firms; for risk-aversion investors, this discourages them from attempting to 
purchase more shares in larger firms.  Therefore the degree of ownership is expected 
to be less concentrated in larger firms. 
Other than shareholders, debt holders also exert a considerate amount of control over 
management actions in modern large public corporations.  The way in which 
corporations raise finance may have potential significant influence on firm 
performance.  So ownership structure may affect firm performance indirectly 
through its effect on firm capital structure.  The inclusion of financial leverage as a 
control variable may reflect the possibility that creditors provide some of the 
monitoring of management that otherwise would have come from equity holders, in 
other words, capital structure could be a substitute government mechanism for 
ownership structure.  Therefore the higher is the financial leverage, the less 
concentrated we would expect the shareholder ownership to be. 
Capital intensity and market power might also be significant determinants of 
ownership structure.  Investments in fixed capital are observable and more easily 
monitored, so firms with a greater concentration of fixed or “hard” capital in their 
inputs will generally require a lower degree of ownership concentration.  Market 
power is the free cash flow available for distribution among all securities holders of 
the firms.  High free cash flow is desirable to shareholders.  Therefore it is expected 
that the higher is a firm’s free cash flow, the more concentrated is the shareholder 
ownership. 
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Therefore, ownership concentration can be described in the following model: 
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where performance, performance03, performance02, performance01 and 
performance00 are the performance values in the years of 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001 and 
2000, respectively.  Data for all other variables are from the year of 2004.  The 
Herfindahl index (H), the largest shareholding (C1), and the Shapley value (SV) are 
representatives of ownership concentration; the return on assets ratio (ROA), gross 
profit margin (PMG) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) are representatives of firm performance; 
SizeTA is the log of total assets; Lev is the long term debt to total assets ratio; CInt is 
capital intensity and FCF is free cash flow.  Table 8.1 summarises descriptive 
statistics of the determinants of ownership concentration. 
Table 8.1  Descriptive statistics of determinants of ownership concentration 
 N Min Max Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Median 
ROA 655 -0.31  0.35  0.06  0.06  0.13  9.42  0.05  
ROA03 655 -0.55  0.31  0.04  0.07  -2.44  21.60  0.04  
ROA02 655 -1.09  0.25  0.04  0.09  -6.25  66.60  0.04  
ROA01 655 -0.39  0.45  0.05  0.06  -0.76  12.71  0.05  
ROA00 655 -0.40  0.57  0.07  0.06  0.67  21.86  0.06  
PMG 646 -0.04  0.95  0.26  0.18  1.00  3.84  0.23  
PMG03 644 -0.04  0.93  0.26  0.18  1.06  3.97  0.22  
PMG02 643 -0.13  0.91  0.25  0.18  1.05  4.11  0.22  
PMG01 636 -0.68  0.95  0.25  0.18  0.83  5.02  0.21  
PMG00 629 -4.53  0.97  0.25  0.26  -9.06  169.95  0.23  
TQ 652 0.02  6.36  0.86  0.73  2.65  13.45  0.65  
TQ03 647 0.02  6.77  0.75  0.72  3.25  18.69  0.53  
TQ02 643 0.01  6.32  0.68  0.71  3.26  18.22  0.48  
TQ01 631 0.01  9.66  0.87  1.07  3.99  24.07  0.57  
TQ00 614 0.02  17.12  1.15  1.64  4.42  29.59  0.63  
SizeTA 655 4.69  9.11  6.59  0.61  0.59  3.22  6.49  
Lev 655 0.00  0.71  0.19  0.14  0.79  3.71  0.17  
CInt 652 0.05  1.46  0.55  0.17  -0.09  3.81  0.58  
FCF 504 2.06  8.12  5.26  0.84  0.13  3.84  5.20  
1.2  Regression results 
Firm performance could be a direct determinant of ownership concentration and the 
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impact of performance on ownership could lag for several years to take effects.  The 
iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions are carried out to control the impacts 
of influential outliers, and mitigate the non-normality and heteroskedasticity issues in 
residuals.  Table 8.2 presents the regression results.   
No significant impact of current performance on ownership concentration is found in  
Table 8.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of ownership 
concentration 
 H  C1  SV  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A Firm performance measured as ROA 
ROA -0.1796  -1.05 -0.2749 -1.16 -0.5095  -1.07  
ROA03 0.1640  0.94 0.1157 0.48 0.2784  0.57  
ROA02 0.0191  0.17 0.1322 0.85 0.2756  0.88  
ROA01 0.0689  0.44 -0.0105 -0.05 -0.1117  -0.26  
ROA00 -0.3701  -2.89*** -0.5207 -2.93*** -0.8979  -2.51**
SizeTA 0.0269  1.38 0.0062 0.23 0.0270  0.50  
Lev -0.1739  -2.48** -0.2537 -2.61*** -0.4296  -2.19**
CInt 0.0775  1.38 0.0888 1.14 0.1541  0.98  
FCF 0.0181  1.25 0.0417 2.07** 0.0738  1.81*  
Constant -0.1044  -1.13 0.0898 0.70 0.0022  0.01  
F 3.35***  3.34***  2.78***  
R2 0.06  0.06  0.05  
Adjusted R2 0.04  0.04  0.03  
No. of obs. 504  504  504  
Panel B Firm performance measured as PMG 
PMG -0.1830  -1.14 -0.0935 -0.43 -0.0678  -0.15  
PMG03 0.1664  0.73 -0.0317 -0.10 -0.2866  -0.45  
PMG02 0.0650  0.32 0.2031 0.73 0.4048  0.72  
PMG01 0.0540  0.43 0.0688 0.40 0.1167  0.33  
PMG00 -0.1971  -1.90* -0.3186 -2.24** -0.4484  -1.56  
SizeTA 0.0394  1.97** 0.0166 0.60 0.0370  0.67  
Lev -0.1678  -2.36** -0.2367 -2.42** -0.3921  -1.98** 
CInt 0.1116  1.84* 0.1258 1.51 0.1957  1.17  
FCF 0.0124  0.86 0.0368 1.85* 0.0716  1.79*  
Constant -0.1711  -1.76* 0.0295 0.22 -0.0768  -0.29  
F 2.83***  2.79***  2.13**  
R2 0.05  0.05  0.04  
Adjusted R2 0.03  0.03  0.02  
No. of obs. 484  484  484  
Panel C Firm performance measured as TQ 
TQ -0.0424  -1.56 -0.0590 -1.54 -0.1075  -1.41  
TQ03 0.0624  2.00** 0.0813 1.85* 0.1400  1.60  
TQ02 -0.0398  -1.47 -0.0484 -1.27 -0.0623  -0.82  
(continued on next page) 
Notes: ROA, return on assets ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the 
largest shareholding; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, Log(total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; CInt, total 
capital/total assets; FCF, free cash flow.  -1, -2, -3 and -4 indicate the last one, two, three and four years 
respectively.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 8.2  Iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions of ownership 
concentration (continued) 
 H  C1  SV  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
TQ01 0.0065  0.33 0.0026 0.10 -0.0037  -0.07  
TQ00 -0.0034  -0.39 -0.0079 -0.65 -0.0139  -0.58  
SizeTA 0.0152  0.74 -0.0131 -0.46 -0.0122  -0.21  
Lev -0.1464  -2.04** -0.2315 -2.29** -0.3619  -1.79* 
CInt 0.0505  0.86 0.0397 0.48 0.0749  0.46  
FCF 0.0229  1.55 0.0502 2.40** 0.0918  2.20** 
Constant -0.0552  -0.56 0.1804 1.30 0.1602  0.58  
F 2.65***  2.78***  2.24**  
R2 0.05  0.05  0.04  
Adjusted R2 0.03  0.03  0.02  
No. of obs. 476  476  476  
Notes: ROA, return on assets ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the 
largest shareholding; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, Log(total assets); Lev, long term debt/total assets; CInt, total 
capital/total assets; FCF, free cash flow.  -1, -2, -3 and -4 indicate the last one, two, three and four years 
respectively.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
any of the regressions.  However, the past years’ firm performance variables are 
found to have a significant impact on current ownership concentration.  The 
accounting return on assets (ROA) and profit margin (PMG) four years ago have a 
significant negative impact on current ownership, while last year’s Tobin’s Q has a  
significant positive impact on current year’s ownership.  This indicates that firm 
performance does have impacts on ownership structure, but the impact needs years to 
take effect.  For ROA and PMG, the lag of the impact could be four years, or even 
longer.  Their negative impacts suggest that firms with better accounting rate of 
return or profit  
margin in the past tend to have more dispersed ownership.  Tobin’s Q has a more 
immediate impact on ownership concentration.  It has a positive impact on the next 
year’s ownership concentration, suggesting that firms with higher Tobin’s Q tend to 
have more concentrated ownership in the immediate following year.  This sign of 
impact is contrary to that of ROA and PMG.  The reason might be that ROA and 
PMG are accounting rates of return, which are backward-looking.  The fact that there 
is a four year lag for them to have effects on ownership indicates that shareholders 
who favour accounting rates of return care more about past performance of the firm.  
The decrease in ownership concentration caused by better past accounting rates of 
return could be explained as that small investors are more interested in the past 
performance of the firm.  Tobin’s Q measures investors’ expectations for the future 
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profitability of the firm.  It reveals both economic and market performance of the 
firm in recent periods.  The increase in ownership concentration with higher last 
year’s Tobin’s Q suggests that large shareholders are more interested in the more 
recent performance measures.  
Very little significant result is found of size (SizeTA) and capital intensity (CInt) on 
ownership concentration.  On the contrary, leverage is found to be significant in all 
regressions, suggesting that it is a strong determinant of ownership concentration.  
The impact of leverage is negative, indicating that capital structure could be a 
substitute corporate governance mechanism for ownership concentration.  Free cash 
flow (FCF) is revealed to have a significant positive impact on the largest 
shareholding (C1) and the power of multiple large shareholders (SV), confirming that 
stronger market power is desirable to shareholders. 
2 Testing the endogeneity of ownership and performance 
2.1  Instrumental variables estimation 
The studies so far have modelled and tested single causalities between ownership and 
performance.  However, ownership and performance can be jointly determined by 
some unobserved variables.  Therefore, reduced-form regressions will generate 
inconsistent estimates if the dependent variable performance and independent variable 
ownership are endogenously determined.  It can be tested by controlling instrumental 
variables, which are highly correlated with ownership concentration and uncorrelated 
with the error term in the equation.   
The first section of this chapter has discussed the determinants of ownership 
concentration, including size, leverage, capital intensity and market power.  
Observed firm characteristics, such as size and leverage, are natural instruments for 
the test, since it is very possible that portions of the variability of both firm 
performance and ownership structure are jointly determined by them.  However, 
strictly speaking the instruments should be correlated with ownership structure, but 
not correlated with firm performance unless indirectly through its impact on 
ownership structure.  In other words, instrumental variables should be “outside” the 
system.  Therefore firm characteristics are not the best candidates for instruments.  
Capital intensity and market power are not direct determinants of firm performance, 
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while they might be significant determinants of ownership structure.  Therefore in 
this study they are chosen as the instruments to test the endogeneity of ownership. 
Table 8.3 compares the results of robust regressions, as found in Chapter Five, and the 
results of 2SLS using capital intensity and free cash flow as instrumental variables.  
The table also presents the Hausman test results for the hypothesis that the robust 
regressions estimators are not consistent.  All the Hausman tests are insignificant, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the robust regressions estimators are inconsistent.  
Therefore there seems no endogeneity of ownership and performance. 
However, it should be noted that the Hausman test is based on the assumption that the 
instrumental-variance estimation is always consistent.  Although the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the robust regression estimation is found consistent, the estimations for 
ownership concentration variables C1 and SV are significantly different between the 
2SLS and robust regressions.  The 2SLS regressions find significantly positive 
coefficients for C1 and SV, while the robust regressions generate negative coefficients.  
This could be due to the non-normality and heteroskedasticity in the residuals, and 
influential outliers in the data, as the violations of the OLS assumptions found in 
Chapter Five.  Another potential reason is that the non-linear impact of ownership on 
performance, as found in Chapter Six, has caused deficiency in the model. 
2.2  Two-equation simultaneous system 
The instrumental-variables estimations reject the endogeneity of ownership and 
performance.  However, the Hausman tests might not be reliable due to violations of 
the assumptions or deficiency in the model.  To further investigate the endogeneity 
of ownership and performance, a simultaneous equation model is built by combining 
single causality models.  In the following simultaneous equation systems, ownership 
structure and firm performance are treated as endogenous variable, with performance 
during past years, size, leverage, intensity of intangible assets, risk, capital intensity 
and free cash flow as exogenous variables.  The two equation system is as follows: 
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Table 8.3  Hausman tests of robust and 2SLS regressions of firm performance 
 ROA PMG TQ 
 Robust  2SLS  Robust  2SLS  Robust  2SLS  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
H -0.0183  -2.55***  1.5225 1.46 -0.0457  -1.53  3.2955 1.33 -0.1478  -2.10** 15.9284 1.44  
SizeTA-d 0.0023  0.78  -0.0516 -1.08 0.0606  4.81*** -0.0374 -0.36 -0.0160  -0.54  -0.5971 -1.18  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.71*  -0.0007 -0.02 -0.0415  -2.74*** -0.0134 -0.16 -0.0770  -2.41** -0.1031 -0.30  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.06***  0.0024 0.89 -0.0002  -0.37  0.0058 0.93 -0.0077  -5.74*** 0.0176 0.61  
(Lev-d)2 -2.2E-06 -0.59  -3.32E-05 -0.41 0.0001  2.22**  -0.42E-04 -0.24 0.0003  7.58*** 0.0001 0.17  
IAInt -0.0140  -1.28  0.0613 0.50 0.2241  4.96*** 0.3426 1.33 0.7280  6.80*** 1.4810 1.15  
Beta -0.0060  -3.27***  0.0006 0.03 -0.0088  -1.15  -0.0052 -0.11 -0.0234  -1.27  0.1376 0.62  
Constant 0.0678  19.37***  -0.2480 -1.11 0.2332  15.37*** -0.4252 -0.82 0.5816  16.88*** -2.6208 -1.11  
F 7.06***  0.44  9.01***  0.52  16.20***  0.44  
Hausman test 
chi2(6) 
2.38    2.08    2.99    
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
C1 -0.0177  -2.70***  0.9377 2.16** -0.0421  -1.55  1.6501 1.94* -0.1682  -2.63*** 9.9817 2.12**  
SizeTA-d 0.0024  0.79  -0.0361 -1.31 0.0606  4.81*** 0.0040 0.08 -0.0143  -0.49  -0.4420 -1.48  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0056  -1.71*  -0.0063 -0.28 -0.0412  -2.72*** -0.0395 -0.82 -0.0765  -2.40** -0.1613 -0.67  
Lev-d -0.0006  -4.07***  0.0012 0.88 -0.0002  -0.34  0.0024 0.90 -0.0078  -5.79*** 0.0055 0.36  
(Lev-d)2 -2.1E-06 -0.58  1.84E-06 0.04 0.0001  2.20**  3.57E-05 0.37 0.0003  7.62*** 0.0005 0.92  
IAInt -0.0148  -1.36  0.0328 0.42 0.2242  4.97*** 0.2790 1.93 0.7238  6.79*** 1.1942 1.42  
Beta -0.0061  -3.34***  0.0012 0.08 -0.0089  -1.16  -0.0007 -0.02 -0.0248  -1.35  0.1454 0.93  
Constant 0.0703  18.04**  -0.2479 -1.64 0.2378  14.22*** -0.3005 -1.03 0.6087  15.96*** -2.6791 -1.64  
F 7.34***  0.95  9.04***  1.29  16.65***  1.26  
Hausman test 
chi2(6) 
5.24    4.90    6.53    
(continued on next page) 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); 
Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 8.3  Hausman tests of robust and 2SLS regressions of firm performance (continued) 
 ROA PMG TQ 
 Robust  2SLS  Robust  2SLS  Robust  2SLS  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
SV -0.0038  -1.39  0.3544 2.42** -0.0096  -0.86  0.6020 2.17** -0.0464  -1.74*  3.7741 2.37**  
SizeTA-d 0.0022  0.74  -0.0253 -1.15 0.0600  4.75*** 0.0192 0.46 -0.0143  -0.49  -0.3277 -1.38  
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0058  -1.78*  -0.0008 -0.04 -0.0411  -2.71*** -0.0370 -0.87 -0.0795  -2.49** -0.1028 -0.47  
Lev-d -0.0005  -3.93***  -3.1E-05 -0.03 -0.0001  -0.23  0.0003 0.15 -0.0074  -5.56*** -0.0079 -0.77  
(Lev-d)2 -2.3E-06 -0.61  2.63E-05 0.58 0.0001  2.21**  0.0001 0.85 0.0003  7.51*** 0.0008 1.56  
IAInt -0.0138  -1.25  0.0328 0.47 0.2248  4.98*** 0.2896 2.23** 0.7227  6.77*** 1.1941 1.59  
Beta -0.0061  -3.30***  -0.0023 -0.19 -0.0087  -1.13  -0.0034 -0.14 -0.0234  -1.27  0.1081 0.80  
Constant 0.0664  18.19***  -0.1510 -1.58 0.2288  14.69*** -0.1198 -0.67 0.5800  16.33*** -1.6484 -1.60  
F 6.30***  1.19  8.77***  1.63  15.53***  1.58  
Hausman test 
chi2(6) 
6.47    6.09    8.16    
Number of 
observations 
640  491  630  485  637  491  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); 
Lev, long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; -d, deviation from mean.  *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 8.4 shows 2SLS results of simultaneous systems on different ownership 
structure measures and different firm performance measures.  All ownership 
concentration measures are found to have significant impacts on current firm 
performance.  For performance measured as ROA, the coefficients of the impact 
are positive, while for other performance measures PMG and TQ, the coefficients are 
negative.  This contradicting result might be caused by the non-linear hypothesis 
discussed in Chapter Six.  No significant impact from current firm performance on 
ownership concentration is found.  However, significant negative impacts are found 
of ROA00 (the ROA value in the year of 2000) on current ownership concentration 
variables H and C1.  This result is consistent with the single causality result in 
section one.  It confirms that accounting rates of return negatively affects the 
ownership concentration degree after four years time. 
3  Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the inverse impact of firm performance on ownership 
concentration and tests the endogeneity of ownership and performance.  Current 
performance and ownership might be jointly affected by some unobserved variables, 
and therefore current performance could seem to affect ownership concentration as 
well as being determined by it.  Past firm performance might also affect ownership 
concentration.  Size could affect ownership concentration negatively due to higher 
cost of capital associated with larger firms.  Leverage might have a negative impact 
on ownership concentration as a substitute corporate governance mechanism.  
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Table 8.4  2SLS results of simultaneous systems of different ownership structure 
measures and firm performance measures 
Performance ROA  PMG  TQ  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
Panel A  Continuous ownership concentration as H 
Equation 1       
H 0.3008 1.99** -1.8389 -3.36*** -6.3956 -2.38** 
SizeTA-d -0.0080 -0.85 0.1296 2.98*** 0.1916 1.16 
(SizeTA-d)2  -0.0060 -0.73 -0.0799 -1.7* -0.1893 -1.28 
Lev-d -0.0003 -0.6 -0.0053 -2.48** -0.0322 -3.65*** 
(Lev-d)2 4.89E-06 0.25 0.0001 1.15 0.0009 2.56** 
IAInt -0.0106 -0.37 0.0891 0.63 0.0874 0.16 
Beta -0.0061 -1.18 -0.0068 -0.26 0.0125 0.13 
Constant 0.0102 0.31 0.6432 5.29*** 2.0872 3.56*** 
F 2.63**  2.3**  2.45**  
Equation 2       
Performance 1.7708 0.98 0.8402 0.41 -0.0244 -0.32 
Performance03 -0.7255 -1 -0.9607 -0.49 0.0418 0.62 
Performance02 0.1932 1.17 0.2964 0.99 -0.0371 -1.01 
Performance01 -0.1132 -0.44 0.1405 0.73 0.0042 0.16 
Performance00 -0.4000 -1.96* -0.4337 -1.43 -0.0074 -0.66 
SizeTA 0.0529 1.06 0.0099 0.35 -0.0034 -0.11 
Lev -0.0789 -0.46 -0.1970 -1.86* -0.2276 -2.47** 
CInt -0.0115 -0.1 0.0840 0.89 0.0470 0.62 
FCF -0.0170 -0.41 0.0211 1.14 0.0286 1.38 
Constant -0.0865 -0.47 0.0412 0.3 0.1103 0.74 
F 1.67*  2.19**  1.73*  
No. of obs. 491  475  467  
Panel B  Continuous ownership concentration as C1 
Equation 1       
C1 0.2040 2.43** -1.2224 -3.67*** -2.4309 -2.25** 
SizeTA-d -0.0057 -0.76 0.1145 3.45*** 0.0713 0.78 
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0071 -1 -0.0651 -1.8* -0.1706 -1.99** 
Lev-d -0.0005 -1.33 -0.0041 -2.6*** -0.0237 -5.19*** 
(Lev-d)2 1.16E-05 0.71 0.0001 0.89 0.0007 3.61*** 
IAInt -0.0150 -0.63 0.1072 0.98 0.3664 1.19 
Beta -0.0059 -1.3 -0.0116 -0.57 0.0224 0.41 
Constant 0.0038 0.13 0.6765 5.74*** 1.5684 4.14*** 
F 3.62***  3.06***  5.54***  
Equation 2       
Performance 2.2260 1.1 0.5019 0.23 -0.0389 -0.46 
Performance03 -0.9083 -1.12 -0.6283 -0.29 0.0611 0.83 
Performance02 0.2560 1.39 0.2947 0.91 -0.0416 -1.05 
Performance01 -0.2030 -0.7 0.1158 0.56 0.0008 0.03 
Performance00 -0.5850 -2.56** -0.4457 -1.36 -0.0097 -0.81 
(continued on next page) Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; H, the 
Herfindahl index; C1, the largest shareholding; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, 
long term debt/total assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; CInt, total capital/total assets; 
FCF, free cash flow. -d, deviation from mean. -01, -02, -03 and -04 indicate years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 
respectively. *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 176
Table 8.4  2SLS results of simultaneous systems of different ownership structure 
measures and firm performance measures 
Performance ROA  PMG  TQ  
 coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. coefficient t stat. 
SizeTA 0.0515 0.92 0.0021 0.07 -0.0210 -0.64 
Lev -0.0563 -0.29 -0.2188 -1.91* -0.2373 -2.37** 
CInt -0.0161 -0.13 0.1093 1.07 0.0429 0.52 
FCF -0.0064 -0.14 0.0399 2** 0.0517 2.3** 
Constant -0.0128 -0.06 0.1235 0.84 0.2412 1.49 
F 2.36**  2.88***  2.49***  
No. of obs. 491  475  467  
Panel C  Power of multiple large shareholders as SV 
Equation 1       
SV 0.0614 2.58*** -0.4456 -3.77*** 0.0836 0.25 
SizeTA-d -0.0021 -0.34 0.0983 3.44*** -0.0275 -0.4 
(SizeTA-d)2 -0.0062 -0.99 -0.0630 -1.94* -0.1754 -2.57*** 
Lev-d -0.0008 -2.87*** -0.0025 -1.96* -0.0177 -5.5*** 
(Lev-d)2 1.63E-05 1.15 0.0000 0.54 0.0007 4.26*** 
IAInt -0.0177 -0.85 0.1032 1.05 0.5933 2.48** 
Beta -0.0069 -1.75* -0.0109 -0.6 0.0430 1 
Constant 0.0348 2.12** 0.5417 6.74*** 0.6893 3.12 
F 4.56***  3.43***  7.64***  
Equation 2       
Performance 4.5990 1 0.3236 0.06 -0.1282 -0.68 
Performance03 -1.5954 -0.86 -0.5738 -0.11 0.1520 0.91 
Performance02 0.6386 1.52 0.4387 0.58 -0.0564 -0.63 
Performance01 -0.6245 -0.94 0.4402 0.91 -0.0085 -0.13 
Performance00 -1.8150 -3.48*** -1.0497 -1.36 -0.0159 -0.58 
SizeTA 0.0763 0.6 -0.0168 -0.24 -0.1062 -1.43 
Lev 0.0552 0.13 -0.3139 -1.17 -0.3028 -1.33 
CInt 0.0406 0.14 0.3000 1.25 0.0813 0.43 
FCF 0.0073 0.07 0.1052 2.25** 0.1602 3.14*** 
Constant -0.0668 -0.14 0.1463 0.42 0.5075 1.39 
F 2.85***  2.69***  2.3**  
No. of obs. 491  475  467  
 
Note: ROA, return on assets ratio; PMG, gross profit margin; TQ, Tobin’s Q; H, the Herfindahl index; C1, the 
largest shareholding; SV, the Shapley value; SizeTA, LOG(last year’s total assets); Lev, long term debt/total 
assets; IAInt, intangible assets/total assets; Beta, market risk; CInt, total capital/total assets; FCF, free cash flow. 
-d, deviation from mean. -01, -02, -03 and -04 indicate years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively. *, **, and 
*** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Fixed capital is easily monitored and requires lower concentration of ownership.  
Free cash flow means more market power, which is desirable to shareholders, and 
therefore should have a positive impact on ownership concentration. 
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No significant effect of current performance on ownership concentration is found, 
rejecting the endogeneity hypothesis.  However, accounting rates of return are 
found to adversely affect ownership concentration in four years time, and Tobin’s Q 
has a positive impact on the next year’s ownership concentration.  Leverage is 
found to be a strong determinant of ownership concentration and represents a 
substitute effect of capital structure as a corporate governance mechanism.  The 
positive impact of market power is also found on some ownership concentration 
variables. 
Among the potential determinants of ownership concentration, the fixed capital and 
free cash flow are chosen as instrumental variables for two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions of firm performance on ownership concentration.  The Hausman tests 
are carried out to compare the instrumental-variables estimators and previous robust 
regressions estimators.  The endogeneity of ownership and current performance is 
rejected by the Hausman tests.  However, the Hausman tests are restricted by the 
assumption that the IV estimation is always consistent.  Therefore further 
investigation is carried out by testing a two-equation simultaneous system with 
current ownership concentration and firm performance as endogenous variables.  
Again, the endogeneity problem is rejected.  Ownership concentration is found to 
significantly affect current firm performance, and performance measured as return 
on assets still affects current ownership concentration level inversely. 
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Conclusion 
This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern 
corporations: separation of ownership and control.  Berle and Means (1932) 
provide the seminal account of separation of ownership and control based on their 
anticipation of prevalent manager-controlled firms in modern economies.  Their 
followers such as managerial theorists and agency theorists, and the majority of 
existing empirical literature have focused on the inefficiency associated with 
controlling managers and the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance.  
However, recent empirical studies on corporate ownership around the world find that 
the degree of ownership concentration is higher today than earlier in the century, and 
multiple large shareholders is found to be prevalent in European countries.  The 
conflict of interests between large shareholders and minor investors becomes the 
central governance issue in Europe.  The absence of one share-one vote, and 
“pyramid” ownership structures separate ownership and control further.  
Using a combination of British and Continental European companies, this study aims 
to provide evidence on the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate 
governance mechanism to ease the agency problem raised from the separation of 
ownership and control.   
Starting from a brief introduction of early literature on the separation of ownership 
and control, this study reviews current theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  Hypotheses 
are developed from a value-maximizing model of ownership concentration.  
Performance could be positively affected by the degree of ownership concentration 
due to the monitoring effects of large shareholders on management, and interest 
alignment effect of ownership and control.  However the agency cost due to the 
conflict of interests between controlling shareholder(s) and outsider investors, and 
the higher cost of capital associated with higher ownership concentration could be 
 179
detrimental for firm performance.  Moreover, the negative impact could only take 
effect beyond a certain degree of ownership concentration, which results in a 
non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance.  
However, the endogenous ownership structure theory suggests that ownership and 
performance could be two jointly determined variables, and the natural selection 
theory and the theory of substitution effects of other corporate governance 
mechanisms predict that there will in fact be no relationship between ownership and 
performance.  The simple presence of multiple large shareholders should benefit 
the company due to monitoring effect and “control dilution”.  However, when the 
large shareholders form a controlling coalition and collude with each other, the 
power of the controlling coalition could be detrimental for firm performance, and the 
contestability of the controlling coalition should improve firm performance.  The 
existing literature on the impacts of different owner identities, such as management, 
institutional, government, founders and non-financial companies, is also discussed.   
Most pre-1990 empirical studies compare firm performance between different 
control type firms.  While the majority of early studies find evidences for 
convergence-in-interest hypothesis, their results are often statistically insignificant 
(Short, 1994).  Post 1990 studies start to use continuous ownership concentration 
variables.  The impacts of internal control (managerial ownership) and external 
control (ownership concentration of bloc-shareholders) have been extensively 
investigated.  Various firm performance and ownership measures are applied.  
Some of the studies take consideration of the controlling effects of the company’s 
market monopoly power or industry effects, or relate ownership structure to actions 
or events which are believed to affect future corporate performance.  Positive, 
negative, non-linear or insignificant results are evidenced across different studies.  
Only a few among the most recent studies investigate the impact of the identities of 
external controllers on firm performance and significant results are found in these 
studies.   
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This study moves on to review and discuss the methodology issues involved in 
examining the ownership-performance relationship, including quadratic and cubic 
regressions and piecewise linear regressions to model the non-linear impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance, and econometric and 
non-econometric approaches to the endogeneity of ownership and performance.   
A sample of 1291 European companies for the year of 2004 is used to investigate the 
current ownership and control structure in Europe as a whole, by country and by 
industry.  Voting shares instead of cash flow shares are used as ownership data.  
Ownership is recorded even when the percentage is very small (less than 1%).  In 
additional to direct ownership data, ultimate owners are identified to capture the 
ultimate control of the firm.   
The descriptive statistics of various measurements of ownership concentration are 
discussed, including the independence indicators describing the degree of 
independence of a company with regard to its shareholders, continuous and 
dichotomous ownership concentration variables describing the degree of control, 
identities of direct and ultimate control describing the location of control, and 
variables to measure the power of multiple large shareholders.   
European companies have relatively high concentration indices values with the 
largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company.  Over half of 
European companies are characterised by concentrated ownership measured by 
traditional dichotomous variables although the independence indices show that most 
independent companies are also prevalent among European companies.  British and 
Finnish companies are the relatively dispersed companies, while Germany, France, 
Belgium and Italy seem to have relatively concentrated ownership.  Among 
different industries, the construction companies seem to have the most dispersed 
ownership, while the ownership of electricity and financial companies are the most 
concentrated.  
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The distribution of identities of the ultimate owners is found to be different from that 
of direct owners.  Industrial companies hold a majority direct control of European 
non-subsidiary companies, while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate 
owners of European non-subsidiary companies.  Moreover, in the U.K. and Italy, 
institutional owners have significantly less power in controlling their companies 
ultimately than directly.  Companies in chemistry and electricity industries are 
directly owned by industrial companies, while ultimately owned by governments. 
The average number of large shareholders is found more than one in the sample.  
The power of multiple large shareholders is found to be the highest in Germany, 
France and Italy, while lowest in Britain.  Industry wise, financial, electricity and 
food and beverage manufacture companies seem to have relatively high power of 
large shareholders, while construction companies have relatively low power values. 
A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship 
between ownership, control and firm performance.  Competing models using 
various measurements for performance and ownership concentration are compared 
and tested.  Three groups of measurements for performance are discussed: 
accounting rates of return, profit margin measurements and combinations of 
accounting and market return.  The measurements for ownership concentration are 
continuous ownership concentration variables, dichotomous ownership 
concentration variables and power of multiple large shareholders variables.  Size, 
leverage, intangible assets and risk are also included in the model as control 
variables.  T-tests for nested models and non-nested J tests and Cox-Pesaran tests 
are applied to test competing models using different ownership concentration 
measures.  The modified P tests are used to test competing models using different 
measures of performance as the dependent variable.   
Based on these variables, regressions are carried out to test the linear impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance.  Various tests are performed to test 
the misspecifications of OLS regressions for cross-sectional data.  
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Multi-collinearity is found in size and leverage variables and their squared terms.  
The residuals are non-normally distributed and heteroskedastic.  There are also a 
large number of observations that are influential outliers.  To control the 
multi-collinearity problem, size and leverage variables are replaced by the values of 
their deviation from the mean.  To control the problems of heteroskedasticity and 
non-normality in residuals, the OLS regressions are carried out with robust standard 
errors.  Additionally, robust regressions using iteratively re-weighted least squares 
are carried out to control the influential outliers, as well as addressing the problems 
of heteroskedasticity and non-normality in residuals.  Significant negative impacts 
of continuous ownership concentration measures on accounting rates of return and 
market return are revealed in the iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions.  
There is also a significant negative impact of the power of multiple large 
shareholders.  No significant result is found when ownership concentration is 
measured as a dichotomous variable.  The firm performance measured as gross 
profit margin seems to be irrelevant to ownership concentration.   
Significant interaction effects from some countries and industries are found, 
suggesting that the efficiency of using ownership structure as a corporate governance 
mechanism can be different among countries and industries.  In Greece, the 
corporate governance effect of ownership concentration is relatively strong, while in 
France and Germany, this effect is relatively weak.  Industry wise, the effect is 
relatively weak in the manufacture of fabricated metal products, manufacture of 
radio, television and communication equipment and water transport, while relatively 
strong in the manufacture of machinery and equipment, manufacture of medical, 
precision and optical instrument and real estate activities. 
The quadratic and piecewise regressions are carried out to control the potential 
non-linear impact of ownership concentration.  The results of quadratic regressions 
provide strong evidence on a non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance.  The shape of the impact seems to be an inverted-bell curve.  This 
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result might be restricted by the fact that quadratic regressions can only capture 
single turning point.  Piecewise linear regressions are carried out with ownership 
variables divided by ten ranges using the percentiles of the data.  The results 
strongly support a non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance with multiple turning points.  Specifically when firm performance is 
measured as Tobin’s Q, best performance can be achieved when the Herfindahl index 
is round 0.08.  The impact of the Herfindahl index H on Tobin’s Q is positive 
within the range of 0.04 and 0.08, negative between 0.08 and 0.14, and positive 
again between 0.14 and 0.22.  No significant impact is found within other ranges.  
For a company that requires a certain level of ownership concentration, a largest 
shareholding of 10% can deliver relatively strong performance.  The power of 
multiple large shareholders is found to be detrimental for firm performance, although 
for some ranges the impact is insignificant.  This indicates a positive impact of the 
contestability of the controlling coalition. 
The location of control is differentiated by direct and ultimate locations of control 
and investigated separately.  The models are set up by including owner identity 
dummies and their interaction variables with ownership concentration variables.  
Firm performance is found to be significantly affected by owner identities, and the 
impact of an owner identity as the direct controller is different from that as the 
ultimate controller.  Founder owners are found to have an efficient monitoring 
impact on management and are able to improve firm performance when they control 
the company directly.  However, when they are the ultimate owners of the company, 
this impact disappears.  Mutual & pension funds / nominees / trusts / trustees 
owners seem to be detrimental for firm performance when they are the direct 
controllers of the firm.  This impact disappears when they are the ultimate owners.  
No significant impact is found from banks, financial companies and insurance 
companies when they are the direct controllers of the firm.  However, they affect 
firm performance significantly when they are the ultimate owners.  The short-term 
profit-seeking goals of modern banks and financial company owners seem to be 
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detrimental for their companies, while insurance companies seem to have more 
efficient monitoring effects over managements.  Direct and ultimate government 
controls are both found to be detrimental for firm performance due to their political 
rather than profit-maximizing goals.  A consistent positive impact is found of direct 
and ultimate management control, confirming its interest alignment effect.  
Non-financial corporate owners extract more private benefit than the other owners if 
they are the ultimate owners. 
This chapter also confirms the interaction effects of degree and location of control.  
The impact of ownership concentration on performance is conditioned by the 
identities of their controllers.  Moreover, direct controller identities have different 
interaction effects from that of ultimate controller identities.  When the company is 
directly controlled by the founder, the impact of ownership concentration on 
performance is weaker, while when ultimately controlled, the sign of the effect is not 
clear.  Additionally, direct management control and ultimate financial institution 
control may cause the impact of ownership concentration less efficient  
In addition to ownership concentration and owner identity, size, leverage, intangible 
assets and risk are all found to be strong determinants of firm performance.  Size 
affects firm performance (especially profit margin) positively when it is below a 
certain level.  After size reaches that level, it starts to be detrimental for firm 
performance.  On the contrary, better-performing companies are associated with 
lower leverage when the leverage level is below a certain level.  When it is above 
that level, borrowing seems to benefit firm performance through the monitoring 
effect from debt holders.  Intangible assets are beneficial for firm’s profit margin 
and market return, but detrimental for accounting rates of return.  Systematic risk 
Beta seems to have a significant negative impact on accounting rates of return. 
The final part of the empirical study investigates the inverse impact of firm 
performance on ownership concentration and tests the endogeneity of ownership and 
performance.  In addition to current and past firm performance, size, leverage, fixed 
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capital and free cash flow are assumed to be determinants of ownership 
concentration.  Ownership concentration is regressed on current and past firm 
performance.  No significant effect of current performance on ownership 
concentration is found.  Accounting rates of return are found to adversely affect 
ownership concentration in four years time, and Tobin’s Q has a positive impact on 
the next year’s ownership concentration.  Leverage is found to be a strong 
determinant of ownership concentration, indicating a substitute effect of capital 
structure as a corporate governance mechanism.  A positive impact of market power 
is also found on some ownership concentration variables.  Instrumental-variable 
estimations are used to test the endogeneity of ownership and performance.  
Specifically, fixed capital and free cash flow are chosen as instrumental variables, 
and the Hausman tests are carried out to compare the 2SLS regressions with 
iteratively re-weighted least squares regressions.  The tests can’t confirm the 
endogeneity of ownership and current performance.  However, a two-equation 
simultaneous system with ownership and performance being treated as endogenous 
variables rejects the endogeneity problem. 
In conclusion, this study suggests that firm performance can be maximized by 
adjusting the degree of ownership concentration.  Tobin’s Q can reach the highest 
when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion of other 
shareholders, is 0.08.  A largest shareholding of 10% is also able to deliver 
relatively strong performance.  Restructuring owner identities could be another 
efficient governance approach.  The efficiency of ownership and control structure 
as a corporate governance mechanism is conditioned by country, industry and 
controller identities.  Therefore ownership governance policies should be adjusted 
according to their corresponding institutional environments.  Firm performance can 
also be improved by strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition’s 
power.  Past firm performance and capital structure are found to be strong 
determinants of ownership concentration, suggesting that these elements should be 
taken into account when the ownership governance mechanism is implemented. 
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Due to data access limitation, this study uses cross-sectional data instead of panel 
data, which has restricted it from capturing changes in the ownership-performance 
relationship caused by time differences.  When a set of panel data is available, a 
fixed effect model can be used to control for the various possible unobserved 
heterogeneities.  Moreover, due to data limitation, this study is unable to test all 
theoretical hypotheses as set up in Chapter One.  For example, the power allocation 
among multiple large shareholders requires further investigations, and the theory of 
substitution effects of other corporate governance mechanisms could be tested in a 
simultaneous equations system. 
Additionally, the reduced form nature of econometric regression tests could limit the 
interpretation of the relationship between ownership concentration and performance.  
The structural model of the firm suggested by Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2003) 
initiates a new avenue for future research. 
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Appendix 1  Summary of definitions of variables and codes 
 
Independence indicators 
A+ Any company with no recorded shareholder with an ownership over 24.99% 
(either direct or total), also companies with 6 or more identified shareholders 
whose ownership percentage is known. 
A As above, but includes companies with 4 or 5 identified shareholders. 
A- As above, but includes companies with 1 to 3 identified shareholders. 
B+ Any company with no recorded shareholder with an ownership percentage 
(either direct or total) over 49.99%, but having one or more shareholders with an 
ownership percentage over 24.99%, also companies with 6 or more identified 
shareholders whose ownership percentage is known. 
B as above but includes companies with 4 or 5 identified shareholders. 
B- as above but includes companies with 1 to 3 identified shareholders. 
C Any company with a recorded shareholder with an ownership (either direct or 
total) over 49.99%.  The C indicator is also given to a company when a source 
indicates that the company has an Ultimate Owner. 
U Companies not falling into the categories above, indicating an unknown degree 
of independence. 
Continuous ownership concentration variables 
C1 Percentage ownership of the largest shareholder 
C3 Combined ownership of the largest 3 shareholders 
C5 Combined ownership of the largest 5 shareholders 
C10 Combined ownership of the largest 10 shareholders 
C20 Combined ownership of the largest 20 shareholders 
H Herfindahl index of up to top 20 shareholders 
Dichotomous control-type variables 
OC1 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 5% 
OC2 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 10% 
OC3 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 20% 
OC4 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 30% 
OC5 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding exceeds (>=) 50% 
OC6 Dummy = 1 if the largest shareholding equals 100% 
OC90 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 90% using probabilistic model. 
OC95 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 95% using probabilistic model. 
OC99 The probability that the largest shareholding can secure majority support in a 
contested vote exceeds 99% using probabilistic model. 
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Owner identities 
A Insurance 
B Banks 
C Industrial companies 
D Individuals or families, unnamed 
E Mutual & pension funds/nominees/trusts/trustees 
F Financial companies 
I One of more known individuals or families 
J Foundations/research institutes 
L Bulk lists of companies and private owners 
M Employees/managers/directors 
S Public authorities, states, governments 
Z General public (only applies to publicly listed companies) 
Power of multiple large shareholders 
H_diff =(OW1-OW2)2+(OW2-OW3)2
OW1: Largest shareholdings; OW2: Second largest shareholdings; OW3: Third 
largest shareholdings 
H_con =OW12+OW22+OW32 
Definitions for OW1, OW2 and OW3 are as above. 
SV Shapley value solution for the largest shareholder in a three large shareholder 
voting game 
Performance Variables 
ROA Return on assets ratio = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest 
Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Last Year's Total Assets 
ROC Return on invested capital ratio = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + 
((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / (Last Year's 
Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term 
Debt) 
ROE Return on equity ratio = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred 
Dividend Requirement) / Last Year's Common Equity  
PMG Gross profit margin = Gross Income / Net Sales or Revenues 
PMO Operating profit margin = Operating Income / Net Sales or Revenues 
TQ Tobin’s Q = Market capitalization/total assets 
MTB Market to book ratio = Market capitalization / ordinary capital reserves 
Other variables 
SizeTA Log(total assets) 
Lev Leverage ratio = Long term debt/total assets 
IAInt Intangiable assets intensity = Intangible assets/total assets 
Beta Market risk variable, which is the beta coefficient of the Security 
Characteristic Line: 
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ra = αa + βa rm + εi 
where ra is the return of an individual asset, and rm is the return of a market 
portfolio (a representative stock index).  Returns are calculated as monthly 
changes in market prices. 
CInt Capital intensity = Total capital % total assets 
FCF Free cash flow = Log(net cash flow – capital expenditures) 
Industry classifications 
N11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to 
oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 
N13 Mining of metal ores 
N14 Other mining and quarrying 
N15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
N18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
N21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
N22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
N23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
N24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
N25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
N26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
N27 Manufacture of basic metals 
N28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
N29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
N30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
N31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
N32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
N33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
N34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
N35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
N36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
N40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
N41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 
N45 Construction 
N50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 
N51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
N52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and 
household goods 
N55 Hotels and restaurants 
N60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 
N61 Water transport 
N62 Air transport 
N63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 
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N64 Post and telecommunications 
N65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 
N67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
N70 Real estate activities 
N71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and 
household goods 
N72 Computer and related activities 
N73 Research and development 
N74 Other business activities21 
N75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
N90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 
N92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
N93 Other service activities 
                                                        
21 These activities include legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market 
research and public opinion polling; business and management consultancy; holdings; architectural and 
engineering activities and related technical consultancy; technical testing and analysis; advertising; labour 
recruitment and provision of personnel; investigation and security activities; industrial cleaning; other business 
activities n.e.c. 
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